Economic influences on and impacts of the migration of health professionals by Wang, Shaolin
University of Dundee
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Economic influences on and impacts of the migration of health professionals
Wang, Shaolin
Award date:
2010
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 17. Feb. 2017
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Economic influences on and impacts of
the migration of health professionals
Shaolin Wang
2010
Conditions for Use and Duplication
Copyright of this work belongs to the author unless otherwise identified in the body of the thesis. It is permitted
to use and duplicate this work only for personal and non-commercial research, study or criticism/review. You
must obtain prior written consent from the author for any other use. Any quotation from this thesis must be
acknowledged using the normal academic conventions. It is not permitted to supply the whole or part of this
thesis to any other person or to post the same on any website or other online location without the prior written
consent of the author. Contact the Discovery team (discovery@dundee.ac.uk) with any queries about the use
or acknowledgement of this work.
  
 
ECONOMIC INFLUENCES ON AND IMPACTS OF  
THE MIGRATION OF HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SHAOLIN WANG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted for 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Economic Studies 
School of Business  
University of Dundee 
October 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
DEDICATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my late father, 
Xinzhong Wang 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Dedication .............................................................................................................................. ii 
List of figures ......................................................................................................................... v 
List of tables ......................................................................................................................... vii 
List of abbreviations ............................................................................................................ viii 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................... ix 
Declaration ............................................................................................................................. x 
Certification............................................................................................................................ x 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................. xi 
Chapter 1 - Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 2 - Institutional and policy background: Policies towards the supply of health 
professionals ..........................................................................................................................  6 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 6 
2.2 Domestic education and training for health professionals ......................................... 8 
2.2.1 Background ...................................................................................................... 9 
2.2.2 Finance of training for health professionals ................................................... 10 
2.3 International migration of health professionals........................................................ 22 
2.3.1 Patterns and trends of medical migration into the UK ................................... 23 
2.3.2 Factors influencing migration decisions ........................................................ 27 
2.3.3 Regulatory regimes in migration of health professionals .............................. 29 
2.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 38 
Appendix to Chapter 2 ..................................................................................................... 41 
Chapter 3 - The self-selection of migrant health professionals ............................................ 43 
3.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 43 
3.2 The extended model ................................................................................................. 49 
3.3 Influences on the self-selection of migrant health professionals ............................. 55 
3.3.1 General comparative Statics ........................................................................... 55 
3.3.2 The relative returns to skills ........................................................................... 60 
3.3.3 Migration and permanent residence costs ...................................................... 64 
3.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 74 
Chapter 4 - Institutional background and data ..................................................................... 77 
4.1 NHS dental services and access schemes in Scotland ............................................. 77 
4.2 MIDAS data ............................................................................................................. 83 
4.3 Descriptive analysis: migrant dentists in NHS Scotland ......................................... 85 
 iv 
4.3.1 Dentist inflows ............................................................................................... 85 
4.3.2 Individual characteristics and career patterns ................................................ 87 
4.4 Discussion and conclusion ....................................................................................... 92 
Chapter 5 - Migrant dentist retention in the Scottish National Health Service: A discrete-
time survival analysis ........................................................................................................... 94 
5.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 94 
5.2 Discrete-time survival analysis methodology .......................................................... 97 
5.2.1 Kaplan-Meier survival analysis...................................................................... 99 
5.2.2 Regression modelling: proportional hazards specifications ......................... 101 
5.3 Data description ..................................................................................................... 104 
5.3.1 Construction of the panel data for survival analysis .................................... 105 
5.3.2 Factors behind dentists’ retention decisions ................................................ 110 
5.4 Estimation results ................................................................................................... 114 
5.4.1 Overview ...................................................................................................... 114 
5.4.2 Kaplan-Meier estimation .............................................................................. 115 
5.4.3 Hazard regression modelling ....................................................................... 121 
5.5 Discussion and conclusion ..................................................................................... 134 
Chapter 6 - Comparing treatment of migrant and non-migrant dentists in the Scottish 
National Health Service ..................................................................................................... 138 
6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 138 
6.2 Empirical framework ............................................................................................. 140 
6.2.1 Data .............................................................................................................. 140 
6.2.2 Regression methods ..................................................................................... 144 
6.2.3 Regression results ........................................................................................ 147 
6.3 Discussion .............................................................................................................. 152 
6.3.1 Absolute difference: auxiliary OLS regression ............................................ 155 
6.3.2 Patient effects: two dimensional fixed effects specification ........................ 159 
6.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 170 
Chapter 7- Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 173 
Bibliography ....................................................................................................................... 178 
 
 
 
 
 v 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1: Working lifespan strategies. -----------------------------------------------------------7 
Figure 3.1: Skill sorting. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 64 
Figure 3.2: Influence of M0 and R0 on Skill Sorting (assuming α = β = 0). ----------------- 66 
Figure 3.3: Influence of α on Skill Sorting (assuming β = 0). -------------------------------- 68 
Figure 3.4: Influence of β on Skill Sorting (assuming α = 0). -------------------------------- 69 
Figure 4.1: VT numbers issued from October 2000 to September 2009. ------------------- 80 
Figure 4.2: The number of VT numbers issued to EEA nationals who hold a recognised 
European diploma. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 81 
Figure 4.3: Applicants for VT numbers by country. ------------------------------------------- 81 
Figure 4.4: Gender breakdown of migrant dentists in the GDS. ----------------------------- 87 
Figure 5.1: Plots of the observed tenure by month of entry for the migrant dentists active 
in the Scottish GDS between 1996 and 2008 (n=269). ----------------------------- 108 
Figure 5.2: Kaplan-Meier survival analysis of retention of retention for migrant dentists in 
the Scottish GDS between 1996 and 2008. ------------------------------------------- 117 
Figure 5.3: Kaplan-Meier survival analysis of retention for migrant dentists by country
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 118 
Figure 5.4: Kaplan-Meier survival analysis of retention for migrant dentists by year of 
entry. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 118 
Figure 5.5: Kaplan-Meier survival analysis of retention for migrant dentists by 
deprivation category of the practice (1-affluent, 7-deprived). --------------------- 119 
Figure 5.6: Kaplan-Meier survival analysis of retention for migrant dentists by health 
board (caid=1-8,10-12,14,30). ---------------------------------------------------------- 119 
Figure 5.7: Within-sample predictions of hazard distribution for various baseline hazard 
functions. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 123 
Figure 5.8: Out-of-sample prediction of hazard for the discrete-time proportional hazard 
model with no unobserved heterogeneity, Gaussian-distributed unobserved 
heterogeneity, Gamma-distributed unobserved heterogeneity for an “average” 
migrant dentist by (1) year of entry and (2) percentage male patients. ---------- 131 
Figure 5.9: Out-of-sample prediction of hazard and survival for the   multivariate    
discrete-time proportional hazard model with Gaussian-distributed unobserved 
heterogeneity for an “average” migrant dentist by (1) year of entry and (2) 
percentage male patients. ---------------------------------------------------------------- 133 
Figure 6.1: Distribution of GDPs by deprivation category of the practice. --------------- 143 
 vi 
Figure 6.2: Treatment value for migrant and non-migrant GDPs over time. ------------- 144 
Figure 6.3: Predicted treatment experience profiles for migrant and non-migrant GDPs.
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 151 
Figure 6.4: Distributions of dentist effects for migrant and non-migrant ----------------- 156 
Figure 6.5: Distributions of dentist effects for migrant and non-migrant GDPs estimated 
from the two dimensional fixed effects specification on two samples. ---------- 169 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1: Estimated critical shortage of doctors, nurses and midwives, by WHO region. 6 
Table 2.2: Doctors and nurses trained abroad working in OECD countries. --------------- 23 
Table A2.1: Structure of training for physicians. ----------------------------------------------- 41 
Table 3.1: Summary of comparative statics results for migration. --------------------------- 58 
Table 3.2: Summary of comparative statics results for permanent migration. ------------- 60 
Table 3.3: Number of years of medical training after secondary education and ratio of 
remuneration of specialists to remuneration of GPs, 2004 (or closest year 
available). ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 62 
Table 3.4: Physician Payment methods. --------------------------------------------------------- 63 
Table 4.1: Migrant dentist inflow in Scottish GDS by country. ------------------------------ 86 
Table 4.2: Age distribution of migrant dentists in the GDS (%). ---------------------------- 86 
Table 4.3: Individual characteristics and career patterns of migrant and non-migrant GDPs 
in the Scottish GDS. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 91 
Table 5.1: Overview of the original and refined sample. ------------------------------------ 110 
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics. ----------------------------------------------------------------- 113 
Table 5.3: Kaplan-Meier survival analysis of retention for migrant dentists in the ----- 115 
Table 5.4: Goodness-of-fitting statistics for variorums baseline hazard functions. ----- 122 
Table 5.5: Regression results of multivariate proportional hazard models. -------------- 124 
Table 5.6: Regression results of mixed proportional hazard models controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity. -------------------------------------------------------------- 129 
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics. ----------------------------------------------------------------- 142 
Table 6.2: Estimation results of the dentist fixed effects model. --------------------------- 147 
Table 6.3: Predicted assimilation rates. -------------------------------------------------------- 151 
Table 6.4: Estimation results across dentist fixed effects specifications. ----------------- 153 
Table 6.5: Estimation results of the auxiliary OLS regression. ----------------------------- 159 
Table 6.6: Identification of the two dimensional fixed effects models. ------------------- 163 
Table 6.7: Estimation results across specifications controlling for dentist effects, or both 
dentist effects and patient effects. ------------------------------------------------------ 164 
 
 
 
 
 
 viii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ACGME:  Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education  
ACT:   Additional Cost of Teaching  
AHP:  allied health professionals  
AIC:   Akaike Information Criterion 
AKM:   Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis 
CDS:   Community Dental Service 
cloglog:  complementary log-log  
CoT:   course of treatment 
DGME:  Direct Graduate Medical Education  
DiD:   difference-in-differences 
DVT:   Dental Vocational Trainee 
EEA:   European Economic Area  
EPV:   events per independent variable 
GDC:   General Dental Council  
GDP:   General Dental Practitioner 
GDS:   General Dental Service 
GMC:   General Medical Council 
GME:   Graduate Medical Education  
GP:   General Practitioner 
HCHS:  hospital and community health services  
HDS:   Hospital Dental Service 
HEI:   Higher Education Institution 
IME:   Indirect medical education  
IMG:   International Medical Graduate 
KM:   Kaplan-Meier 
LOWESS:  locally weighted scatterplot smoothing  
MIDAS:  Management Information & Dental Accounting System 
MPH:   mixed proportional hazards  
NES:   NHS Education for Scotland 
NHS:  National Health Service 
NMC:   Nursing and Midwifery Council  
ONP:   Overseas Nurses Programme  
PH:   proportional hazards 
PLAB:  Professional and Linguistic Assessment Board  
PMETB:  Postgraduate Medical Education and Training Board  
SDR:   Statement of Dental Remuneration 
SFC:   Scottish Funding Council 
USMLE:  United States Medical Licensing Examination 
VT:   Vocational Training 
 
 
 
 
 ix 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This research was carried out at the Department of Economic Studies, University of 
Dundee, during 2006-2010. My deepest gratitude goes to my supervisors, Professor 
Martin Chalkley and Dr Colin Tilley for their comprehensive guidance, patience and 
support throughout these years. The thesis would not have been accomplished without 
their help and words alone do not do justice to them for all they have done through the 
time. My gratitude is due also to other faculty members for their helpful comments and 
continuous encouragements that helped me complete the study, in particular those of Dr 
Paul Allanson, Professor Hassan Molana, Dr Xiaoyi Mu, Dr Dennis Petrie, Dr Bill 
Russell, Dr Paul Seaman, and Dr Yin Zhang.  
I am grateful to my student colleagues for their joyful companionship and my 
close friends for their support and understanding. All of them have made my life in 
Dundee colourful and fulfilled. A special thanks to Ms. June Campbell and Ms. Adele 
Ferrier for their excellent secretarial assistance.  
Finally, but not least, I wish to thank my husband Long and my family, 
including my mother, my step father and my parents-in-law, for their understanding, 
encouragement and support that have made my education possible. 
The financial support of the Department of Economic Studies is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dundee, October 2010     Shaolin Wang 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
DECLARATION 
I hereby declare that I am the author of this thesis. All references cited have been 
consulted, unless otherwise stated. All the work of which this thesis is a record has been 
done by myself. It has not been previously accepted for a higher degree. 
 
 
                                                     Signed…………………………………… 
                                                     Name: Shaolin Wang, PhD Candidate 
                                                     Date……………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATION 
This is to certify that Ms. Shaolin Wang conducted her research under my supervision 
in the Department of Economic Studies, University of Dundee. Ms. Wang has fulfilled 
all the conditions of the relevant Ordinances and Regulations of the University of 
Dundee for obtaining the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
 
 
          Signed…………………………………… 
                                                          Name: Martin Chalkley, Supervisor 
                                                          (Professor of Economics) 
                                                          Date……………………………………… 
 
 
 xi 
ABSTRACT 
Migration has become an important feature of health labour markets due to the global 
shortage of health professionals. While there exists an extensive Labour Economics 
literature studying the general migration, policy development remains hampered by 
limited research undertaken in the health sector. This thesis fills some of that gap by 
examining the economic influences on and impacts of the migration of health 
professionals.  
The migration of skilled health professionals has exhibited strong sectoral 
properties, such as the motivation of career development and various regulatory 
regimes. We incorporate these features into the self-selection model by Borjas and 
Bratsberg (1996) and examine factors that influence the scale and skill composition of 
the migration flow. Our model suggests that the restrictive relicensing regime and work 
permit requirements for non-EEA professionals adopted by the British government to 
maintain practice standards and secure employment opportunities for native graduates, 
could only limit the migration from countries with higher returns to skills. The effect is 
ambiguous for most donor countries, which provide lower returns to skills. 
Using the administrative data derived from the Scottish dental system, we also 
examine the impacts of health professional migration within EU on the host country by 
investigating the performance of EEA dentists contracted under the Scottish NHS in 
terms of retention and treatment provision. A discrete-time survival analysis has been 
applied to characterize the time trend of the retention and identify factors associated 
with the likelihood of a dentist leaving the NHS. We also compare treatments provided 
by migrant and non-migrant dentists by estimating a difference-in-differences model. 
Unobserved heterogeneity in dentists is controlled using fixed effects.  
Our results suggest that EEA health professionals can be a good substitute to 
British graduates. They provide marginally different treatments and exhibit strong 
 xii 
assimilation within two years post-entry. However, a constant issue we have found is 
their high turnover rates in the NHS: half of them left the service by the 26th month 
following entry. The primary policy recommendation of our analyses is that there is 
need for the government to develop recruitment initiatives so as to retain migrant 
dentists. Our results suggest hazards of leaving are significantly associated with 
dentists’ age-at-entry, arrival cohort and patient composition, but not with dentists’ 
gender, country and practice deprivation. These findings potentially help to set 
evidence-based targets for international recruitment programmes. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
To address the global crisis in the health workforce, OECD countries have adopted a mix of 
long-term policies of national self-sufficiency (e.g. increasing domestic training, improving 
retention, and adapting skill mix), and short or medium-term policies of international 
recruitment. Migrant health professionals have proven to be a flexible and low-cost 
response to shortages and make a significant and escalating contribution to health care 
labour markets in industrialized countries. In 2000, there were approximately 400,000 
migrant doctors and 710,000 migrant nurses working in the OECD area (OECD, 2008). 
The United Kingdom, in particular, has become a major destination of migrant health 
professionals, with 33% (69,813) of the doctors and 10% (65,000) of the nurses working in 
2006 qualified overseas (WHO, 2006).  
Migration, therefore, becomes an important feature of health labour markets, being 
high on the health policy agenda for both donor and host countries. For donor countries, the 
ultimate aim is to improve retention and encourage emigrants to return thus minimising the 
brain drain and losses of public health sector investment. In the labour-intensive health 
sector, loss of health professionals presents serious challenges to the quality of health 
service delivery to the population, and also, increases work burdens and worsens working 
conditions for the remaining health providers, which could in turn induce further 
emigration. From host countries‟ perspective, on the other hand, while international 
recruitment becomes an increasingly popular short term adjustment to the workforce 
imbalance, OECD (2008, pp. 36) lists a series of “side effects” that need to be addressed, 
including “problems related to the integration of immigrants into health workforce (such as 
the recognition of foreign qualifications and language proficiency); costs of international 
recruitment, especially when migration is mainly temporary; difficulties in retaining 
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doctors and nurses in less attractive locations and positions; and the risk of becoming 
excessively dependent on foreign health professionals to fill domestic needs”.  
Despite the importance attached to migration in the health sector, policy 
development remains hampered by limited, mostly descriptive, research undertaken in this 
field. For example, although push and pull factors that influence the migration decisions of 
health professionals are well documented in the health policy literature, the extent to which 
these factors affect the decisions are rarely addressed (Vujicic et al., 2004); in addition, 
whilst the impact of health professional migration on outcome is important, existing 
research mainly focuses on the quantitative effects rather than qualitative effects (Bach, 
2003). While there exists an extensive literature on general migration addressing three 
particular issues: “1) what determines the size and skill composition of immigrant flows to 
any particular host country; 2) how do the immigrants adapt to the host country‟s economy; 
and 3) what is the impact of immigrants on the host country‟s economy?” (Borjas, 1989, 
pp. 457); this literature is not applied to the issue of health professional migration. This 
study aims to fill these gaps and specifically seeks to meet the following three objectives.  
The first objective is to analyse the migration and permanent residence decision of 
health professionals, and influences on the direction, scale and skill composition of the 
migration flow in a theoretical model framework. Unlike other workers who generally 
migrate for income maximization, the migration of skilled health professionals has 
demonstrated strong sector-specific characteristics, e.g. the motivation of career 
development (George et al., 2007), and a strict relicensing and regulatory regime (Bach, 
2003; Commander, Kangasniemi and Winters, 2002; Manning and Sidorenko, 2007). The 
strict regulatory regime is a particular feature of the migration in the health sector: host 
countries generally set out restrictive requirements for relicensing and registration to 
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control the entry and guarantee the practice standards of migrant health professionals. 
These could however, be overly restrictive and thus would deter potentially competent 
health professionals from migrating. Assessing the impact of regulatory regimes on health 
professionals‟ migration decisions is clearly a concern for public policy. We account for 
these sector-specific factors in health professionals‟ migration and permanent residence 
decisions by developing the self-selection model by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996). A 
comprehensive understanding of health professionals‟ migration and return decisions is 
essential to develop policies regulating and controlling migration in- and outflow. 
Having analysed the reasons behind, our next issue to address is the impacts of 
health professional migration. Using administrative data derived from the Scottish dental 
system, we target a particular group of migrant health professionals – dentists migrating 
from the European Economic Area (EEA) countries and contracted under the Scottish 
National Health Service (NHS). Migration within the European Union has attracted 
considerable attention: registration requirements are relaxed with qualifications in member 
states automatically recognized, which, together with great salary disparities between EEA 
countries, encourage more professionals to move. OECD (2008) documents the growing 
within-migration flows since the May 2004 and December 2007 European Union 
enlargements, and calls for a systematic analysis of the trends and consequences. We 
evaluate the impact of the health migration within the EU on the health care provisions in 
the host country by looking at a specific case where we investigate the performance of EEA 
dentists in the Scottish NHS in terms of retention and treatment provision.  
The second objective is to characterize the time trend of retention for EEA dentists 
in the Scottish General Dental Service (GDS) and identify factors associated with the 
likelihood of a dentist leaving the service. Effective workforce planning requires good 
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information on migrant health professionals‟ retention patterns and influences on these 
(Hann, Sibbald and Young, 2008). We carry out multivariate analysis in a mixed discrete-
time proportional hazards framework to assess the importance of four dimensions of 
variables in the underlying utility function that governs each dentist‟s stay-or-leave 
decision (e.g. dentist personal characteristics, practice characteristics, patient composition 
and dentist overall treatment provision), while controlling for random unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
There are obvious questions regarding the transferability of health education in EU 
member countries, and in the realm of health care, where in the presence of asymmetric 
information health care professionals have considerable discretion over the type of care 
they deliver, this raises concerns regarding both the quality and safety of healthcare 
(OECD, 2008; Simoens and Hurst, 2006). The final objective is to compare empirically the 
treatments delivered by migrant and domestically trained dentists working in the Scottish 
GDS. We choose the group of EEA dentists who started providing treatment in the service 
after 2006 and the 2005/06 cohort of Scottish Dental Vocational Trainees (DVTs) for 
comparison so as to compare the outputs of the government recruited migrant General 
Dental Practitioners (GDPs) with the outputs of local graduates who entered the service at 
the same time. A difference-in-differences model is estimated to examine how migrant 
dentists‟ responses to different case mix and individual circumstances (treatment category, 
patient type, remuneration, etc.) compare with non-migrant dentists‟ responses, and in 
particular, whether there is a convergence between the two groups of dentists as migrants 
assimilate into the host country. Given the longitudinal nature of the data, we control for 
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity in dentists using the fixed effects method. 
However, the dentist fixed effects method cannot identify the initial treatment difference 
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and assumes homogeneous patients that unobserved dentist-specific characteristics affect 
treatment delivery in the same way for all patients. These two limitations are addressed by 
estimating an auxiliary OLS regression of dentist effects estimated to isolate the fixed 
effect of migrant status, and, making full use of the matched patient and practitioner data to 
simultaneously control for patient- and dentist-specific effects using a three-way error-
component model. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides the institutional 
and policy background by describing the structure and finance of domestic training, and the 
numbers, reasons and regulatory regimes of international recruitment across countries. 
Chapter 3 investigates the individual migration and permanent residence decision of 
healthcare professionals using an extended self-selection model which allows for the 
sector-specific properties of health professional migration documented in Chapter 2. The 
extent to which current regulatory regimes implemented in the UK affect the size and skill 
composition of (permanent) health migration inflows is assessed as a case study. Chapter 4 
provides the data source for the following two empirical analyses and the institutional 
background for the dental service provision and international recruitment in the Scottish 
NHS. Descriptive statistics are presented to investigate the inflow of dentist from EC/EEA 
countries and their individual characteristics and career patterns. Chapters 5 and 6 are 
where we conduct empirical analysis to investigate EEA dentist performance in the Scottish 
GDS. Chapter 5 examines the retention patterns of these dentists and identifies factors that 
influence their retention decisions using the discrete-time hazard modelling approach. 
Chapter 6 compares the treatment provided by migrant and non-migrant dentists by 
estimating a difference-in-differences model where we control for unobserved 
heterogeneity in dentists using fixed effects estimation method. The last chapter concludes.   
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CHAPTER 2 
INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY BACKGROUND: POLICIES 
TOWARDS THE SUPPLY OF HEALTH PROFESSIONALS  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
To provide the institutional and policy background for subsequent analysis, this chapter 
describes key features of the finance of domestic training and regulatory regimes of 
international recruitment for health professionals across countries.  
A global crisis in the availability of well-trained health professionals has been 
identified as an obstacle to achieve national and global health goals in the world health 
report “Working together for health” (WHO, 2006). As a result of the aging of populations, 
the transition of health concerns from acute diseases to chronic and degenerative ones with 
higher care demands represents further health workforce challenges (Pruitt and Epping-
Jordan, 2005). Based on the WHO estimate of a threshold in workforce density below 
which high coverage of essential interventions are very unlikely to achieve, there are 57 
countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asia, struggling with critical 
workforce shortage equivalent to a global deficit of 2.4 million doctors, nurses and 
midwives (see Table 2.1).  
   Table 2.1: Estimated critical shortage of doctors, nurses and midwives, by WHO region. 
WHO region 
Number of countries In countries with shortages 
Total 
With 
shortages 
Total stock 
Estimated 
shortage 
% increase 
required 
Africa 46 36 590 198 817 992 139 
Americas 35 5 93 603 37 886 40 
South-East Asia 11 6 2 332 054 1 161 001 50 
Europe 52 0 NA NA NA 
Eastern 
Mediterranean 
21 7 312 613 306 031 98 
Western Pacific 27 3 27 260 32 560 119 
World 192 57 3 355 728 2 358 470 70 
NA, not applicable 
Source: Working together for health (WHO, 2006), page 13. 
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In order to respond to these skills crises, the report lays out a “working lifespan” 
framework which specifies strategies related to the following three stages (see Figure 2.1): 
 Entry: preparing the workforce through strategic investments in education and 
effective and ethical recruitment practices. 
 Workforce: enhancing worker performance through better management of workers 
in both the public and private sectors. 
 Exit: managing migration and attrition to reduce wasteful loss of human resources. 
In particular, the fundamental objective of workforce development is to prepare 
sufficient numbers of qualified health professionals to meet the national demand of health 
care. It is the strategies pertaining to the entry stage, more specifically on the domestic 
training and international recruitment, that are the subject of this chapter. 
 
 
                 Source: Working together for health (WHO, 2006). 
Figure 2.1: Working lifespan strategies. 
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2.2 DOMESTIC EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR HEALTH 
PROFESSIONALS
1
  
 
Given that we use data derived from the Scottish dental system for the subsequent empirical 
analyses, we focus on several key issues within the system of training health professionals 
in Scotland
2
, and describe how other OECD countries with available information approach 
them. These issues are: how the system of health care is funded; how the number of 
undergraduate training places is determined; how undergraduate training is funded; how the 
clinical costs of undergraduate training are funded; how postgraduate medical education is 
funded; and what policies have been used to influence the geographical distribution of the 
workforce.  
It shows that different countries adopt a variety of approaches to the structure and 
finance of health training. While it is tempting to make comparisons between different 
elements of training across countries, whether the approach adopted in Scotland is better or 
worse than in other countries is difficult to assess because the structure and finance of 
training reflects the objectives and constraints of each country in which the training and 
employment of health professionals is located, and these objectives and constraints are 
likely to differ significantly between countries. As a result, this section has deliberately 
limited itself to describing a number of features of the system in different countries. By 
describing how different countries approach the structure and finance of health training, we 
identify the possible set of instruments available that may improve the outcomes of the 
training system in Scotland. 
                                                 
1
 This research is funded by NHS Education for Scotland and the Scottish Funding Council to contribute to 
the SFC Skills Committee‟s discussions of the framework within which health training is provided in 
Scotland. 
2  
While the details of the training system that we discuss here relate to the NHS in Scotland but the 
organisational structure, funding methods and funding rates apply equally to the NHS in England and Wales. 
9 
 
The review was approached in a systematic way with well-defined search terms 
used to trawl the literature. Unfortunately, the literature did not contain all the detailed 
information required for this survey on an individual country or countries. As a result, 
various different types of documents were trawled through looking for pieces of 
information within documents written for other purposes that might inform this review, 
including academic papers, policy documents and training guides for health professionals. 
All relevant documents were identified and useful references followed up. 
 
2.2.1 Background 
 
Training for health professionals is different from other professional groups in terms of its 
structure, finance and cost.  
One way in which the structure of health training is different from other forms of 
professional training is the integrated nature of training and employment. The structure of 
education and training for physicians across different countries is presented in Table A2.1. 
The public sector funds the undergraduate and postgraduate training of health care 
professionals and the public sector is also the employer or payer (for independent General 
Medical Practitioners and General Dental Practitioners) of the vast majority of trained 
labour. This differs from other professionals who are more likely to work in the private 
sector after graduation. The extent of this integration might be of interest if it explains 
differences in the features of training across countries. For example, the degree of 
integration might explain why there are restrictions on training for doctors, dentists and 
nurses. 
The finance of health training courses differs from all other undergraduate training 
courses. In Scotland, undergraduate training is provided by both the Higher Education 
Institutions (HEIs) and NHS Boards. Whilst the Scottish Funding Council (SFC) allocates 
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funding to HEIs at a fixed price per final funded student, NHS Education for Scotland 
(NES) allocates funding directly to NHS Boards in order to compensate them for the 
additional costs of teaching. Learning to Care (SFC and NES, 2008) reported that there 
have been concerns about the accountability of these funds. Thus, there is some interest in 
alternative methods of funding (clinical and non-clinical) providers. There may also be 
concerns that subsidies to clinical training might distort the composition of training courses 
because of incentives for HEIs to shift the balance of training from non-clinical to clinical 
training. Differences in the nature of funding might therefore explain differences in the 
relative amount of clinical and non-clinical training. 
The cost of training health professionals to the public sector in Scotland is 
substantial. Learning to Care (SFC and NES, 2008) recently published that in the academic 
year 2007-08, SFC provided £160 million to universities for the training of doctors, 
dentists, nurses and allied health professionals (AHPs) and for health-related postgraduate 
courses. In addition, NES provided more than £343 million for the training and education 
of doctors, dentists, clinical psychologists, pharmacists, nurses, midwives, AHPs and other 
staff groups working in NHS Scotland. This significant public sector investment in the 
training health professionals means that there is some interest in identifying how other 
countries finance training. 
 
2.2.2 Finance of training for health professionals 
 
The funding of health care provision 
 
The funding of health care provision is likely to have important implications for the 
structure and finance of training for health professionals. If health care systems are mainly 
funded by the public sector, and therefore employ or contract trained health professionals, 
then the public sector is concerned with the costs of employment. These costs may impact 
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on whether, and to what extent, the public sector chooses to influence the structure and 
finance of training. For example, if the public sector funds the training of health 
professionals and is the purchaser of trained health professionals, it may more likely restrict 
the number of funded training places compared to a system in which the private sector 
provides training and delivers health care. However, this depends on the extent to which the 
public sector funds training. 
Bloor and Maynard (2003) provide a summary of the finance and delivery of health 
care in five countries (Australia, France, Germany, Sweden and the UK) and show that 
while the majority of health care was funded by the public sector in all countries, the 
system of funding, the nature of the providers of health care and the payment systems 
between purchasers and providers vary between countries.  
In France, the health care system is funded through health insurance, financed 
mainly by the social security contributions of residents in employment and supplemented 
by funds from taxation. Health care is provided by a mix of public (about 65% of hospital 
beds) and private providers (Wait, 2006).  
In Germany, the health care system is financed through a system of statutory health 
insurance covering almost 87% of the population, and around 10% of the population 
covered by private health insurance. An additional mandatory insurance programme 
ensures access to nursing care for elderly people. Regional physicians' and dentists' 
associations negotiate contracts with the different sickness funds that operate in their state 
and distribute the financial resources they receive among their members. Ambulatory care 
is mainly provided by private providers working in single practices. Patients are able to 
choose between doctors, dentists and pharmacists (Weinbrenner and Busse, 2006).  
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Norway's health care system is predominantly financed through general taxation 
and, to a lesser degree, through out-of-pocket payments. General Practitioners and hospital 
doctors are either directly employed by the public sector or are independent contractors 
with their remuneration determined by the public sector and the Norwegian Medical 
Association (Brenne, 2006).  
In Poland, the health care system is financed through compulsory health insurance. 
Individuals contribute 7.75% of their taxable income, and the public sector funds 
individuals on low income. Initially the system was organised through regional sickness 
funds but from 2003, they were amalgamated to create a National Health Fund. There is a 
mix of public and, increasingly, private sector providers (Strózik, 2006). 
 
The number of undergraduate training places 
 
The difficulties of workforce planning for health professionals were identified in Learning 
to Care (SFC and NES, 2008). These difficulties are not unique to Scotland: OECD (2008) 
reports that many OECD countries faced nursing and medical shortages towards the end of 
the 1990s and Bloor and Maynard (2003) reports that several countries have experienced 
cycles of shortages and surpluses, particularly in nursing.  
One of the key determinants of the supply of health professionals is the number of 
undergraduate training places. In general, the optimal number of undergraduate places 
depends upon the costs and benefits of training. The costs of training include, among other 
things, the cost of training to the HEI, the cost of employment, the proportion of the tuition 
fee paid by students and whether training and/or employment is funded by the public 
sector. Differences in the benefits, costs or source of funding between countries are likely 
to generate differences in the optimal number of undergraduate places. 
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In Scotland, the number of places is set either by the public sector (medicine, 
dentistry and nursing), or by the minimum of the supply of by HEIs and demand for places 
by students (other health professions). One alternative approach would be to allow HEIs to 
charge fees for places and allow the fee to equate supply and demand. Another alternative 
approach would be to consider forms of funding other than the current fixed price 
mechanism. For example, despite persistent excess demand for places from suitably 
qualified applicants, the number of undergraduate places on medical and dental courses in 
Scotland is restricted. Allowing the number of training places to be determined by the 
demand for and supply of places under a fixed price mechanism would be a costly 
proposition for the public sector. Therefore, the public sector may want to consider 
changing the system of funding. 
Moreover, the number of training places is likely to be a function of amount and 
type of funding. For example, in some countries, the public sector funds a limited number 
of places, and does not control the total number of places. Simoens and Hurst (2006) and 
OECD (2008) report the extent to which places for undergraduate medical training are 
controlled. Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Japan, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Spain and Sweden all operate some form of numerous clausus 
arrangements that control the number of medical school places. In Austria, Germany, 
Ireland, Korea, Switzerland and the US the number of places at medical school is not 
controlled. Simoens, Villeneuve, and Hurst (2005) and OECD (2008) report the extent to 
which places for undergraduate nursing training are controlled. In Australia, Belgium, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and the United States, the number of nursing 
places is determined by nursing schools. The public sector funds some of these places. In 
Austria, Canada, England, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Slovak Republic, 
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Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, the number of training places is controlled by the public 
sector.  
More specifically, regardless of whether undergraduate places are controlled or not, 
there is variation in the amount of public sector subsidy: 
 In Norway, Brenne (2006) reports that the public sector has successfully used the 
level of tuition fee scholarships to influence the number of physiotherapists and 
doctors. There are no tuition fees for undergraduate training. In addition, Norwegian 
students receive loans and grants in order to fund their education. If students 
graduate within a certain period of time, part of their loans are converted into a 
grant.  
 In Poland, the public sector funds a limited number of undergraduate places but 
additional places are available for self-funded students. This mixed system is 
believed to have caused a large number of graduates, many of whom have 
difficulties finding employment (Strózik, 2006).  
 Ireland has a limit on the number of EU undergraduate medical students but there is 
no limit on the number of non-EU fee-paying students. In 2003, it was estimated 
that non-EU medical students accounted for 62% of the new student intake and 83% 
of student related income (Department of Health and Children, 2006; Finucane and 
Kellett, 2007).  
 In Australia, all students pay fees. However, some student places are subsidised by 
the public sector. The extent of this subsidy depends upon the training course and 
whether the profession, for example nursing, is deemed to be a national priority area. 
Fees can be paid up-front, in which case students receive a discount, or as a 
graduate tax. For example, at the University of Melbourne, Australian full fee 
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paying students will pay over A$40,000 for a standard full time course load. By 
contrast, a subsidised place costs A$8,500. The number of subsidised places is 
determined by the public sector (Australia Universities, 2007; Metz, 2004). 
 In the US, medical school tuition fees are set either by the medical school, the 
Board of Trustees of the university or by a state authority (20%). Students fund their 
tuition fees through scholarships or loans.  
 In Japan, the majority of the costs of training are funded by the public sector (about 
44%) and students (about 40%) (Ban, 2005).  
Simoens and Hurst (2006) and OECD (2008) find that the density of doctors is 
higher in countries where the number of undergraduate medical school places is not 
controlled. 
 
Additional Costs of Teaching 
 
Undergraduate pre-registration clinical training imposes additional costs such as the use of 
hospital facilities and staff. In Scotland, the public sector compensates NHS Boards for the 
Additional Cost of Teaching (ACT) medical and dental students but does not compensate 
NHS Boards for the additional costs (if any) of training nursing or AHP students. ACT is 
allocated by NES from the Education budget.  
A couple of concerns have been raised around ACT (in England, the Service 
Increment for Teaching). First, because the clinical training of undergraduate students is 
produced jointly by HEIs and NHS Boards, ensuring the accountability of ACT and SFC 
funds is difficult and imposes significant costs on NES, HEIs and NHS Boards. Second, 
subsidising clinical training in this way provides incentives for HEIs to place a greater 
emphasis on clinical training than they otherwise would. 
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An alternative approach to overcome both these concerns would be to allocate ACT 
directly to HEIs and allow HEIs to contract with NHS Boards around the use of their staff 
and facilities. 
There is substantial variation in the funding of undergraduate clinical training in 
other countries.  
 In Germany, practice-based education is generally funded by the insurance funds as 
part of their contracts with individual hospitals (Weinbrenner and Busse, 2006). The 
clinical training of nurses used to be the responsibility of the public sector but is 
expected to be financed in the future by a surcharge on treatment costs (Busse and 
Riesberg, 2004). While in the past, there has been cross subsidisation between 
clinical and academic budgets, the separation of funding, as required by law, has 
recently been enforced (Pietz et al., 2002).  
 In Ireland, there is no distinct source of funding provided by the Department of 
Health and Children to hospitals or primary care facilities, to compensate them for 
the costs of undergraduate clinical training. Undergraduate medical training is 
indirectly funded by medical staff devoting a proportion of their time to training 
students on clinical placements. Hospitals may also receive recurrent and capital 
funding through agreements in place with the medical schools. These include 
agreements involving the refunding of hospitals for staff costs associated with 
training. Medical schools may pay for specific infrastructure and facilities located in 
the hospitals and which are geared towards medical training. However, this does not 
apply to all hospitals and where it does, it may not always be consistent (INDECON, 
2005). Department of Health and Children (2006) reports that it believes it is 
essential that hypothecated funding be provided for undergraduate clinical training 
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and suggests that while the funding should be allocated by the public sector directly 
to the Health Service providers, it is equally essential that the medical schools can 
influence how such funding is utilised in order to ensure effective and high quality 
teaching in line with curriculum requirements. 
 In Australia, public hospitals may receive some payment from universities for the 
use of their facilities for clinical training purposes. Indeed, there is an explicit 
clinical training component in the Government's contribution to medical and nursing 
course costs. Also, provision has been made for clinical training provided to nurses. 
However, for allied health courses, there is no separately identified clinical training 
component in government funding. Hence, universities must meet the cost of any 
payments to public hospitals (or other training providers) from general funding 
sources. 
 In Norway, the public sector is responsible for providing students of nursing, 
medicine and other health professions with clinical training. Some HEIs have had 
difficulties in finding enough clinical training placements for their students because 
of the lack of incentives for the clinical training providers. The public sector plans 
to instruct clinical training providers to offer clinical training placements (Brenne, 
2006). 
 
The funding of postgraduate medical education 
 
Health training in general and medical training in particular is one of the few professions to 
have a substantial amount of postgraduate training. A significant amount of public sector 
funding in Scotland is allocated to supporting postgraduate medical education in the form 
of salaries for doctors in training (Foundation Year doctors and Specialist Trainees). In 
effect, the public sector subsidises the cost of employing doctors in training. One reason for 
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this public sector subsidy might be the concern that NHS Boards would have few 
incentives to train staff and, instead, divert resources to service delivery.  
An alternative way of funding postgraduate training might be for the trainees to pay 
either directly, through fees, or indirectly, through a relatively low training wage. 
 In Germany, medical trainees receive a relatively low wage during postgraduate 
training. Some of the costs of postgraduate medical education are borne by both the 
public and private sector. Sickness funds and private insurers indirectly support 
education through paying higher patient care costs to teaching hospitals and, along 
with regional physicians' associations, also finance half of the salaries for general 
practitioners trainees during their practice-based training period (2-3 years). In 
addition, the public sector is responsible for the budgets of hospitals so also 
indirectly subsidises postgraduate medical education (Wynn et al., 2006). 
 In Poland, doctors compete for employment posts as residents. Residency training is 
financed by the public sector. Residents are employed for the entire duration of their 
specialty training (Kuszewski and Gericke, 2005). 
 In Ireland, the Department of Health and Children (2006) reports that the evolution 
of postgraduate medical education and training in the absence of an integrated 
national strategy for medical education and training has resulted in a fragmented 
system and that the lack of hypothecated training allocations has led to inadequate 
investment in medical education and training. 
 In Australia, Australian Government Productivity Commission (2005) reports that 
funding for hospital-based clinical training comes from a variety of disparate 
sources and is not always separately identified. This lack of explicit payment for 
many clinical training services makes the funds vulnerable to competing service 
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needs. The public sector funds General Practice training through a much more 
explicit and transparent framework. Australia has found that a lack of hypothecated 
funding for clinical training has meant that training in the public and private sector 
has decreased. 
 In Canada, postgraduate medical education funding is provided for every Canadian 
medical school graduate but the number of funded training posts often increases to 
cover international medical graduates. Canada sends direct Graduate Medical 
Education (GME) funds, for residents' and teaching physicians' salaries and 
teaching physicians, to the medical school and requires that all GME programs be 
based at a medical school, rather than at a hospital (Wynn et al., 2006).  
 The US provides an enormous amount of information on the structure and finance 
of postgraduate medical education. For a detailed overview see Wynn et al. (2006). 
Postgraduate medical education in the US is funded through two components: direct 
and indirect Graduate Medical Education (GME). Direct GME (DGME) costs are 
those costs that are directly attributable to the teaching activity, such as resident 
stipends, teaching physician compensation, and administrative costs and 
administrative overhead. Indirect medical education (IME) costs are higher patient 
care costs associated with having GME programs that cannot be directly attributed 
to the teaching program. Residents agree to a relatively low wage in return for 
higher wages in the future. GME is funded through a number of sources but 
Medicare
3
 is the largest single contributor. Medicare funds the education and 
training of medical, nursing and other non-physician health professionals (e.g., 
physical therapists) through GME (Thies and Harper, 2004). Medicare pays each 
                                                 
3
 Medicare is a public sector insurance fund designed to provide a health care safety net for older Americans. 
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hospital for DGME according to a formula that reflects Medicare's share of the 
hospital's patients, the number of residents, and the per-resident cost of DGME. The 
indirect IME subsidy is a mark-up over the standard fixed amount per inpatient 
discharge that it pays to hospitals. The formula used to calculate the IME 
adjustment factor is a function of the hospital's teaching intensity, as measured by 
the intern-to-resident bed ratio. Wynn et al. (2006) estimate that in 2003, DGME 
and IME amounted to $2.5 billion and $4.9 billion dollars respectively. There is also 
a limit on the number of residents each hospital could claim for DGME and IME 
costs. In Maryland and New York, patients covered by private insurance schemes 
finance GME through state taxes based on an assessment of the number of 
individuals covered by each payer. 
 
The geographical distribution of the workforce 
 
SFC and NES (2008) identify remote and rural issues as a key concern in Scotland.  
Simoens and Hurst (2006) and OECD (2008) report that most OECD countries suffer from 
an unequal geographical distribution of their physician workforce, with rural and deprived 
urban areas experiencing shortages of physicians, and affluent, metropolitan areas facing 
surpluses. Countries often have several policies to influence the geographical distribution of 
doctors, some of which are related to training. 
Training initiatives designed to attract doctors to rural and deprived urban areas 
have been based around the background of the medical student and the content of the 
medical curriculum. In Australia, there is evidence that selective admission policies of 
medical schools attract doctors to rural areas. There is also evidence that educational 
programmes which expose students to practise in rural and deprived urban areas are more 
likely to attract students to such areas when they graduate. In addition, Australian medical 
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students have at least eight weeks of rural experience in their curriculum and by 2000, 600 
scholarships were offered to undergraduate and graduate medical students to work and 
study in rural areas. In Canada, undergraduate medical students receive training in rural 
locations and have a rural practice residency or speciality. In Greece, all doctors are 
required to practise for two years in a rural area after they obtain their medical degree. 
Since the 1970s, Norway and Sweden have located medical schools in rural areas with the 
aim of attracting more students from these areas into medical school and of providing more 
training in rural health. The Physician Shortage Area Program in the United States consists 
of a selective admission policy (students of rural origin with interest in practising family 
medicine in rural areas), financial aid, a family medicine programme and rural practice 
sites. There is some evidence that these training initiatives have been successful in 
recruiting and retaining doctors in rural areas. 
In many countries, scholarships or loans are offered to trainees in return for a 
commitment to practice in rural and deprived urban areas for a number of years. Medical 
students who practise in North Norway have been partially exempted from repaying their 
loan. In Japan, medical students can be exempted from repaying their loan if they work in a 
public hospital or clinic in a rural area for a certain period of time. In the US, a number of 
programmes provide scholarships and loan repayment schemes to medical students in 
exchange for serving in specific areas. The evidence on the success of these return-of-
service schemes is mixed (OECD, 2008). Some countries have funded departments of rural 
health in medical schools in order to expand the rural health component of the medical 
curriculum. In Australia, the public sector funded the establishment of six university-linked 
Departments of Rural Health and an Advanced Specialist Training Posts Programme 
designed to create specialist training posts in major rural centres. 
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2.3 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OF HEALTH PROFESSIONALS  
 
As highlighted in the previous section, while OECD countries have generally attached great 
importance to domestic education and training, it could hardly balance the supply and 
demand for workforce completely on its own. Apart from difficulties in exercising health 
workforce planning per se, a major reason could be the long duration of education for 
health professionals (around 10 years long for physicians). In addition, exogenous shocks 
could also lead to unforeseen mismatches between supply and demand, for example 
“legislative changes with respect to working hours for junior doctors or other health 
professionals”, “a large and sustained rise in public spending on the NHS”, “unexpected 
outflows from the health workforce, including emigration”, “exogenous technological 
innovation” and so on (OECD, 2008, pp. 35). In such contexts, migration emerges as an 
effective short-term adjustment to health labour markets in many OECD countries with 
high flexibility but low costs. 
This section surveys the existing information on the migration of health 
professionals. It reviews the patterns and trends of health work migration in the UK, 
explores factors influencing migration decisions, and finally, describes the regulatory 
regimes on international recruitment. Again, although our primary focus is the health 
migration in the UK, regulatory regimes implemented in other major host countries have 
also been reviewed. A thorough review of numbers, reasons and institutional backgrounds 
is essential for the subsequent analyses of influences on and impacts of the migration of 
health professionals.   
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2.3.1 Patterns and trends of medical migration into the UK 
 
Overseas qualified doctors and nurses have made a significant contribution to health labour 
markets in the OECD area, particularly in English-speaking countries such as the United 
States, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia (see Table 2.2) (WHO, 2006). The OECD 
health policy report (2008) compares graduation and immigration flows of doctors and 
nurses for 12 OECD countries in the period of 1995-2005. It suggests that whilst the 
domestic graduation rates generally grow slightly, physician immigration rates rose sharply 
around the period of 2002-03 or earlier, and remained above graduation rates throughout 
the period in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, UK and USA and 
exceeded graduation rates during the period in Sweden. The case for nurses is the opposite 
in that domestic graduation rates are much higher than immigration rates in most countries 
except Denmark, Ireland and New Zealand.  
       Table 2.2: Doctors and nurses trained abroad working in OECD countries. 
OECD country 
Doctors trained abroad Nurses trained abroad 
Number % of total Number % of total 
Australia 11 122 21 NA NA 
Canada 13 620 23 19 061 6 
Finland 1 003 9 140 0 
France 11 269 6 NA NA 
Germany 17 318 6 26 284 3 
Ireland NA NA 8 758 14 
New Zealand 2 832 34 10 616 21 
Portugal 1 258 4 NA NA 
United Kingdom 69 813 33 65 000 10 
United States 213 331 27 99 456 5 
NA, not applicable. 
Source: Working together for health (WHO, 2006), page 98. 
 
In the UK, the latest figure suggests over 91,000 of the 243,910 doctors registered 
with the General Medical Council (GMC) obtained their medical qualification from 
overseas countries (Butler, 2008). With the relatively lower medical personnel to 
population ratio, the British government set out the NHS Plan target of 2000 to increase 
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7500 consultants, 2000 General Practitioners (GPs) and 20000 nurses by the year of 2004 
on the basis of 24401 consultants, 28593 GPs and 335952 nurses in 2000 (DoH, 2002). 
Besides national workforce strategies such as expansion of medical schools and improving 
retention, international recruitment has made a major contribution to maintaining adequate 
medical staffing, particularly in those socially and economically deprived areas (Woodhead 
et al. 2002 cited in Kelly, Morrell, and Sriskandarajah, 2005) and those consultant 
specialties, for example, that can be hard to fill (Goldacre, Davidson, and Lambert, 2004). 
 Doctors 
The number of overseas-qualified doctors practising in the UK has grown over the 
last decade, from 23.7% (19170) in 1993 to 29.4% (32096) in 2003 (Kelly, Morrell, and 
Sriskandarajah, 2005). The annual data on full registration figures for new doctors from the 
GMC provides further evidence of this continuing trend (GMC, 2005). Almost two thirds 
(8102) of new registered doctors obtained qualification abroad in 2004, of which doctors 
from the EEA account for 30%. The Indian subcontinent and the Middle East are traditional 
suppliers of doctors to the NHS. Although the ethical Code of Practice (DoH, 2004) has 
called for NHS employers to only target international recruitments at countries with 
medical staff surpluses, doctors from developing countries like South Africa have been 
recruited continually (Buchan and Maynard, 2006). 
Foreign medical graduates contribute less to consultant level than junior and 
intermediate level posts as a result of the pyramidal structure of the health workforce in the 
UK (Dobson, 2004). Of the medical and dental staff in the hospital and community health 
services (HCHS) of the NHS in England in 2006, foreign graduates constitute 28% of 
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consultants, 74% of staff grades and 40% of doctors in training and equivalents
4
. 
Nevertheless, Specialist medical practices in the NHS have progressively and significantly 
recruited overseas-trained consultants in the recent years, making up from 15% before 1992 
to 24% in 1992-2001, particularly in specialties where posts have been hard to fill with the 
domestically-trained workforce (Goldacre, Davidson, and Lambert, 2004). Indeed, 
consultants trained abroad are over-represented in the top ten NHS specialities, accounting 
for more than one third of all doctors employed (Kelly, Morrell, and Sriskandarajah, 2005). 
 Nurses 
Immigrant nurses are estimated to account for around 10% (65000) of the total 
registrants with the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC), and 44% (15152) of the initial 
registration in 2003/4 (Kelly, Morrell, and Sriskandarajah, 2005). Despite these lower 
proportions compared with doctors' in relative terms, their significantly high numbers 
suggest the UK is a much larger market for nurses and midwives. In addition, non-EEA 
countries are major destinations of nursing recruitment, regardless of the mutual 
recognition of qualifications between the UK and the EEA (Kelly, Morrell, and 
Sriskandarajah, 2005). Nurses from non-EEA countries represent more than 90% of foreign 
admissions, and the main non-EEA sources are India, the Philippines, South Africa and 
Australia. During the period of 1998 to 2005, India and Philippines have surpassed the 
traditional donor countries - the more developed commonwealth countries of Australia, 
New Zealand and South Africa, and contributed more than half of all foreign registrants. 
Among the top ten donor countries, five of them are identified as developing countries 
where NHS recruitment is proscribed by the Department of Health (NHS Employers, 
                                                 
4
 The Information Centre for health and social care: http://www.ic.nhs.uk/statistics-and-data-
collections/workforce 
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2005). Though, the year of 2005 has seen a fall in admissions from four of them such as 
South Africa, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Ghana, with the exception of Pakistan. 
 Dentists 
In dentistry, 23% (7497) of the total registers in 2005 with the General Dental 
Council (GDC) obtained their qualifications overseas, among which EEA qualified dentists 
represent more than half (53%). Of 2,257 dentists added to the register in the same year, 
half (1136) of them were EEA qualified and only 34% (776) were “home trained”. In other 
words, countries within the EEA, particularly Poland, Spain and Germany, are the main 
donor countries of foreign dentists working in the UK, which is clearly distinguishable 
from doctors and nurses as above highlighted. 
In particular, the much greater proportion of migrant health professionals in the 
annual registration than in the overall workforce, on the one hand, suggests the increasing 
significance of international recruitment in staffing of UK medicine. On the other hand, 
many health professionals migrated to the UK on a temporary, contract basis rather than a 
permanent basis. Indeed, the NHS has a long history of offering salaried training posts and 
supernumerary posts in public hospitals to foreign professionals for limited periods of time 
through training and educational programs, which has succeeded in overcoming staffing 
crisis in short term. South Africa, for example, signed an agreement with the UK in 2003 
that the health professionals will return home where their posts are kept open after the 
exchange period (WHO, 2006). According to the nursing registration data, for example, 
more than half of non-EU nurses who initial registered in 1995 did not re-register in 1998 
as required if they wish to continue practising in the UK (Buchan and O'May, 1999). 
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2.3.2 Factors influencing migration decisions 
 
The high demand for health professionals and active recruitment by host countries has 
encouraged and facilitated the migrations in the health sector. Apart from external or 
exogenous factors, the migration could also simply be a result of professionals seeking 
employment opportunities and job security in the dynamic globalized health labour 
markets. Existing research lists factors that motivate only some professionals in the donor 
country to migrate to a particular host country, for example, differences between two 
countries in remunerations, professional developments, working environments and so on 
(Bach, 2003).  
Similar to migrations in other sectors, the possibility to enhance earnings reinforces 
the attractiveness of medical migration. Comparisons of wages between main donor 
countries and host countries made by Vujicic et al. (2004) suggest significant differentials 
(2-25 times for doctors and 2-29 times for nurses) even after cost-of-living adjustment. 
However, it is also interesting that South African professionals earn 5-6 times more than 
Ghanaians, but show almost the same intention to migrate. This suggests that changes in 
the wage differentials, alone, would have little impact on the supply of migrants (Vujicic et 
al., 2004). The high supply from donor countries may be attributed to better training 
opportunities in developed countries. A second possible reason is that work experiences in 
South Africa can increase the likelihood of being offered employment in developed 
countries, making migration costs from South Africa much lower than from Ghana. 
Furthermore, a major stimulus for migration for highly skilled workers could come 
from continuous professional and personal development. It is a widespread belief that a 
period of training or working experience in the NHS can enhance the career prospects and 
provide access to better working opportunities. A survey of non-European doctors working 
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in the UK in 2006 reported that over three-quarters (76.7%) had chosen the UK mainly for 
'training', only 7.2% for better pay and 7.1% for better work environment (George et al., 
2007). Data on HCHS staff in 2006
5
 well confirms the importance of professional 
development and training on medical migration decision: over half (53%) of the overseas-
trained doctors migrated for training grade posts, compared with 12% working in staff 
grade and 26% as consultants. Enhanced skills and experience are important features that 
underpin international healthcare mobility. 
Poor working environments may also push professionals to seek employment 
abroad. The influences in this context involve the lack of occupational protection, the AIDS 
epidemic and its resultant workload increase, the inadequate resources and facilities, the 
inefficient management of health services, the low social prestige for health professionals 
(especially nurses and community health workers) and the threat of violence (Alkir and 
Chen, 2004). 
Other factors that are found to be important in the migration decision include 
differential tax regimes (Barrett, 2001 cited in Bach, 2003), language traditions with 
training, the existence of migrant professional communities from the donor country 
(Commonwealth, 2001 cited in Dovlo and Martineau, 2004) and so on.  
While the push and pull factors documented above can obviously affect the 
migration decisions of health professionals, the institutional regulation can also be an 
important influence. Indeed, due to its dual – social and economic – function, health care is 
typically supported by the public sector and highly regulated domestically. These 
regulations may act as a powerful barrier to international mobility of health professionals 
(Manning and Sidorenko, 2007) and will be discussed in details in what follows. 
                                                 
5
 The Information Centre for health and social care: http://www.ic.nhs.uk/statistics-and-data-
collections/workforce. 
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2.3.3 Regulatory regimes in migration of health professionals 
 
As health professionals from developing countries make significant and escalating 
contribution to the health workforce in industrialized countries, there is increased 
awareness of the importance of regulating and monitoring international recruitments. In 
addition to generic regulations (e.g. a wide variety of national administrative practices for 
controlling the inflow of non-nationals and the outflow of nationals), sector-specific 
regulations of international migration have been adopted to maintain high quality of health 
care delivered in host countries, and minimise the brain drain and losses of public health 
sector investment in developing countries (Manning and Sidorenko, 2007). In what follows, 
we describe regulatory policies on the health professional migration undertaken in main 
host countries in terms of three key features: migration policies, registration and relicensing 
regimes, and ethical management of international recruitment. 
 
Migration policies 
 
Host countries adopt different migration policies according to the demand for health 
workforce in each country.  
In the United State, the Federal Government estimated that 35 million people live in 
areas without doctors, and 16,000 doctors are needed to fill this gap (Cichowski, 2010). But 
an independent review (Chou, 2006) shows that the Government report was rather 
conservative, and that at least 200,000 doctors will be needed by 2020 due to increasing 
population growth and aging populations. H-1B visas are thus introduced to foreign 
nationals with technical skills in specialty occupations. Having gained popularity in the 
information technology sector, there is now an increasing trend for hospitals to act as 
sponsoring employers in recruiting International Medical Graduates (IMGs) with no 
obligation to return home to fill the shortage of medical personnel. More importantly, H-1B 
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visa holders are also eligible to apply for permanent residency to settle in the US after 
fulfilling residency requirements, and this is another highlight as it offers many people the 
chance to pursue their “American dreams” (Mullan, 2005). 
In Australia, migration policies are also simpler for health professionals. Currently, 
visa class 457 and 422 are available to non-Australian citizens in the employment of 
medical professionals. Since April 2005, visa class 457 was created for foreign medical 
practitioners to apply in the form of Temporary Business Long Stay Visa. Alternatively, 
foreign doctors may apply for visa class 422 – Medical Practitioner Visa, which allows 
health professionals to gain permission to work in rural Australian communities or for local 
councils through a sponsoring scheme as an individual medical practitioner in a solely-run 
practice without a direct employer. All applicants applying for these visas of temporary 
entry nature must have appropriate recognised medical qualifications as well as in the 
possession of conditional registration to practice medicine in Australia. Once these 
applicants gain full medical registration status after a few years of practice and passed 
assessments and examinations set by the medical licensing authority in their location, they 
may be able to apply for permanent residency to stay in Australia on a permanent basis 
under any category of the point-based General Skilled Migration Program; after satisfying 
further criteria under permanent residency status, applicants may then be eligible to apply 
for Australian citizenship (Carver, 2008). 
In European countries such as the United Kingdom, Belgium, Ireland, Denmark, the 
Netherlands or Spain, health professionals are put on shortage lists with no need for work 
permits (OECD, 2008), although the situation for the UK has recently changed. The 
recruitment of foreign doctors into the health service sector had been a large concern for 
both the general public as well as the sector itself. The debate is essentially centred on two 
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opposing arguments for the scheme. On one hand, the government draws up plans to 
improve health services by increasing the number of doctors and specialists. According to 
estimates however, this cannot be achieved without a corresponding inflow of extra doctors 
from overseas. On the other hand, there are also major concerns that a large influx of 
migrant graduates will potentially displace UK medical graduates from obtaining training 
opportunities (Grantham, 2008). In 2007, out of the 23,247 training posts available in the 
NHS which attracted 32,649 medical students to apply, 10,000 of the students were 
migrants (Grantham, 2008). To secure the training and employment opportunities for an 
increased number of UK medical graduates, the Home Office announced changes of 
immigration rules affecting doctors, dentists and band 5&6 nurses recently (NHS 
Employers, 2007).  
The category in the immigration rules for postgraduate doctors and dentists, which 
enabled foreign graduate to train in Foundation Programmes, Senior House Officer and 
equivalent grades and in Specialist Registrar and equivalents grades for many years, was 
announced to be changed (DoH, 2006). Foreign graduates who take up training posts are 
considered as in employment rather than in training. The majority of non-EEA candidates 
for posts will require a work permit, which means the unavailability of EEA nationals to fill 
the post should be confirmed before the approval for international recruitment; while EEA 
nationals, who have automatic right to work in the UK, only need to register with Workers 
Registration Scheme. Migrants with valid leave as a Postgraduate Doctor or Dentist will 
continue on the current conditions, and so will doctors with insufficient leave to 
enter/remain to complete a programme because the guidance will continue to be held in 
abeyance due to the practical difficulties in making changes at the current stage (NHS 
Employers, 2007). The category of Postgraduate Doctors and Dentists will still exist, but 
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only to enable those UK graduate to take their Foundation Programme. As to nursing 
recruitment, band 5 and 6 nurses have been removed from the shortage occupation list since 
14 August 2006. Therefore, an employer can no longer apply for a work permit for band 5 
and 6 nurses without proving they could not fill their vacancy with resident worker. Nurses 
at band 7 or 8, or in particular specialities are still recognised as the “shortage occupations”. 
The NHS and the Department of Health have been criticised for the poor planning 
on these new policies. Since then, the number of IMGs and foreign doctors applying to 
work in the UK has dropped significantly and surveys revealed that the number of IMGs 
wishing to stay in the UK to work fell significantly. Meanwhile, some hospitals complained 
that they had vacancies that cannot be filled, and there were reported shortages of doctors in 
some areas in England and Wales throughout 2008. Perhaps the cause of this result was 
foreign doctors and IMGs being put off by the new immigration and recruitment policies, 
or confused by reports that there were as many as 10,000 doctors unemployed in the UK in 
2007. The Department of Health and the NHS then reassured that opportunities are still 
open to qualified overseas doctors and IMGs through four routes: (i) international 
development exchange programmes; (ii) reciprocal training schemes; (iii) short-term 
clinical skills training contracts arranged by Royal Colleges; (iv) positions that cannot be 
filled by suitable UK or EEA candidates. All four routes were incorporated into the later 
point-based migration management system and operated under Tier 5 of that system, which 
allow successful applicants to work for up to two years in the UK on sponsorships from a 
specific employer. Since the UK considers itself as a non-immigrant country, it is very 
difficult for foreign nationals to settle to be naturalised as British citizens, even if they are 
highly educated medical professional with specialised skills (Grantham, 2008). 
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Registration and relicensing regimes 
 
As a key feature of the health professional migration, migrant health professionals need to 
successfully pass language tests and professional licensing examination to be registered as 
an eligible healthcare provider. The UK, Finland and Ireland require applicants to attend a 
period of adaptation or initial supervision before registration. Some host countries shorten 
the procedures by introducing temporary or conditional registration for certain health 
professionals, for example, the Netherlands issues registration for individuals with near-
equivalent skills, Australia for health professionals migrating on sponsoring schemes, or 
New Zealand for individuals continuously working in a comparable health system for at 
least three years; while some other countries set out exceptional high registration 
requirement for migrant health professionals, for example, national postgraduate 
qualifications in Canada, satisfactorily completing internship and postgraduate residency 
training in the USA, or obtaining citizenship in Italy, Finland, Greece, Turkey and 
Luxembourg (OECD, 2008).   
In the UK, more specifically, NHS Employers have provided guidance on the 
registration of international doctors, dentists, and nurses (NHS Employers, 2005). 
 Doctors  
All doctors, including GPs and consultants, must register with the GMC before they 
can take up a post in the UK. EEA doctors are eligible for immediate full registration with 
GMC and even specialist registration as long as their specialist qualification recognised by 
the European Medical Directive. Alternatively, non-EEA doctors and EEA doctors in 
particular specialities need to successfully complete the following examinations to be 
eligible for registration: 1) passing the International English Language Testing System 
(IELTS) to the required standard (e.g. Overall 7, Speaking 7, Listening 6, Academic 
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reading 6 and Academic writing 6); and 2) taking the Professional and Linguistic 
Assessment Board (PLAB) to demonstrate the GMC whether they have the basic medical 
competence and communication skills to practise medicine in the UK. To qualify for the 
General Practice Registration of the GMC, EEA GPs needs to submit evidence of their 
qualification in general practice to the GMC, while non-EEA doctors and EEA doctors in 
particular specialities need to pass an assessment by the Postgraduate Medical Education 
and Training Board (PMETB). Normally the PMETB will recommend at least three to six 
months' induction into NHS general practice as a GP Registrar with formal assessment and 
those who satisfy PMETB will obtain the Statement of Eligibility for Registration (formally 
the Certificate of Equivalent Experience). At the consultant level, Specialist Register of the 
GMC is required to practice in the UK. The non-EEA doctors and EEA doctors in 
particular specialities need to be assessed by PMETB to be eligible for registration.  
 Dentists  
Similar to the registration requirements for doctor category, EEA-qualified dentists 
have automatic registration with the GDC, while non-EEA dentists need to pass IELTS (a 
minimum score of 6.5 in each section and an overall average of 7) and the International 
Qualifying Exam to be admitted by GDC Registration. 
 Nurses  
The NMC is the regulatory body for nurses and midwives in the UK, which is 
responsible to issue registration enabling its holder to practise. Nurses with equivalent 
qualifications from EEA have automatic registration with the NMC, while non-EEA nurses 
are required to pass the IELTS and undertake all or part of the Overseas Nurses Programme 
(ONP) to gain registration. The score standard of IELTS has been changed since 1st 
February 2007: a minimum score of 7 in each section and an overall average of 7, 
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compared with a minimum score of 5.5 in the listening and reading sections, 6 in the 
writing and speaking sections and an overall average of 6.5. In the ONP, nurses must 
complete a compulsory 20-day period of protected learning and a three-to-six-month period 
of supervised practice if needed. 
The US, as one of the most developed countries in the world, has some of the 
strictest and comprehensive rules for granting license to practice medicine to medical 
graduates of foreign nationals (Hallock, 2003). First of all, IMGs seeking to take up 
graduate medical training must have their qualifications evaluated by the Educational 
Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates; if IMGs attended medical schools outside the 
US or Canada, the programs they studied must be officially recognised and medical schools 
they attended must be accredited by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical 
Education (ACGME). The ACGME‟s certification involves education requirements and 
comprehensive examinations, where IMGs must first satisfy the requirement of completion 
of medical education, then pass Step 1 and 2 of the United States Medical Licensing 
Examination (USMLE) as well as a test in English language proficiency. On the practical 
side, an assessment in clinical skills is also in place in Step 3 of the USMLE to test the 
practical ability and skills of IMGs. Since each individual state has a medical licensing 
authority, and other US (overseas) territories have their own licensing authorities as well, 
the rules and regulations for granting license to practice medicine are different in different 
areas as each licensing authority has its own jurisdictions. Also the procession of license 
issued by one licensing authority does not give the automatic right to obtain licences of 
other licensing authorities. Although licensure rules vary in different areas, all licensing 
authorities have three core requirements in common for licensure: (i) examination 
requirement, that applicants must pass appropriate examinations; (ii) education 
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requirement, that applicants must complete and pass recognised medical trainings at 
graduate level; (iii) practical skills requirement, that applicants must pass assessments in 
clinical skills. 
The Australian Government has many approaches in place aiming for the 
integration of IMGs with their medical education environment and practice experience 
(Carver, 2008). Similar to the United States, there is not a single licensing authority to issue 
license to practice medicine in Australia. Having realised the inefficiency and 
inconvenience of operating different systems across the country, an agreement was reached 
in 2006 by the Council of Australian Governments to establish a unified national system in 
assessing and evaluating IMGs with nationally consistent processes. According to this 
national system, IMGs are to be assessed before they take up employment using 
standardised examinations; competence of the medical position IMGs apply for are also 
assessed before limited registration are awarded by the medical licensing authority, which 
may involve a clinical interview. After the employment is approved by the Australian 
Medical Council, IMGs must go through orientations to learn about the Australian health 
care system, as well as different cultural issues to minimise any communication problems 
that may arise due to Australia‟s multi-culture background. Continuous on-the-job 
supervisions and reporting are also in place to ensure the standard and quality of medical 
practice; and in order to re-register with the licensing authority on a periodical basis to 
renew the right to practice medicine, IMGs must enrol themselves to compulsory 
continuing professional development programs to keep up with their knowledge base. Apart 
from theoretical knowledge, assessments are also carried out at workplace for evaluating 
practical skills. Only after passing all these processes and subject to further licensing 
assessment would IMGs be eligible for full medical registration status, and once fully 
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qualified, continuous of consistent assessments in specific medical areas are in place set by 
specialist colleges should IMGs decide to become specialists. 
 
Ethical management of international recruitment 
 
The United Kingdom has taken the lead in establishing ethical codes for international 
recruitment of health professionals (OECD, 2008). The Code of Practice for NHS 
employers involved in the international medical recruitment was first published in October 
2001 and then revised in December 2004. The Scottish Executive has introduced a similar 
code in March 2006. The target of the Code is not only to promote high standards in the 
recruitment and employment of health professionals from overseas, but also "to mitigate the 
adverse effects of migration of health personnel" (DoH, 2004, pp. 3). Based on the ethical 
principles, the Department of Health and the Department for International Development, 
according to economic and medical staffing status, have produced a list of developing 
countries that should not be actively recruited from, unless an explicit government-to-
government agreement with the UK have been reached to support recruitment. NHS 
employers are expected to use this government-to-government agreement to achieve ethical 
recruitment. For example, registered mental health nurses are authorised to recruit from 
Ghana for up to a three-year period of employment. Similarly, dentists from Poland, and 
health professionals, particularly nurses, from Philippines, China and India have been 
agreed for direct recruitment. These established country-to-country campaigns offer 
migrant health professionals with professional development and training opportunities, and 
consequently benefit donor countries through the exchange of knowledge and skills. 
The Australian Government followed and introduced the Commonwealth of Nations 
Code of Practice for the International Recruitment of Health Workers to rule out direct 
recruitment from developing countries (Lennon, 2005). Some other host countries have also 
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used bilateral agreements for international recruitment, for instance, Switzerland, Canada, 
France, Germany and Italy, but far less intensively (OECD, 2008). 
 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
 
International recruitment provides governments with a flexible and low-cost response to 
shortages in the presence of global crisis in the health workforce and makes an escalating 
contribution to health care labour markets in industrialized countries. This chapter provides 
the institutional and policy background for the health professional migration, which 
however, cannot be viewed alone without mentioning the efforts governments devote to 
long-term policies of domestic training.   
We first described the structure and finance of training for health professionals 
across countries. There is variation in the nature of funding the provision of health care 
across countries, which gives rise to variation in the structure and finance of training for 
health professionals. Firstly, it is not uncommon to use quantity rationing to limit access to 
professional training. However there are several countries where there is rationing by price 
such as India, Poland and Ireland. There is some evidence of a relationship between 
quantity rationing and the density of health professionals. Second, there is some element of 
private sector funding of undergraduate health training in many countries, while the 
Britain's systems is unique in being entirely funded by the public sector. Thirdly, there is 
significant variation in the funding of the additional costs of teaching undergraduate 
courses. In Germany, this reflects the funding of the overall health system where health 
care is funded by insurance funds and there is a strict separation of clinical and academic 
funding. In Australia, ACT is paid to health care providers by medical schools. In Ireland, 
there is no explicit ACT payment. Some countries provide ACT for nurses, others do not. 
Finally, postgraduate medical education is funded in several different ways. In Germany 
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and the US, the costs are borne partly by trainees who accept a relatively low training wage. 
In Canada, funding is provided by the public sector. In Ireland and Australia, where there is 
no hypothecated postgraduate training funding, there are concerns around the quantity and 
quality of postgraduate training. Despite these variations in the structure and funding 
arrangement of domestic education, countries are generally suffering from the imbalance 
between the supply and demand for workforce, largely because of the long duration of 
education which hardly responds to the workforce mismatch in time and also the 
difficulties in workforce planning.  
We then review the patterns and trends of health professional migration into the 
UK, explore factors influencing migration decisions, and describe regulatory policies 
related to migration in the health sector that are undertaken in major host countries. In 
recent years, the UK has seen a growing inflow of doctors, dentists and nurses, with most 
of doctors and nurses from outside the EEA areas, while dentists mainly from within the 
EEA. The significant remuneration differences between donor and host countries, working 
environment, and most importantly, professional developments are reported as major 
reasons for these movements. Besides, the regulation regimes with respect to migration of 
health professionals could also be an important influence, including migration policies, 
registration and relicensing regimes, and ethical management of international recruitment. 
OECD countries have in general adopted selective migration policies to facilitate health 
professionals, for example, the US introduced H1-B visas specific for health professionals, 
Australia and New Zealand offer extra points in permanent migration programmes, and 
European countries put health professions on shortage lists with no requirement for work 
permits. In the UK, however, these policies changed after 2007, with postgraduate doctors, 
dentists and band 5&6 nurses removed from the shortage list to secure training and 
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employment opportunities for the increased number of domestic graduates. However, while 
it seems relatively easier for health professionals to move into a new country compared 
with other professions, this is not the case for them to practise in the new country. Host 
countries generally set out restrictive requirements of relicensing and registration to control 
entry and guarantee the practice standards of migrant health professionals. While some 
countries shorten the procedures for a group of professionals who are considered to be 
“qualified”, some other countries, with the highest popularity in the global health labour 
markets, increase requirements to limit the entry. Finally, the negative impact of the 
migration on donor countries has also drawn considerable attention, and some host 
countries have introduced ethical codes of practice for the international recruitment to avoid 
recruitment from developing countries unless a government-to-government agreement is 
achieved.  
These features are specifically related to the health sector and should be taken into 
account in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of health professionals‟ migration 
and return decisions. In the next chapter, we shall incorporate these features into a formal 
model framework to investigate the individual migration and permanent residence decision 
of health professionals. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 
Table A2.1: Structure of training for physicians. 
  Basic (undergraduate) Education (Post)graduate Education / Specialization 
Australia Undergraduate-entry program: 5-6 years; Internship in hospitals: at least 1 year - Full registration 
  Graduate-entry program: 4 years. (3 core terms of supervised practice +formal educational opportunities) 
  
(theoretical teaching and early clinical exposure) 
 
Resident Medical Officers in hospitals: 2 years - Provider Number  
Issued 
    General Practitioner Specialist 
    (Fellow of the RACGP) (Fellow of the RACS) 
Canada Graduate/Second entry program: 3-4 years Residency training: 2-6 years 
  (1/2 basic science, 1/2 clinical clerkship) Year 1: MCCQE - Licentiate of the Medical Council of Canada 
    Family medicine: 2-3 years Specialty: 4-6 years. 
    Full licensure accredited by CFPC Full licensure accredited by RCPSC 
France Undergraduate-entry program: 6 years   
  (1/2 basic science, 1/2 Extern in hospitals) Residency training: 2-6 years 
  Year 1: internal ranking examination for numerous clausus 
    Final year: National ranking exam to determine specialties 
  Germany Undergraduate-entry program: 6 years 
Practice-based specialization   (2-year preclinical classes, 3-year clinical classes, 
  one-year internship in hospitals) Non-academic: 2-3 years Academic: 4-6 years 
  Non-academic - federal medical exam licensing degree   General practitioner: 4 years 
  Academic - dissertation   
   Graduation - Full Registration   
 India MBBS Programme: 5½ years 
Postgraduate Degree or Diploma: 2-3 years   (4½-year didactic lectures and clinical clerkship or rotation, 
  1-year intern or house surgeon in hospitals (CRRI)) Sub-specialization: 3 years 
  Final MBBS examination - Provisional registration 
    CRRI complete - Permanent registration and Medical degree 
  Ireland Undergraduate-entry program: 6 years; Internship: 1 year - Full registration 
  Graduate-entry program: 4-5 years. 
    (last two years in the affiliated teaching hospitals) 
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Table A2.1: Structure of training for physicians (continued). 
 
Basic (undergraduate) Education (Post)graduate Education / Specialization 
Italy Undergraduate programme: 6 years/12 semesters Not-paid internship: 3 months 
  (1/2 pre-clinical courses, State (license) examination - Registration as GPs 
  1/2 rotations at different hospital departments Examination - School of Medical Specialisation 
  and/or some clinical theoretical courses) Specialisation: 4-6 years 
  Thesis or dissertation - Academic degree (supervised training and theoretical courses) 
Japan Undergraduate-entry programme: 6 years     
  Last two years: clinical training in University Hospitals 
    National Medical License examination - Full registration 
  Holland Undergraduate-entry program: 6-7 years     
  (4-year preclinical training, 2-year clinical training) or  
    (3-year preclinical training, 3-years clinical training)   
Norway Undergraduate programme: 6-6½ years Internship in rural areas ≥ 18 months - a medical license 
  Special research pathways: 7 years (6 months internal medicine ward, 6 months surgical ward, 
    6 months general practice) 
    Specialist training ≥ 5 years (9 years in average) 
Philippines Graduate-entry programme: 4 years Internship in an accredited hospitals 
  (Year 1&2: basic science, Medical licensure examinations 
  Year 2&3: clinical science, Year 4: rotation) Graduate programs in medicine: 1-5 years Medical specialization: 3-6 years 
Poland Undergraduate programme: 6 years Internship: 13 months 
    A national examination for licensing 
    Specialization: 3-7 years 
United Undergraduate-entry programme: 5-6 years 2-year Foundation Programme: rotations 
Kingdom Graduate entry programme F1 - full registration with GMC 
  (2-year preclinical training, Specialty Training - Certificate of Completion of Training (CCT) 
  3-year clinical training at a teaching hospital) General Practitioner Consultant 
    GP Register - 3 years Specialist Register - 6 years 
United  Second-entry programme: 4 years (Traditional rotating internship: 1 year) 
States Undergraduate-entry programme: 7 years Specialty training program/Residency: 3-7 years 
  (1/2 pre-clinical training, 1/2 clinical rotations) Fellowship in highly specialized fields: 1-3 years 
    Fellow - Board Eligible or Board Certified 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE SELF-SELECTION OF MIGRANT HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Given the strong sector-specific characteristics of the migration of health professionals 
discussed in the previous background chapter, it is necessary to investigate the individual 
migration and permanent residence decisions of health professionals in context. This 
chapter extends the self-selection model by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) to explicitly 
account for sector-specific factors such as the motivation of career development and 
various regulatory regimes. 
International migration becomes a basic structural feature of nearly all industrialized 
countries, and its emergence has been explained at a variety of perspectives, levels and 
assumptions. Neoclassical economics (Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1969; Todaro and 
Mamszko, 1987; Borjas, 1987) views migration as an individual decision for income 
maximization, while the “new economics of migration” (Stark and Bloom, 1985) conceives 
it as a household decision to minimize risks. Instead of focusing on such micro-level 
decision processes, dual labour market theory (Piore, 1979) and world system theory 
(Portes and Walton, 1981; Petras, 1981; Castells, 1989; Sassen, 1988; Morawska, 1990) 
link immigration to the structural requirements of national and international economies, 
respectively. Nevertheless, these theories are not inherently compatible when understanding 
causal processes of immigration because it might operate on multiple levels simultaneously. 
In fact, the complicated and multifaceted nature of contemporary immigration calls for the 
incorporation of different levels of analysis (Massey et al., 1993). 
This chapter analyses the migration decisions of health professionals in the light of 
neoclassical microeconomic model. In neoclassical economics, individual rational actors 
choose whether or not to migrate through maximizing their expected discounted net 
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earnings over some time horizon, net of migration costs. The expected income depends on 
the actual (or average) earnings and the probability of employment. Assume that 
individuals are risk neutral and their other characteristics than skills are the same. Thus, 
individuals should consider the following function when deciding whether to migrate at 
t=0: 
   ( )  ∫ [  (  ( ))  ( )    (  ( ))  ( )] 
         
 
 
 (3.1)                                     
where   ( ) is the discounted present value of the expected return of migration at time 0; t 
is time;    and    are the probabilities of employment in the host country and donor 
country;   ( ) and   ( ) are the unemployment rate in period t in the host country and 
donor country;   ( ) and   ( ) are net expected real income in period t if employed in the 
host country and donor country based on, say, the average real income of previous periods; 
r is the discount factor;    is the cost of migration and relocation in the host country; and n 
is the individual's time horizon. A rational individual migrates if   ( )   , and stays if 
  ( )   . 
Based on the same behavioural hypothesis of income maximization and the 
theoretical formulation by Roy (1951), Borjas (1987) assumes that the log earnings which 
potential migrants face in the donor country and host country have a joint normal 
distribution, and systematically analyses the impact of the selection process on the scale, 
direction and skill composition of migration flows. The Borjas model offers a new rigorous 
framework to analyse the skill composition of migration flows, which is particularly crucial 
for evaluating the economic consequences of migration. It is the skill-price differentials 
between two countries that determine the skill composition. Positive selection occurs when 
the host country offering higher rewards to skills draws migrants from the upper tail of the 
income distribution; Negative selection occurs when the host country offering a smaller 
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payoff to skills attracts individuals with below-average skills to migrate; and Refugee 
sorting occurs when immigrants do badly in the donor country but well in the host country, 
where the skill components of earnings in the donor country are not closely or even 
negatively correlated with those in the host country. 
Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) extend this self-selection model to the return migration 
decisions of foreign-born persons, in which the possibility of Refugee Sorting is excluded 
by assuming a perfect correlation between the skill components of earnings in the two 
countries. In this model, the presence of numerous return migrants may be attributed to 
either erroneous information about economic opportunities in the host country or improved 
economic options in the donor country after a practice experience abroad. The return 
migration is predicted to intensify the original selection process of immigrant flows. That is 
to say, permanent immigrants are the “best of the best” in the case of positive selection, and 
the “worst of the worst” otherwise. 
In the context of migration, the economic gain needs to be weighed against the costs 
corresponding to migration process. Migration costs are an important factor in the analysis 
of migration decisions and generally involve psychological, out-of-pocket, and opportunity 
costs. The psychological costs include the disutility associated with leaving behind family 
ties and social networks. The out-of-pocket costs include commuting expenses, fees, and 
household goods setting up for a new home. The opportunity costs involve the foregone 
wages while travelling, searching for, and learning a new job and are affected by 
immigrants' skill level and unemployment rate in donor and host countries (Sjaastad, 1962). 
However, these models in general base discussions on the assumption that costs of 
migration remain constant in the population, which in turn limits the applicability of these 
models in empirical analysis. In fact, it has been argued that economic migrants are 
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presumably favourably "self-selected" for a labour market success, such that a higher 
variance of earnings in the donor country does not necessarily yield negative selectivity but 
rather only less favourable positive selectivity (Chiswick, 1999). Brücker and Trübswetter 
(2004) draw a similar conclusion based on an extended version of Roy's model assuming 
skills and moving costs are negatively correlated. 
Besides factors that motivate general migration (e.g. wage difference, valuation of 
skills and migration costs) that have been extensively discussed in the neoclassical 
microeconomic model, the stringent regulatory regime can be a very important determinant 
to medical migration and return. Foreign professionals are normally severely limited in 
entering the health sector due to the social dimension of health care. It has been asserted 
that the importance of institutions in generating and sustaining international migration 
needs to be considered explicitly in the highly regulated health sector (Bach 2003; 
Commander, Kangasniemi and Winters 2002; Manning and Sidorenko, 2007). In the case 
of UK, the regulatory regimes that need to be considered involve the country-to-country 
campaign, relicensing regime and work permits. 
The country-to-country campaigns, advocated in the Code of Practice, have 
established “critical paths” of medical migration, for example, for Filipino, Indian nurses 
and Polish dentists. Carrington et al. (1996) state that migration tends to develop 
momentum, even as wage differentials narrow, because the established network of previous 
migrants can lower migration costs. And yet, the influence of social networks has been 
rarely acknowledged in the analysis of medical migration (Bach, 2003). 
The existing studies of occupational licensing have emphasized the important effect 
of licensing on the supply of both the native and migrant labour, particularly in the health 
sector with stringent regulation (Kleiner 2000; 2003). The mobility of professionals is 
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significantly reduced in different licensed professions because of the high costs of meeting 
the entrance requirement. For example, Boulier (1980 cited in Kleiner, 2003) examined 
dentists, and Kleiner et al. (1982 cited in Kleiner, 2003) covered 14 licensed occupations, 
including six health professions. Kleiner (2000), thus, affirms that political institutions 
could be used to control the initial entry and in-migration in the state-regulated occupations. 
However, White (1980 cited in Kleiner, 2003) finds little impact on employment levels of 
registered nurses. The small impact of regulation has been found in other low wage and low 
education occupations such as cosmetologist and barbers (Thornton and Weintraub, 1979 
cited in Kleiner, 2000). One possible reason is the relatively looser regulation for nurses 
due to their less established role in professional organizations compared with doctors. 
Nevertheless, although there is evidence that the quality of individual professionals, 
such as dentists and optometrists, can be enhanced as a consequence of restricting supply of 
lower skilled applicants (Holen, 1968; Carroll and Gaston, 1981 both cited in Kleiner, 
2003), recent analyses suggest an ambiguous effect on quality of outcome due to the 
countervailing force of prices. The increased price and wages caused by licensing 
regulation tend to reduce the quantity of healthcare demanded, and therefore reduce the 
quality of healthcare received (Kleiner, 2000). Holen (1978 cited in Kleiner, 2003) finds a 
positive effect of dentists licensing on the quality of care, while Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) 
discover that tougher licensing in terms of either licensing statutes or pass rates does not 
improve outcome of dental care. Furthermore, Kugler and Sauer (2005) study a model of 
optimal license acquisition in which relicensing costs vary among individuals of different 
skill levels, and prove both theoretically and empirically that stricter relicensing 
requirements could lower migrant physician quality. 
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Similarly, the work permit requirements may restrain the mobility of health 
professionals as well. Work permits place great demand on the skills and specialty of 
foreign applicants to secure EEA nationals. In addition, employers may be reluctant to 
recruit internationally because of the time consuming procedure and extra costs imposed by 
additional advertising and administrative expenses. 
In a word, while there exists extensive literature on Labour Economics examining 
the migration decisions of general workers, the skilled migration of health professionals 
exhibiting strong sectoral properties requires an accurate and comprehensive analysis 
(Commander, Kangasniemi and Winters, 2002). The existing health policy literature has 
well documented the push and pull factors that influence the migration decisions of health 
professionals, but rarely addressed the extent to which these factors affect the decisions 
(Vujicic et al.,  2004). This chapter contributes to the literature by incorporating these 
sector-specific features into the self-selection model by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) and 
examining how these factors influence the direction, scale and skill composition of the 
migration flow. A comprehensive understanding of health professionals‟ migration and 
return decisions is essential to develop policies regulating and controlling migration in- and 
outflows. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The following section lays 
out the mechanics of the extended model which considers the investment motivation of 
professional development and training, and allows for a correlation between labour market 
abilities and moving costs. The penultimate section explores potential influences on the 
scale and skill composition of (permanent) migrant health professionals, particularly of 
institution variables; and the final section concludes. 
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3.2 THE EXTENDED MODEL 
 
To examine the effects of remuneration, professional development opportunities, and 
regulation regimes on the migration and return decisions of health professionals, we use a 
variant of the model by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996). For a better understanding of the 
migration decision in the neoclassical economics scheme, it is instructive to initially set 
forth the following important assumptions. 
1. The earnings in both countries are time predictable; 
2. An individual has the same time profile of working life; 
3. The probability of employment is not time-variable. 
Given these assumptions, we can consider a two-country, one-period and static 
model where health professionals of the donor country (country 0) decide whether to 
migrate to a foreign country (country 1) temporarily or permanently. 
We assume that the relative skill endowments of health professionals in the donor 
country follow a normal distribution    (    
 ), which can be known to the individual 
and transferable across countries. The log earning distributions facing a professional in the 
donor and host countries are determined as follows: 
                          (3.2)                                                                                   
where    is the mean log income in the donor country, and    is the mean income in the 
host country for this particular population. The variable   measures the rate of return to 
skills in the donor country relative to the host country: the higher the return on skills, the 
greater the income inequality. 
Besides the pursuit of better pay, health professionals may seek a period of 
employment abroad in the belief that it will aid professional development and enhance 
earnings both in the donor and host countries. For this investment motivation of 
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professional development and training opportunities, we assume that an immigrant's 
professional skills will enhance by k after spending the fraction   of his whole working life 
in the host country. We assume that   is endogenous to migrant individuals. It depends on 
the demand for health workforce and relevant regulatory policies adopted in different host 
countries. The return on the foreign practice experience may vary in individual cases as 
different professionals may give different level of efforts and commitments and 
demonstrate different ability of adapting to an alien work environment. Thus, the 
distribution of the random variable k for professionals in the donor country is given by: 
                 (3.3) 
where    is the presumed expected enhancement in skills underpinned by the practice 
experience in the host country, and the random variable   measures deviation from the 
expected increase in skills and follows a normal distribution:    (    
 ). The variable   is 
assumed to be independent of original skills, v, and remains unknown to professionals until 
they migrate to the host country. Accordingly, it implies the uncertainty of professional 
development and training opportunities, or rather the uncertain component in migration 
decisions. 
Health professionals may either return to the donor country or continue to remain in 
the host country after completing the time-limited contracts of employment. Ignoring 
discounting and using a first-order approximation, the log earnings for temporary 
immigrants are given by:  
            (   )(     ).    (3.4)                                                                                          
Similarly, professionals who reside in the host country permanently will face the 
earnings distribution: 
           (   )(    ).         (3.5)                                                                                      
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Professionals seek to maximize their expected earnings, relative to migration costs 
along with permanent residence costs in the host country. So the migration decisions can be 
derived as follows: 
“Migrate” if: 
                       (3.6)                                                                                                        
“Migrate and not return” if:  
                                           (3.7)                                                           
where M gives a "time-equivalent" measure of costs of migrating to the host country, and R 
gives "time-equivalent" costs of switching temporary migration for permanent residence. 
Given the investment motivation of professional development and training, we assume that 
a professional emigrates as long as her expected wage from temporary migration, net of 
migration costs, exceeds the wage in the donor country; and once earning foreign practice 
experience, she then decides whether to return or remain according to benefits received 
from the experience: those facing better opportunities in the host country, net of permanent 
residence costs, than in the donor country tend to remain permanently. 
The equilibrium sorting of health professionals based on the above migration 
decisions is: 
“Stay in country 0” if:  
  (   )  (         )  
     
 
               (3.8)                                                                     
“Migrate to country 1” if:  
  (   )  (         )  
     
 
                 (3.9)                                                               
“Migrate and then return to country 0” if:  
  
(         )  
     
 
 (   )                                                                         
                                               ,      (   )  -  
 
   
 (   )    
     (3.10) 
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“Migrate and then remain in country 1" if:   
 (   )(   )  ,      (   )  -  
 
   
    (3.11)                                                           
The probability of migration, p, and probability of permanent migration, q, are 
given by: 
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)                  
            (3.12)                                                      
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)                                          
   (3.13)                                              
where   is the standard normal distribution function. In particular, the derivatives of p and 
q with respect to various exogenous parameters are as follows: 
 
  
   
  ;                                                      (3.14)                                                                      
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   if    ;              (3.15)                                                    
  
  
  
   if   
 
  
  and 
  
  
   if   
 
  
;    (3.16)   
  
  
  
  .        (3.17)   
The migration rate depends positively on how much health professionals are 
expected to benefit through the practice experience in the host country (shown in the 
derivative in 3.14). The permanent migration rate, on the other hand, depends positively on 
enhanced skills if the donor country values skills less (i.e.    ), and negatively otherwise 
(shown in the derivatives in 3.15). That is to say, for positively selected migrants, the more 
they could benefit, the more they are willing to remain; while for the negatively selected 
migrants, the more they could benefit, the more they are willing to return. The duration of 
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training programs or contracts can also affect the (permanent) migration rate. Professionals 
prefer to move to countries offering longer programs when the increased wages in the home 
country less than compensates for migration costs (i.e.   
 
  
); and vice versa (shown in 
the derivatives in 3.16). The permanent migration rate, on the other hand, falls regardless 
when the duration of training programs is extended (shown in the derivative in 3.17). 
Professionals who decide to migrate permanently wish to receive the investment on human 
capital as soon as possible. 
The implications for skill composition of medical migration flows can be drawn 
from the selection bias of migrant professionals relative the average professionals. Define 
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|   |  
       
,      (   )  - 
 
   
|   |√  
    
 
 . (3.18)                                     
The selection bias of migrant professionals   , and the selection bias of permanent 
migrant professionals,   , are given by: 
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   (3.20)                               
where  ( )  
 ( )
   ( )
 and   is the density function of the standard normal distribution. We 
can then decide whether the average (permanent) migrant is better or worse off than the 
average professional in the donor country according to the sign of (permanent) selection 
biases. A similar self-selection process for health professionals can be summarised using 
the terminology of Borjas (1987) and Borjas and Brasberg (1996): if skills are valued more 
highly in the host country than in the donor country (i.e.    ), health professionals with 
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higher skills tend to migrate (i.e.      ), and among these positive-selected migrants 
those most skilled tend to migrate permanently (i.e.       and     ); and vice versa.  
Existing models (Borjas 1999; Borjas and Bratsberg 1996) in general base 
discussions on the assumption that costs of migration remain constant in the population, 
and ignore the possibility that migration costs are able to determine whether immigrants are 
drawn from the upper or lower tail of the skill distribution. The restrictive relicensing and 
regulatory regimes for the migration of health professionals, as documented in Chapter 2, 
might make migration costs and permanent residence costs vary among professionals. More 
specifically, the restrictive relicensing regime imposes additional costs of relicensing on 
migrant professionals, involving out-of-pocket costs (e.g., tuition and registration fees) and 
psychological costs (e.g., the efforts expended in meeting relicensing requirements) (Kugler 
and Sauer, 2005); the requirement of work permits imposes psychological costs (e.g., the 
efforts expended in obtaining a work permit), out-of-pocket costs (e.g., fees of extending 
visa and work permit) and opportunity costs (e.g., the foregone wages the professional 
could have earned if return to home country). Higher skilled professionals are likely to feel 
it relatively easier to meet relicensing requirements and find a long-term employment, and 
bear relatively higher forgone wages. Accordingly, we can assume the skill level is 
negatively correlated with the psychological costs of acquiring a license and finding a long-
term employment, but positively correlated with the opportunity costs. 
To reflect the skill-related moving costs, we assume that:  
                  (   )      (3.21)                                                                     
where   and    measures the out-of-pocket costs and the skill-independent component of 
psychological costs (e.g., the reluctance to leave behind family ties and social networks). 
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The sign of parameter   and   are determined by correlation between skill levels and the 
sum of opportunity costs and the rest psychological costs in the relevant migration process. 
The migration decision rules of health professionals then become: 
"Stay" if:  
 .    
 
 
/   (         )  
      
 
             (3.22)                                                              
"Migrate" if:  
 .    
 
 
/   (         )  
      
 
             (3.23)                                                     
"Migrate and then remain" if:   
 .    
 
   
/ (   )  ,      (   )  -  
  
   
      (3.24)                                              
 
3.3 INFLUENCES ON THE SELF-SELECTION OF MIGRANT HEALTH 
PROFESSIONALS 
 
3.3.1 General comparative Statics 
 
Using the model laid out in the previous section, we explore the implications of the income-
maximization hypothesis separately for the scale and skill composition of the self-selected 
migration flow. First, the new probabilities of migration and permanent migration are: 
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where    
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.    is positive if     
(   )(      )       , i.e. average professionals in the donor country could not 
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benefit from migration, and negative otherwise. Analogously,    is positive if (  
 )(     )     (   )(      ) , i.e. average migrant professionals could not 
benefit from permanent migration, and negative otherwise. The qualitative effects of 
migration costs and permanent residence costs on these probabilities are given by: 
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  . (3.30) 
The share of migration in the population falls when skill-independent costs (e.g. 
out-of-pocket costs and reluctance to leave behind family ties and social networks) rises 
(show in the derivative in 3.27). In addition, the migration share decreases with the 
correlation between costs and skill level in case of positive selection (i.e.     
 
 
  ); 
and increases with the correlation in case of negative selection (i.e.     
 
 
  ) (show 
in the derivatives in 3.28). Similar conclusions can be drawn for the self-selection process 
of permanent migrant professionals. 
The implications for skill composition of medical migration flows, on the other 
hand, can be drawn from the selection bias of migrant professionals relative the average 
professionals. The selection bias of migrant professionals,   , and the selection bias of 
permanent migrant professionals,   , are given by 
    . | .    
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As we can see from Equation 3.31, the introduction of skill–related migration costs 
set a new critical value for the self-selection process of medical migration: migration flows 
are positively selected if     
 
 
  , and negatively selected if     
 
 
  . That is 
to say, a higher skill premium in the lower income donor country (i.e.    ) does not 
necessarily imply negative selection, and vice versa. Take the situation of        
 
 
 
for example. With negative skill-related migration costs(i.e.    ), the incentives to 
migrate for those who are worse off may decline due to their relatively higher migration 
costs, while those at the upper tail of the income distribution may be willing to migrate, 
such that migrant professionals are positive selected even though the host country taxes 
highly skilled professionals and subsidizes less skilled professionals relative to the donor 
country (i.e.    ). Similar conclusions can be drawn for the self-selection process of 
permanent migrant professionals. 
The impacts of any variable x on the average quality of migrants and permanent 
migrants can be found by differentiating the selection bias of (permanent) migrant 
professionals,   (  ), with respect the variable:   
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    (3.34) 
The first term captures the effect of a change in the skill composition for a constant 
scale of (permanent) migration, or what is termed the “composition effect”, and the second 
term captures the effect of a change in the scale of (permanent) migration for a given skill 
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composition, or the “scale effect” (Borjas, 1987). Tables 3.1 and 3.2 summarise the 
comparative statics results under various regimes. 
  Table 3.1: Summary of comparative statics results for migration. 
  Positive Selection 
    
 
 
   
Negative Selection 
    
 
 
   
   
 (     )
 
Composition Effect none none 
Scale Effect – + 
 
   
   
 
Composition Effect none none 
Scale Effect – + 
   
   
 
Composition Effect none none 
Scale Effect + – 
   
  
 
Composition Effect none none 
Scale Effect      + + 
     – – 
   
  
 
Composition Effect none none 
Scale Effect      ? – 
     – ? 
   
   
 
Composition Effect + – 
Scale Effect      – + 
     + – 
 
The impact of a change in the expected return to the practice experience in the host 
country on the average skills of migration professionals is given by: 
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       (3.35) 
Shifts in the expected return to the foreign practice experience only have a scale 
effect on the skill composition of migrant professionals. An increase in    increases the 
migration rate, which in turn decreases the average skills of positive-selected migrant 
professionals and increases the average skills of negative-selected migrants. 
The impact of a change in the rate of return to skills in the donor country relative to 
the host country is given by: 
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      (3.36) 
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The scale effect of the relative return to skills in the donor country is negative if 
migrant professionals are positively selected and average professionals in the donor country 
could  benefit from migration (i.e.     ), or if migrant professionals are negatively 
selected and average professionals in the donor country could not benefit from migration 
(i.e.     ). Otherwise, the direction of the effect is ambiguous. 
Finally, the impact of a change in the inequality of earnings is given by: 
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       (3.37) 
The composition effect depends on the sign of     
 
 
. An increase in income 
inequality improves the earnings of the high skilled, making these better-off more likely to 
migrate if they can benefit from the migration and more likely to stay if they cannot benefit 
from the migration. Hence, the migration flow will include more professionals from the 
upper tail of the distribution if positive selection occurs, but also more professionals from 
the lower tail of the distribution if negative selection occurs. The scale effect has the same 
sign as the composition effect if average professionals in the donor country could benefit 
from migration (i.e.     ), and the opposite sign if average professionals in the donor 
country could not benefit from migration (i.e.     ). 
Similar conclusions can be drawn for the self-selection process of permanent 
migrant professionals except the impact of expected return to the foreign practice 
experience, given by: 
  
   
   
 
   
    
 
   
  
   
       (3.38) 
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The scale effect of the expected return to the foreign practice experience on the 
average skills of permanent migrants is negative if      .    
 
   
/  or   
   .    
 
   
/, and positive if        
 
   
 or   
 
   
    . 
     
     Table 3.2: Summary of comparative statics results for permanent migration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2 The relative returns to skills 
  
In the general formulation of this model, a key determinant of the self-selection process is 
the relative returns to skills between the donor and host countries,   , which is measured as 
“the ratio of household income of the top 10 percent of the households to the income of the 
bottom 20 percent of the households” for general workers  (Borjas, 1987, pp. 545). 
However, within the health sector, measurement of this parameter is clearly an issue with 
the lack of available and comparable data on incomes and occupational classifications 
(Dräger, DalPoz and Evans, 2006).  
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Composition Effect none none 
Scale Effect – + 
   
   
 
Composition Effect none none 
Scale Effect – if     
+ if     
– if     
+ if     
   
   
 
Composition Effect none none 
Scale Effect + – 
   
  
 
Composition Effect none none 
Scale Effect      + + 
     – – 
   
  
 
Composition Effect none none 
Scale Effect      ? – 
     – ? 
   
   
 
Composition Effect + – 
Scale Effect      – + 
     + – 
   
   
 
Composition Effect + – 
Scale Effect      – + 
     + – 
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The best information we find is an OECD health paper by Fujisawa and Lafortune 
(2008), which compares the remuneration ratios of specialists to GPs for 11 OECD 
countries using OECD Health Data 2007. As can be seen in Table 3.3, there are significant 
variations in the remuneration levels of specialists to GPS across countries, ranging from 
90% in Czech Republic, the same level in Iceland, up to more than twice in Netherlands. 
Facing these large variations, GPs are more likely to move to countries with lower ratios of 
remuneration between specialists and GPs, while specialists are more likely to move to 
countries with higher ratios. In particular, the UK offers a small remuneration difference 
(1.3 times) even though the gap in the length of training periods is quite long (4-7 years) 
compared with other countries, Netherlands, for instance, offering 1.4 times more 
remuneration for additional 4-6 years of training. This may provide GPs with higher 
incentives to move into the UK than specialists, resulting in a negative selection of doctors 
between grades from most of the countries with available data, such as Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, France, Austria, Canada, United States and Finland. Indeed, as highlighted in 
Chapter 2, migrants contribute less to consultant level posts, constituting 28% of 
consultants who work in the HCHS of the NHS in England, compared with 74% of staff 
grades and 40% of doctors in training and equivalents. 
As to within grade income difference, no relevant data is available at all. The review 
conducted by Simoens and Hurst (2006) for physician remuneration methods in the OECD 
countries suggests that, for countries where the health care system is funded through 
taxation, primary care physicians tend to be paid by salary set centrally (e.g. Greece, 
Portugal, Spain and Sweden) or at least paid by a mix of salary, capitation and fee-for-
service (e.g. Australia, Denmark, New Zealand, Norway and the UK); while for countries 
where heath care is financed through insurance, physicians tend to provide services as 
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independent contractors and be paid by fee-for-service systems (e.g. Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Switzerland and the USA) (See Table 3.4 for details).  
As experience had shown that salary payment fails to promote high quantity of 
health provision compared with capitation and fee-for-service, middle and upper income 
countries have made attempts to introduce performance-related payment based on outputs 
and outcome (e.g. Australia, Hungary, the United Kingdom, and the United States) (WHO, 
2006). Lower income countries, on the other hand, also show some interest in the 
performance-related payment, but, constrained by the higher administrative costs and 
capacity, health professionals are still mainly paid by salary unrelated to performance in the 
public sector and fee-for-service in the private sector (WHO, 2006). It seems plausible to 
argue that, by paying the better performers and worse performers on the same salary scale, 
the salary payment system is likely to push those health professionals providing higher 
quantity/quality of treatment to join the performance-related payment system, more 
specifically, a positive selection of health professionals within grade from the public sector 
to the private sector, and from poor countries to rich countries. 
Table 3.3: Number of years of medical training after secondary education and ratio of 
remuneration of specialists to remuneration of GPs, 2004 (or closest year available). 
Country GPs Specialists 
Training year 
difference 
Ratio of 
remuneration 
Netherlands 9 13-15 4-6 2.4 
Luxembourg+++ - - - 2 
France 9 10-12 1-3 1.7 
Austria** 9 12 3 1.6 
Canada* 10 12-15 2-5 1.5 
United States* 11 11-15 0-4 1.5 
Finland++ 8 13-14 5-6 1.3 
United Kingdom+ 8-9 12-15 4-7 1.3 
Switzerland*** 11 11-13 0-2 1.1 
Iceland*** 7-11.5 13.5 2-6.5 1.0 
Czech Republic* 8.5 11.5-13.5 3-5 0.9 
        + 1999, ++ 2002, +++ 2003, * 2005, ** 2006, *** 2007. 
          Source: Fujisawa and Lafortune (2008), page 36. 
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Table 3.4: Physician Payment methods. 
Countries Primary care physicians Ambulatory care specialists Physicians in public hospital Physicians in private hospital 
Australia 
75-80% by blended payment (mainly fee-for-
service, 10% of income derived from capitation and 
target payments for immunisation). 
Fee-for-service, with no limit on use of 
services and annual expenditure. 
Blended payment (salary for treating public 
patients and fee-for-service for treating 
private patients in public hospital). 
Fee-for-service and salary. 
 
Austria 
60% by fee-for-service and 40% by fee-for-service 
and capitation. 
90% by fee-for-service, 10% by capitation 
and fee-for-service. 
90% by salary and 10% by fee-for-service.  
 
90% by fee-for-service and 10% by 
salary. 
Belgium Fee-for-service. Fee-for-service. Fee-for-service. Fee-for-service. 
Canada  
Mainly by fee-for-service, some alternative 
payment methods. Mainly by fee-for-service.   Majority by fee-for-service. 
Denmark  
 
Blended payment (63% of income from fee-for-
service, 28% from capitation). Not relevant.  
Salary. 
  
England  
 
86% by blended payment (capitation, practice 
allowance, fee-for-service for selected 
services, target payments for immunisation), 
14% by fee-for-service for private work. 
100% by salary for public patients, fee-for-
service 
for private patients. 
 
100% by salary for public patients, fee-for-
service 
for private patients. 
 
100% by fee-for-service. 
 
France  Fee-for-service.  Fee-for-service.  Salary.  Fee-for-service. 
Germany  100% by fee-for-service.  100% by fee-for-service.  Salary. Fee-for-service for private patients. 100% by salary. 
Greece  
Salary in public sector, fee-for-service in private 
sector. 
Salary in public sector, fee-for-service in 
private sector. Mainly by salary.  
Blended payment (fee-for-service and 
salary). 
Ireland  
Fee-for-service if higher patient income, capitation 
if lower patient income.  
Salary. Fee-for-service for treating privately 
insured patients in public hospital.  
Japan  Fee-for-service.  
Salary for hospital outpatient services, fee-
for-service for independent outpatient 
clinics. 
Salary. 
  
Korea  100% by fee-for-service.  100% by fee-for-service.  100% by fee-for-service.  100% by fee-for-service.  
Mexico  
Salary in public sector, fee-for-service in private 
sector. 
Salary in public sector, fee-for-service in 
private sector. Salary.  
Fee-for-service. 
 
Netherlands  
Fee-for-service if higher patient income, capitation 
if lower patient income.   
Blended payment (salary and fee-for-
service). 
New Zealand  78% by fee-for-service and 22% by capitation.  Majority by salary.  Majority by salary.  
Majority by fee-for-service, minority by 
salary. 
Norway  
Blended payment (70% of income from fee-for-
service and 30% from capitation). 
Salary and fee-for-service in public sector, 
fee-for-service in private sector. 
Salary. 
  
Portugal  
Salary in public sector, fee-for-service in private 
sector.  Salary.  
Fee-for-service. 
 
Slovak 
Republic 
Blended payment (capitation and target payments 
for preventive care). 100% by fee-for-service.  100% by salary.  
Fee-for-service. 
 
Spain  
Blended payment (85% of income from salary and 
15% from capitation). 100% by salary.  100% by salary.  
Mainly by fee-for-service. 
 
Sweden  Salary.  Salary.  100% by salary.  100% by salary. 
Switzerland  96% by fee-for-service and 4% by salary.  90% by fee-for-service, 10% by salary.  
Fee-for-service, salary and blended payment 
(fee-for-service and salary). 
Fee-for-service, salary and blended 
payment (fee-for-service and salary). 
United States  Blended payment. Blended payment. Blended payment. Blended payment. 
Source: Simoens and Hurst (2006), page 45.  
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3.3.3 Migration and permanent residence costs  
 
Besides the relative income distributions in donor and host countries, costs of migration 
and permanent residence also play an important role in determining the direction of self-
selection, especially in the health sector with stringent regulatory regimes, professionals‟ 
skills are likely to influence their migration and permanent residence decisions. We start by 
considering the uncertainty of the professional development and training opportunities (i.e. 
 ), under the situation that migration costs are independent of skills (e.g.      ).  
Figure 3.1 illustrates migration decisions when     and     . The migration 
threshold,  , and the permanent migration threshold,  , are given by: 
  
         
   
 
      
 (   )
     
      (   )  
   
 
  
(   )(   )
        (3.39) 
 
 
The return on the practice experience in the host country may vary in individual 
cases, and the decision of permanent residence depends on how much the professional can 
benefit from the experience. As Figure 3.1 indicates, if    , a professional who has got 
both relatively higher original skills and increment skills from the practice experience will 
Stay 
 
Return 
Return 
Stay 
 
(a) η < 1 (b) η > 1 
Migration threshold Permanent migration threshold 
v v 
δ δ 
Figure 3.1: Skill sorting. 
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find it optimal to migrate permanently; and vice versa. As long as    (   )   , the 
introduction of uncertainty in training leads to similar insights as the human capital model 
presented above: return migration intensifies the selection which characterizes the initial 
migration in terms of both original skills and increment skills. 
For    , 
  ( |                )   ( |                  )  
  ( |                )   ( |                  )     
  (   |                )   (   |                  )  
For    , 
  ( |                )   ( |                  )  
  ( |                )   ( |                  )     
  (   |                )   (   |                  )  
Overall, permanent migrants have higher actual skills than return migrants in the 
case of positive selection; and lower actual skills, otherwise. 
 
Skill-independent costs 
 
We next consider the influence of changes in skill-independent migration costs and 
permanent residence costs (e.g. the out-of-pocket costs, and the independent-with-skill 
component of psychological costs such as the reluctance to leave behind family ties and 
social networks), again under the situation that migration costs are independent of skills 
(e.g.      ). Consistent with earlier studies (Carrington, Detragiache, and Vishwanath, 
1996), Figure 3.2 indicates that a higher (permanent) migration cost reduces the share of 
migrants in the population, which in turn increases the average skills of (permanent) 
migrants in case of positive selection, and decreases the average skills otherwise. Thus, 
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countries could encourage migration flows through lowering    and    , and limit 
migration through increasing   and   .  
 
 
 
Skill-related migration costs  
 
Allowing for migration costs varying with skills, the migration threshold and permanent 
migration threshold then become: 
  
         
    
 
 
 
      
 .    
 
 
/
     
      (   )  
    
 
   
 
  
(   )(    
 
   
)
     (3.40) 
Thus, the migration threshold is determined by the coefficient between skills and 
migration costs (i.e.  ), while the permanent migration threshold is determined by the 
coefficient between skills and permanent residence costs (i.e.  ). In order to illustrate the 
Migration threshold Permanent migration threshold 
(a) η < 1 (b) η > 1 
Stay 
 
Stay 
 
Return 
Return 
δ δ 
v v 
M0’ < M0 M0 > M0’ R0’ < R0 R0 < 
R0’ 
 
Figure 3.2: Influence of M0 and R0 on Skill Sorting (assuming α =   = 0). 
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effect of relicensing and regulatory regimes on international mobility of health 
professionals, we consider migration costs and permanent residence costs separately6.  
Figure 3.3 illustrates how the sign of   influences migration choices, assuming   
 . Consider the threshold of positive selection for a donor country with      when 
migration costs are uncorrelated with skills as a benchmark (indicated as the black vertical 
line in Figure 3.3-a). A negative coefficient between skills and migration costs (i.e.    ) 
leads “marginal stayers” with relatively lower skills than the average migrants to emigrate, 
which in turn increases the share, and decreases the average skills of the migration flow. 
Alternatively, in the case of a positive coefficient satisfying     
 
 
   (indicated as 
   ), migrant professionals will be more skilled as a result of “marginal migrants” with 
less skills dropping out. In short, an increase in the correlation between skills and migration 
costs decreases the scale and increases the average skills of migrant professionals 
provided     
 
 
  . However, it is worth emphasizing that a change in   can alter the 
form of original selection process. When the positive coefficient is large enough to 
turn     
 
 
 into negative (indicated as    ), the professionals with below-average 
skills are likely to migrate, while those immigrants who have relatively higher original 
skills and increment skills will remain in the host country. Hence, migrants are negatively 
selected even though the host country offers higher rewards to skills, although permanent 
migrants are still positively selected: 
  ( |                )   ( |                  )  
             ( |                )   ( |                  )     
             (   |                )   (   |                  )  
                                                 
6
 For simplicity, the remainder of the discussion is based on the assumption that average professionals in the 
donor country cannot benefit from migration (i.e.     ). Obviously, this assumption restricts the migration 
rate to less than half, which is fairly sensible in reality. 
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It is noteworthy that the unchanged permanent migration threshold sets a higher 
standard of increment skills for migrants with lower original skills. Among the lower 
skilled migrants, only those who receive a relatively higher return from the practice 
experience can benefit from permanent migration. Lower skilled migrant professionals 
have to expend more effort to bridge the gap in skills and obtain further employment 
opportunities, while higher skilled professionals may choose to remain in the host country 
even though their increment skills are relatively lower. Therefore, the impact of α on the 
actual skills of permanent migrants, the sum of original skills and increment skills, remains 
ambiguous. 
We then consider the case of negative selection for a donor country with     
when migration costs are uncorrelated with skills (indicated as the black vertical line in 
Figure 3.3-b). An increase in the correlation between skills and migration costs increases 
the scale and average skills of migrant professionals provided     
 
 
  . Similarly, in 
Migration threshold Permanent migration threshold 
δ δ 
v 
v 
Stay 
 
Stay 
 
Stay 
 
Stay 
 
(a) η < 1 (b) η > 1 
Return 
Return 
Return 
Return 
α>>0     α<0       α>0 
α=     
     
α<0       α>0      α<<0 
Figure 3.3: Influence of α on Skill Sorting (assuming   = 0). 
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case of the negative correlation small enough to meet     
 
 
   (indicated as    ), 
migrant professionals will be positively selected, while permanent migration are still 
negatively selected. This finding is consistent with recent studies by Chiswick (1999) and 
Brücker and Trübswetter (2004) that a more unequal income distribution in the lower 
income donor country does not necessarily imply negative selectivity. 
 
Skill-related permanent residence costs 
 
Finally, we allow for permanent residence costs varying with skills, and the permanent 
migration threshold is    
      (   )  
    
 
   
 
  
(   )(    
 
   
)
  . Analogously, Figure 3.4 
shows how the sign of   affects permanent migration choices, assuming    . The actual 
skills of permanent migrants are determined by the sum of original skills and increment 
skills, or rather by the increment skills because the original skills of migrant professionals 
remain constant in the case of    . 
 
 
Migration threshold Permanent migration threshold 
δ δ 
v 
v 
Stay 
 
Stay 
 
Stay 
 
Stay 
 
(a) η < 1 (b) η > 1 
Return 
Return 
 >>0         <0       >0   <0         >0     <<0 
Figure 3.4: Influence of   on Skill Sorting (assuming α = 0). 
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For donor countries providing lower returns to skills (i.e.    ), an increase in the 
correlation between skills and permanent residence costs decreases the scale, and increases 
the average skills of permanent migrants, provided     
 
   
    Otherwise, as the dash 
line (   ) indicates, the form of the selection characterizing permanent migration will be 
switched into a negative selection. In this situation, permanent migrants are negatively 
selected in term of both original skills and increment skills from the sample of the positive-
selected migration flow.  
Alternatively, in the case of donor countries providing higher returns to skills (i.e. 
   ), an increase in the correlation between skills and permanent residence costs 
increases the scale and average skills of permanent migrants provided     
 
   
  . 
Although, permanent migrants will be positively selected if       
 
   
 (indicated as 
   ). 
 
Interpretation: outcomes of institution variables 
 
We consider here the implications of various institutional variables on the scale and skill 
composition of migrant health professionals in the UK example. 
 Country-to-country campaigns 
To mitigate the adverse effects of medical migration, the UK government published 
the Code of Practice and encourages NHS employers to recruits migrant health 
professionals using country-to-country campaigns. This will lower   and    through the 
established network of previous migrants from the same country, thereby bring in more 
migrant professionals. However, the government should be careful that, as indicated in 
Figure 3.2, the increased scale of migration flows will be completely contributed by 
permanent migrants rather than temporary migrants if   and    are reduced at same level. 
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The model suggests that government intervention on permanent residence is necessary to 
avoid a “brain drain” from targeted countries. 
 Relicensing and work permits 
As with British citizens, EEA health professionals are automatically eligible for full 
registrations, except for some particular specialities; and free from immigration controls 
such as work permits. In this situation, migration costs involve psychological costs (e.g., 
the disutility associated with leaving behind family ties and social networks), out-of-pocket 
costs (e.g., commuting expenses, fees, and household goods), and opportunity costs (e.g., 
the foregone wages the professional could have earned when travelling, searching for a new 
job); and tend to be positively related with skills as the high-skilled generally bear higher 
forgone wages. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 suggest although it seems that the average skills of 
migrants from EEA would be increased by bringing in less positively selected health 
professionals and more negatively selected professionals, there exists a risk of turning 
positive selection into negative selection. For example, in countries such as Greece, 
Portugal, Spain and Sweden, where primary care physicians are paid by salary set centrally, 
(permanent) migrant physicians will not be positively selected if     
 
 
   (    
 
   
  ). This happens with a large correlation between (permanent) migration costs and 
skills (e.g. high unemployment rates in the donor country) and a shorter (longer) duration of 
training programs or contracts. 
Non-EEA professionals, on the other hand, have to meet the requirements of 
relicensing and work permits to practise in the UK. The migration costs involve 
psychological costs (e.g., the disutility associated with leaving behind family ties and social 
networks, the efforts expended in meeting relicensing requirements and obtaining a work 
permit), out-of-pocket costs (e.g., commuting expenses, fees, and household goods, tuition 
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and registration fees and fees of applying for the visa and work permit), and opportunity 
costs (e.g., the foregone wages the professional could have earned when travelling, 
searching for a new job and training); while the permanent residence costs involve 
psychological costs (e.g. the disutility associated with leaving behind family ties and social 
networks, and the efforts expended in obtaining a work permit and finding a long-term 
employment in the host country), out-of-pocket costs (e.g. fees of extending visa and work 
permit, and household goods), and opportunity costs (e.g. the foregone wages the 
professional could have earned if return to home country). In this case,   is determined by 
the correlation between skills and the sum of opportunity costs, and psychological costs of 
acquiring a license and work permit, while   is determined by correlation between skills 
and the sum of opportunity costs, and psychological costs of acquiring a work permit and 
finding a long-term employment. Since more skilled professionals are likely to feel it 
relatively easier to meet relicensing requirements and obtain a work permit and spend 
relatively shorter time to find an employment, the restrictive relicensing regime and the 
change of the immigration rules may increase   and   , and decrease   and  .  
Similar to the pervious discussion, an increase in   (  ) decreases the scale of the 
(permanent) migration flow; increases the average skills of (permanent) migrants in the 
case of positive selection, and decreases the average skills in the case of negative selection. 
A decrease in   ( ) decreases the average skills of (permanent) migrants; increases the 
scale of the (permanent) migration flow in the case of positive selection, and decreases the 
scale in the case of negative selection. Consequently, for donor countries that value skills 
more (e.g. Japan, Korea and USA where physicians are completely paid by fee-for-service), 
these regulations not only reduce the scale, but also the average skills of (permanent) 
migrant health professionals. Nevertheless, the model also suggests that it is possible to 
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achieve positive selection by introducing a small negative correlation between (permanent) 
migration costs and skills, and a (longer) shorter duration of contracts and visas. For other 
donor countries, most likely with lower incomes and health professionals paid by salaries 
regardless of performance, the effects are ambiguous as the effects of    and   (   and  ) 
are opposite. 
The effects of relicensing on migration costs we have discussed so far solely focus 
on skills within grade. Effects on skills between grades are also of interest as the British 
government has shown strong intention to improve the recruitment and retention of 
consultants (Ikenwilo and Scott, 2007). The GMC sets separate registration requirements 
for GP registrars and specialist registrars, which means professionals in higher grade posts 
need to expend more efforts to meet relevant relicensing requirements. The diversity 
relicensing regimes increase   in the whole doctor category, and therefore, limit the inflow 
of senior professionals from countries offering higher remuneration difference between 
grades (e.g. Switzerland, Iceland and Czech Republic) and foster the inflow of junior 
professionals from countries otherwise. 
 High unemployment rate in donor countries 
Despite the global shortage of health staff, there are still a large number of 
unemployed professionals in many countries (WHO, 2006). For example, Germany is 
experiencing a surplus of physicians which is attributed to the education system (Kabene et 
al., 2006); the health sector employments have been downsized in many countries 
implementing programmes of structural adjustment, such as Poland (Domagala et al., 2000 
cited in Bach 2003), Uganda (Corkery, 2000 cited in Bach, 2003), Estonia, Latvia and 
Bulgaria (ILO, 2002 cited in Bach, 2003).  
For health professionals from such countries with high unemployment rates, the 
lower skilled may bear lower, or even zero foregone wages if migrate or return to the donor 
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country, and thus, the unavailability of employment opportunities in the donor country 
decrease   and   , and increase   and  . In this situation, the effects of unemployment in 
the donor country on the scale and average skills of (permanent) migrant professionals are 
positive if the donor country values skills more (i.e.   >1); but ambiguous, otherwise. It is 
clear that countries with higher relative returns to skills should reduce the unemployment 
rate in the health sector to retain health professionals. In Germany, for example, where 
primary care physicians are paid by fee-for-service, the reform of the education system is 
necessary that places in medical school should be arranged centrally according to national 
demand.  
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has presented a theoretical analysis of (permanent) migration behaviour of 
health professionals. The self-selection model by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) is extended 
to account for important characteristics that are specific to the health sector. As a specific 
group of highly skilled workers, health professionals have demonstrated strong motivation 
of continuous professional and personal development in the migration decision. The model 
suggests that countries with higher international recognition for the health service delivery 
and training system are in general more popular in the international health labour markets. 
Although the extent to which these professionals migrate on the temporary or permanent 
basis and their preferences in the duration of initial contracts and visas may differ between 
donor countries with different relative returns of skills, their intention to remain 
permanently reduces if the duration of contracts and visas extends.   
By allowing for moving costs varying with skills, the extended model explicitly 
exploits the important role of various institution variables in determining the scale and skill 
composition of (permanent) migrant health professionals in the UK case. The country-to-
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country campaigns developed by the British government are likely to foster a further inflow 
of health professionals from targeted countries by lowering their moving costs with the 
established network of pervious migrants. The model suggests the stimulated inflow will be 
mainly composed of permanent migrants if migration costs and permanent residence costs 
change on the same extent, so government intervention on permanent residence is 
necessary to avoid a “brain drain”. In addition, the UK government has introduced 
restrictive requirements of relicensing and work permits for non-EEA health professionals 
to maintain the practice standards and secure employment opportunities for native 
graduates. These regulations, however, only limit the inflow of migrant health professionals 
from countries with higher returns to skills, although as well as their average skills. For 
most donor countries which provide lower returns to skills, the effect is ambiguous as 
effects of skill-independent costs and the correlation between skills and costs are opposite. 
The general policy suggestion is to adopt performance-based payment mechanism 
and increase remuneration differences between grades to restrict the outflow of high-skilled 
health professionals and the inflow of low-skilled professionals. Furthermore, the 
assumption that migration costs vary among professionals with different skill levels 
provides new insights into the self-selection process: even though the donor country 
provides higher returns to skills, the host country could still achieve positive selection by 
(1) reducing migration costs for high-skilled professionals, and (2) shortening the duration 
of contracts and visas. The first can be simply achieved by setting higher relicensing 
requirement and increasing competition in the labour market, while the second is not 
recommended because, on the one hand, shorter contracts could attract more permanent 
migrants; on the other hand, it could potentially bring in a negative selection of EEA 
nationals, especially those from countries with high unemployment rate, for whom moving 
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costs essentially depend on the forgone wages and are significantly positive related with 
skills.    
An empirical analysis would be necessary to provide a more accurate and 
comprehensive assessment of the extent to which pull and push factors and institutions 
affect the scale and skill composition of (permanent) migrant health professionals. It would 
be ideal to have individual data concerning the donor country to investigate if those who 
emigrated are positively or negatively selected compared with those who stayed; or 
alternatively, use data of the host country to compare those migrants who returned with 
those who remained. However, such data are very limited not only in the health sector but 
also on general migrants. Much of the existing empirical literature examines the dynamics 
of post-migration wages for migrant workers relative to their native counterparts and draws 
inferences about selection from their assimilation experience in the host country (Hatton 
and Williamson, 2002). It is only recently that researchers have started examining internal 
migration using data which document the pre- and post-migration wages. Examples of 
these include the internal migration in the USA and Canada (Chiswick, 1999) and the east-
west migration in Germany (Brücker and Trübswetter, 2004). Data collection is therefore, 
essential for governments, especially those of donor countries, to develop empirical 
evidence and appropriate strategies of regulating and monitoring the migration of health 
professionals. 
Due to the lack of data availability, we are constrained from further empirical 
analysis of the economic influences on the migration decisions of health professionals, but 
move on to assess the impacts of migrant health professionals on the health care provision 
in the host country by investigating migrant professionals‟ performance in the remainder of 
this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 4 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND DATA 
 
The remaining parts of this thesis are concerned with assessing the impacts of the migration 
of health professionals on the health care provision in the host country. For policy makers 
who are concerned to ensure continuity of access to NHS health service, two questions 
could be of particular interest: (1) how long do migrant health professionals work in the 
NHS? and (2) how does the treatment they provide compare with domestically trained 
professionals? In the next two chapters, we shall make attempts to address these two 
questions in the context of the NHS General Dental Service in Scotland. This chapter 
provides the institutional background and the data source for subsequent empirical 
analyses.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The first section reviews 
some relevant features of dental service provision in the NHS and dental access schemes 
that have been launched in Scotland; the second section describes the administrative data 
we employ. The last section presents results of some descriptive analytics where we first 
monitor the size and composition of migrant dentist inflow into the Scottish NHS since 
1996, and then investigate individual characteristics and career patterns of the recent 
cohorts of migrants relative to the Scottish vocational trainees who start working in the 
GDS at the same time. 
 
4.1 NHS DENTAL SERVICES AND ACCESS SCHEMES IN SCOTLAND 
 
Details of the dental service provision in the Scottish NHS have been set out by Chalkley 
and Tilley (2002). The key features that are relevant to this study are:  
 Patients in Scotland receive dental services from both NHS and private providers. 
NHS dental services are delivered in a variety of arrangements, namely, the GDS, 
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the Community Dental Service (CDS) and the Hospital Dental Service (HDS). The 
CDS provide services for adults with special needs and specific groups of children, 
as well as a safety-net function for those who are unable to access GDS; while the 
HDS provides highly specialised services for patients referred from both dental and 
medical practitioners and from other hospital services. They work together to meet 
the diverse needs of the population. The majority of dental services are undertaken 
by „high street‟ primary care GDPs in the GDS, accounting for approximately 75% 
of the costs for all NHS dental services in Scotland (Scottish Executive, 2005).  
 To receive treatment under the NHS, a patient visits and registers with a dentist, 
who is under an agreement with the GDS to provide NHS treatments. The costs of 
treatment are met in part by the NHS Boards, which receive government funds in 
order to meet the dental and medical health care needs of their constituent 
populations. Unlike most other NHS health services, dental services are not free at 
the point of delivery and patients contribute 80% of the treatment costs up to a cash 
limit unless exempt from charges, which can occur for a number of reasons.  
 GDPs are predominantly independent contractors who treat patients on behalf of 
NHS Boards under a hybrid „capitation‟ and „fee-for-service‟ system. More 
specifically, in return for providing NHS dental services, self-employed GDPs 
receive a capitation (continuing care) fee for each child (adult) patient registered on 
their list, and a fee for each item of service they provide to patients. The complete 
menu of capitation (continuing care) payments and item of service payments are 
specified in an annual publication – the Statement of Dental Remuneration (SDR). 
These self-employed GDPs can freely decide on the quantity of NHS work they 
wish to undertake, and usually see a mix of NHS and private patients.  
79 
 
 
 NHS Boards may choose to create salaried posts if GDPs in their locality are not 
accepting NHS registrations, or if GDPs are only accepting for treatment those 
patients exempt from payment, or if there are no GDPs practising in an area. 
Salaried GDPs are directly employed at a fixed salary, unconditional on the number 
or types of services they carry out.  
While dentists may work in one or more of the NHS dental services and/or the 
private sector, the GDS constitutes the primary career destination of dental graduates in 
Scotland (SCPMDE, 2004). Moreover, the detailed treatment data that we exploit in this 
thesis is only available from the GDS. Therefore, this study is focused solely on migration 
flow in the GDS. An important feature of the GDS, which is key to our study, is that items 
of treatment (e.g. examination, polish, filling, etc.) in every course of treatment (CoT) are 
recorded for payment purposes. It is therefore, possible to compare and contrast the 
treatments delivered by migrant dentists with those of non-migrant dentists in the GDS (see 
Chapter 6 for details).  
In order to practise dentistry in the GDS in Scotland, dentists need to obtain an NHS 
Board list number. To obtain a list number, dentists need to be issued with a Vocational 
Training (VT) number from NHS Education for Scotland to indicate that they have 
satisfactorily completed the VT
7 
in the UK or are exempt from the requirement to complete 
VT because: 
 they are from an EC/EEA Member State (other than the UK) and hold a recognised 
European Dental Diploma; 
 they have had a Health Board/Performer number within the last five years; 
                                                 
7
 Typically, VT comprises 12 months of supervised clinical experience in an approved training practice 
supplemented by an educational programme. 
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 they have practised in primary dental care in the CDS or the Armed Forces for four 
years‟ full-time (or equivalent part-time), and for not less than four months during 
the past four years; 
 they have completed a course of vocational training under the voluntary scheme; or 
 their experience and or/training during the previous five years is equivalent to VT. 
VT numbers are therefore a lead indicator of the inflow of dentists into NHS 
Scotland. Figure 4.1 shows that VT numbers issued have more than doubled during the past 
9 years, particularly with a large and sustained increase since 2005-06. As also can be 
found, this increase is mainly contributed by the EEA nationals.  
 
        Source: NHS Education for Scotland. 
Figure 4.1: VT numbers issued from October 2000 to September 2009. 
 
Figure 4.2 shows that there has been a large and sustained increase in VT numbers 
issued to EEA applicants, particularly in 2005-06. To put these numbers into context, the 
number of funded undergraduate dental students entering dental schools in Scotland in 
2009-10 was 170. Applicants for a VT number apply from a wide range of European 
countries and Figure 4.3 illustrates the 5 most common countries of application since VT 
year 2001 (10/2000 – 09/2001). These EEA nationals comprise the migrant dentists in our 
study.  
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        Source: NHS Education for Scotland. 
Figure 4.2: The number of VT numbers issued to EEA nationals who hold a 
recognised European diploma. 
 
 
        Source: NHS Education for Scotland. 
Figure 4.3: Applicants for VT numbers by country. 
 
Despite these existing initiatives, Scottish patients, particularly those in the islands 
and the more remote, sparsely populated areas, have experienced problems in accessing 
NHS dental services. This problem has historically emerged as a result of the uneven 
distribution of dentists, and is escalating in recent years for reasons such as a reduction in 
commitment to the NHS on the part of some GDPs, and insufficient justification for the 
setting up of a full time practice due to a limited number of patients in some areas (Scottish 
Executive, 2007). As of 31 May 2000, it was estimated that only about 49% of Scottish 
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adults and 66% of children are registered with GDPs for NHS dental services; the rest of 
the patients may receive dental services either from the CDS (about 10% of children), 
dental teaching hospitals (about 1% adults), or the private sector (about 14% adults), 
leaving a large proportion of the population not receiving any regular dental services at all 
(Scottish Executive, 2000)
8
. In particular, the private sector continues to grow – for 
instance, the number of patients receiving dental treatment from Denplan, the largest 
independent provider of dental service in the UK, increases from 51,502 in 2000 to 91,673 
in 2008, while the NHS registration rates remain constant for children and reduce gradually 
for adults until 2008 (NES, 2008). This year has seen a significant rise in registration rates 
for both children and adults, which however, may also be a result of extending registration 
period from 15 to 36 months in April 2006. 
In order to improve access to NHS dental services, the Scottish Executive published 
“An action plan for improving oral health and modernising NHS dental services in 
Scotland” (2005). The proposal outlines a range of workforce development measures to 
address the shortfall of over 200 dentists estimated in 2003/04 by 2008. This has included 
incentivising dentists to return to Scotland and recruiting from outside of Scotland; 
sustaining and developing salaried dental services; supporting and rewarding GDPs for 
NHS treatment provision; and expanding training capacity for dental professionals in 
Scotland (increasing by 15% to guarantee an output target of 135 by 2006). These efforts 
have proven successful in recent years and there are now 409 more dentists working in 
NHS Scotland in September 2008 (3,078) as compared to the number in September 2005 
(2,669)
9
. Of the 3,078 dentists practising at September 2008, approximately 2,703 (88%) 
                                                 
8
 Chalkley and Tilley (2008) proposed the NHS participation rate within a specific time interval rather than 
upon a specific time point to measure the actual access to NHS dental services to account for various visit 
frequencies of patients. A much better access has been suggested that about 79% of adult have accessed NHS 
dental services between 1998 and 2006. 
9
 NHSScotland Workforce Information published by ISD Scotland http://www.isdscotland.org/isd/5898.html. 
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work in the GDS, including 2,385 self-employed and 356 salaried. A further 475 dentists 
provide care in the CDS and 287 in HDS. These figures also suggest double counting of 
many dentists occurs as a result of cross-commitments between the three different services: 
for example, as many as 293 dentists work in joint salaried GDS/CDS posts. 
One of the policy initiatives launched by the Scottish Executive was to employ 
about 35 dentists directly from Poland in 2006 to arrive in Scotland in three cohorts. The 
first cohort of 12 dentists was expected to treat about 20,000 patients in Fife, Forth Valley 
and Argyle & Clyde. The latter two cohorts practise in Orkney, Stornoway, the Borders, 
Argyle & Clyde and Dumfries & Galloway, and in Grampian, Highland, Tayside and Fife, 
respectively. These Polish dentists are employed on a three year contract with salaried 
dental service after satisfactorily completing an intensive eight week English course and 
attending a two week residential course (NES, 2006). These recruited Polish dentists 
account for some but by no means all of the VT numbers issued to migrant dentists since 
2006. 
 
4.2 MIDAS DATA 
 
The anonymised treatment data reported in this paper comes from the Management 
Information & Dental Accounting System (MIDAS), which is a large-scale administrative 
database of linked patient-practitioner information maintained by the Practitioner Services 
Division to process, authorise and store all NHS GDS treatment in Scotland. The data is 
based upon mandatory claims for CoTs made by the entire population of practitioners in 
contract to the GDS over the last ten years for remuneration and audit, and therefore, offers 
an accurate reflection of treatments delivered.  
Within each CoT, the patient usually receives a range of items of service, each with 
an associated fee determined annually in a bilateral bargain between dentists‟ representative 
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and health boards. Following the Doctors‟ and Dentists‟ Review Body recommendations, 
items of service payments were initially based on the estimates on periodic reviews of the 
timings of treatment by the Dental Rates Study Group. Since 1996, however, payments 
have only been re-based in relation to the general price level so as to avoid distorted 
increases relative to the initial timing due to technical progress and productivity 
improvements (Chalkley & Tilley, 2002; 2006). In a word, the changes in these fees are 
informed by Doctors‟ and Dentists‟ Review Body but the level of the fees were historically 
set to make all treatment equally remunerative per unit of time. Thus, the total value of a 
claim, measured as the sum of fees for the individual items of services contained, reflects 
the time a dentist has spent treating a particular patient and constitutes a measure of 
treatment intensity. 
The NHS payment system allocates a unique identifier for each patient, GDP, 
practice and CoT, making it possible to follow patients, GDPs and types of treatment over 
time. Information on the migrant status of dentists in the GDS comes from NHS Education 
for Scotland. The VT numbers issued by NHS Education for Scotland were linked to the 
treatment data using the GDC number of the dentist.   
For each CoT, a relatively rich set of information is provided on different 
dimensions. MIDAS records the claim‟s value, payment month, and specifies its 
composition by including an indicator variable for each broad treatment category defined in 
the SDR (e.g. diagnostic, periodontal, conservative, surgical, prosthetic, etc). On the patient 
side, MIDAS contains information on the individual‟s date of birth, age at treatment, 
gender, and exemption status (exempt or non-exempt). The dentist characteristics that are 
provided include the age at treatment, gender, remuneration structure (self-employed or 
salaried). In addition, as dentists need to register with Practitioner Services for a list number 
for each practice where he/she works to process NHS transactions, the associated list 
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number and the date on which the number was resigned are also contained in the claim. 
Finally, MIDAS records the NHS Board and the deprivation category of each practice 
which ranges from 1 (most affluent) to 7 (least affluent). 
 
4.3 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS: MIGRANT DENTISTS IN NHS SCOTLAND 
 
4.3.1 Dentist inflows 
 
For the purpose of our analysis we obtained a full sample covering all claims submitted by 
migrant dentists from the MIDAS database, which includes 445,033 claims made by 269 
GDPs from 22 EC/EEA countries who provided treatment in the GDS between December 
1996 and September 2008. By following each migrant dentist who has ever practised in the 
GDS, we can monitor the size and composition of migrant dentist inflow in the Scottish 
NHS since 1996.  
Table 4.1 reports the number of migrant dentist inflow into the GDS by country of 
application for top six donor countries. From 1996 to 2005, while the number of migrants 
practising in the Scottish GDS increased steadily, there were only a handful of migrant 
GDPs joining the service each year. There is also no clear pattern of inflows across 
countries during that period. However, a contract to directly recruit 35 Polish salaried 
GDPs was achieved in 2006, and since then Scotland has seen a substantial increase in 
dental practitioner migration flows, with 92 migrant GDPs joining the service that single 
year. In particular, Poland has become a major donor country, and, together with Ireland, 
Greece and Germany, has contributed to three-quarters of the inflow of EEA migrant 
dentist during the period. The substantial immigration growth since 2006 highlights the 
importance of employment prospects and social networks to the supply of migrant dentists. 
As the active Polish recruitment scheme implemented by the Scottish Executive has 
signified sufficient employment opportunities, and together with the gradually constructed 
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migrant networks in the GDS, a growing number of EC/EEA dentists are now attracted to 
migrate to Scotland at an individual level.  
Table 4.1: Migrant dentist inflow in Scottish GDS by country. 
Country 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
10
 Total 
Poland         4 4 48 23 12 91 
Ireland 1   1     5 4 11 8 7 37 
Greece     2 2  1 2 2 7 7 10 33 
Germany 1    1    1 1 8 5 5 22 
Spain      1  6 6 3 6   22 
Sweden  1 1 3  2 1   1 1 6 1 17 
TOTAL 4 2 2 6 4 6 2 10 18 16 92 61 46 269 
 
Table 4.2 shows the age distributions of the migration flow in the Scottish GDS 
over the past five years. Over 70% of migrant GDPs are less than 40 years old. However, 
the proportion of practitioners under 30 years old has dropped significantly from 61% in 
2004 to 28% in 2007. The average age of migrant GDPs increased from 28 to 34 during the 
past five years. Figure 4.4 illustrates the gender composition of the entrants. The percentage 
of migrants who are female has fallen from over 60% to 46%. 
Table 4.2: Age distribution of migrant dentists in the GDS (%). 
Age Group 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
<25 28 38 12 8 11 
25-29 33 13 26 20 24 
30-39 28 44 36 43 46 
40-49 11 0 21 16 13 
 50 0 6 5 14 6 
Average 28.4 29.4 33.9 35.9 33.7 
(SD) (6.3) (8.5) (8.3) (10.0) (8.3) 
                                                 
10
 Please note that these figures only take account of those dentists who have started making claims in 
MIDAS before September, 2008. 
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Figure 4.4: Gender breakdown of migrant dentists in the GDS. 
 
 
4.3.2 Individual characteristics and career patterns 
 
We further explore the payment data to compare the individual characteristics and career 
patterns between non-migrant and migrant GDPs. As GDPs in different periods facing 
different markets for dental services may choose different career patterns, and most of the 
migrant GDPs (199 out of 269) working in GDS arrived after 2006, we restrict our 
attention to the migrant dentists who began providing GDS treatment after January 2006, 
and select the non-migrant dentists who successfully completed VT in July 2006 and who 
subsequently provided treatment in the GDS as a comparison group. The treatment data for 
both migrant and non-migrant dentists were restricted to information on adults because 
there is much more detailed information on the treatment of adults compared to children. 
The initial sample consisted of 199 migrant GDPs with 264,843 claims and 83 non-migrant 
GDPs with 217,755 claims paid before September 2008. Given the different practice 
durations for the two groups (max. experience is 32 months for migrants and 25 months for 
non-migrants), we only focus on treatment provided within the first 24 months after entry. 
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This restricted the sample to 251,314 claims by migrant GDPs and 212,621claims by non-
migrant GDPs.  
Descriptive statistics for these recent cohorts of GDPs are presented in Table 4.3 
and highlight some simple stylized facts in terms of three key features: dentist 
characteristics, practice characteristics, and dentist performance. The first two columns 
represent figures for non-migrant and migrant GDPs, while the left remaining five columns 
refer to migrants from four major donor countries, namely Germany, Greece, Ireland and 
Poland. In particular, the recruited and non-recruited Polish dentists are studied separately 
in order to evaluate the Polish recruitment scheme.  
The first panel provides the descriptive information of dentist characteristics to 
illustrate whether the composition of the migration flow varies across countries and how 
these migrant dentists are remunerated in GDS. While migrant and non-migrant GDPs have 
similar gender breakdowns (percentage of female remains around 50%), there is a 
significant variation across different donor countries. Nearly three quarters of recruited 
Polish GDPs are female, compared with 28.9% for those from Greece. The next row of the 
table shows the average age at which GDPs provided the first treatment. The average age at 
entry of the migrant GDPs was 34.5, or 9 years older than the non-migrants. Among the 
migrant GDPs, the Irish and Greek are the youngest when joining the service (25 and 29 
years old), while the others are approximately 35 years old. We finally present the dentists‟ 
remuneration contract in Panel A. As mentioned before, in the NHS GDPs can work either 
as salaried or self-employed. With the exception of 28 Polish recruits contracted with the 
salaried service, the dentists observed are predominately self-employed, of whom only 3 
migrants and 1 non-migrant switched contracts during the sample period. 
Next, the practice-specific characteristics reported in Panel B highlight the variation 
in geographic mobility and distribution between the migrant and non-migrant GDPs. By 
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eliminating repeated claims on the same dentist and practice, we obtained a data set in 
which each observation corresponds to a unique dentist-practice combination or work 
episode. The table reports the average of the number of practices each GDP has worked for, 
and outlines the number and share of the GDPs by the number of practices resided. It is 
apparent that migrant GDPs generally switch practices less frequently than non-migrants: a 
smaller proportion of migrants (17.1%) than non-migrants (34.9%) have worked in more 
than one practice during the sample period. We also presents the average deprivation index 
of practices (ranging from 1 for most affluent to 7 for least affluent), and distinguish 
between different donor countries. Migrant GDPs on the whole, work in practices more 
deprived as compared to non-grants, while, among the migrants from the major donor 
countries, this is the case only with the Greek and Polish GDPs who migrated at an 
individual level. In particular, the Polish recruited GDPs, who are supposed to address the 
"unmet need in area of socio-economic deprivation" (NES, 2006), actually do not reside in 
practices as deprived as the other migrants. In the end, the number of practices where each 
group of GDPs have worked shown in the last row indicates a high concentration of 
migrant GDPs in certain practices: 240 work episodes of the migrants occurred in 139 
practices, compared with 119 episodes in 108 practices for the non-migrants. 
The last panel of Table 4.3 examines dentist performance in terms of treatment 
intensity and overall treatment provision. As to treatment intensity, we find that migrant 
and non-migrant GDPs claim very similar amounts of value for each CoT. Migrants show 
some variation in treatment intensity across donor countries: the German and Greek tend to 
provide patients with more treatment (by value), while the Irish and Polish, especially those 
directly recruited, provide less. Another issue of concern is to what extent migrant GDPs 
improve the access to NHS dental services. We measure the dentist overall treatment 
provision not only by the number of claims being made within each month, but also by the 
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overall time the GDP deliver NHS dental services (measured by the sum of claim values 
paid each month). The average number of patients who have been treated by a particular 
dentist each month is also reported in the table. Statistics show that non-migrant GDPs, on 
average, provide much more NHS dental services than migrants, with 30% higher value 
and number of claims contributed and 30% more NHS patients treated per month. It is 
evident that there is quite a lot of variation across migrants from different donor countries. 
The Greek and non-recruited Polish GDPs perform the highest monthly value of NHS work 
(£5698.4 and £4924.7). The Irish, as a special group, tend to provide more treatment on 
more patients but with a low total treatment value than the others: they provide the most 
courses of treatment (120) on most patients (118) each month, but of lower value (£4872.9) 
than the Greek and non-recruited Polish. The German and recruited Polish fall behind with 
significantly less overall treatment provision, providing only 70 and 44 courses of treatment 
worth £3448.1 and £1823.4 on 69 and 43 patients on average each month respectively. We 
can see that the recruited Polish GDPs perform quite differently from the non-recruited. A 
likely explanation is the salaried contract scheme. As the recruited Polish are employed as 
salaried GDPs in those areas facing the most severe service problems and possibly the 
poorest oral health in Scotland, they might also be involved in NHS work in other sectors 
and, as a result, give less overall treatment provision in GDS. The NHS Workforce data of 
2008 described in Section 4.1 suggest significant cross-commitments by salaried GDPs: as 
many as 293 of whom (82.3%) involve work in the Community Dental Service meantime.   
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    Table 4.3: Individual characteristics and career patterns of migrant and non-migrant GDPs in the Scottish GDS. 
 Non-migrant Migrant 
 Scotland All Germany Greece Ireland Poland 
      recruited non-recruited 
Panel A. Dentist Characteristics        
N (dentist) 83 199 18 24 26 28 55 
Female 42 103 8 6 17 22 32 
 [%] [50.60] [51.76] [44.44] [25.00] [65.38] [78.57] [58.18] 
Mean age at entry  25.29 34.49 36.56 28.88 24.69 34.96 37.18 
 [SD] [2.26] [8.86] [10.69] [2.27] [3.25] [6.89] [6.38] 
Salaried 3 37 1 0 0 28 7 
Self-employed 81 165 17 24 26 1 50 
* switching contracts 1 3 0 0 0 1 2 
Panel B. Practice Characteristics         
N (dentist-practice) 119 240 21 28 31 34 66 
Mean number of practices resided by each dentist 1.43 1.21 1.17 1.17 1.19 1.21 1.20 
 [SD] [0.67] [0.50] [0.38] [0.38] [0.49] [0.50] [0.56] 
% Dentists working in 1 practice 65.06 82.91 83.33 83.33 84.62 82.14 85.45 
% Dentists working in 2 practices 27.71 14.07 16.67 16.67 11.54 14.29 10.91 
% Dentists working in 3 practices and more 7.22 3.01 
  
3.85 3.57 3.64 
Mean practice deprivation (1/7=least/most deprived) 3.83 4.04 3.81 4.07 3.77 3.82 3.98 
 [SD] [1.76] [1.39] [1.50] [1.70] [1.33] [1.17] [1.25] 
 N (practice) 108 139 18 21 24 18 39 
Panel C. Dentist performance        
N (claim) 212621 251314 16737 33474 41035 23011 87009 
Mean claim value (constant SDR107 prices, £) 45.61 46.04 49.24 52.09 40.49 41.36 45.90 
 [SD] [70.02] [63.99] [69.28] [74.31] [55.95] [59.44] [60.42] 
N (dentist-month) 1796 2788 239 306 341 522 811 
Mean number of claims per month 118.4 90.1 70.0 109.4 120.3 44.1 107.3 
 [SD] [76.0] [75.8] [73.6] [86.2] [72.9] [68.6] [54.4] 
Mean monthly values of claims (constant SDR107 prices ,£) 5399.7 4150.5 3448.1 5698.4 4872.9 1823.4 4924.7 
 [SD] [3451.7] [3551.7] [3280.6] [4724.4] [3064.7] [2010.9] [3226.3] 
Mean number of patients treated per month 115.4 88.0 68.5 106.9 117.5 43.0 104.8 
 [SD] [73.4] [73.4] [71.6] [83.9] [70.8] [51.4] [66.7] 
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4.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Scotland has seen a significant increase in the inflow of migrant dentists since 2006. 
However, without sufficient information detailing the workforce participation patterns 
among these migrant dentists, the implications for dental workforce planning are still 
ambiguous. We therefore, characterize the time trend of the retention for migrant 
dentists contracted with the Scottish GDS and identify factors that are important in their 
retention decisions using survival analysis techniques in next chapter. 
Migrant GDPs demonstrate different career patterns compared with their non-
migrant counterparts in their first 24 months after entry: they are more likely to work as 
salaried dentists and in deprived practices, and less likely to switch practices. In terms 
of dentist performance, we find they provide a very similar average amount of treatment 
for each CoT, but significant different amount of overall treatment each month. The 
overall treatment provision could arise from various circumstances. Migrant GDPs who 
have just arrived in a new country generally require a learning-by-doing type of process, 
which is likely to reduce efficiency. Also, they could simply have different practicing 
styles established in donor countries: for example, Irish GDPs seem to prefer treating 
more patients but with less work each visit, although this could also be a result of 
patient demand. Apart from these, there exists considerable uncertainty: GDPs may 
involve cross-commitments between different NHS sectors, and very commonly, they 
may devote some time and efforts towards private treatment provisions at the expense 
of their NHS work. The data we used provides little information to control these 
uncertainties, which hampers a further analysis of dentist performance in terms of 
overall treatment provision.  
Nevertheless, the payment data record detailed information on each individual 
CoT, and warrant a further investigation of treatment patterns by migrant and non-
migrant GDPs. To the extent that a dentist‟ decision regarding how much treatment to 
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offer depends on the characteristics of the patient treated, the dentist‟s practice style, 
experience and training, etc, we compare individual treatments provided by the two 
groups of GDPs in Chapter 6, while adjusting for variations in both demand and supply 
side factors. 
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CHAPTER 5 
MIGRANT DENTIST RETENTION IN THE SCOTTISH 
NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE: A DISCRETE-TIME SURVIVAL 
ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
How migrant health professionals perform in the new country determines how well the 
international recruitment improves the health care provision in the host country. Using 
the MIDAS data described previously, we shall investigate the performance of EEA 
dentists working in the Scottish GDS in terms of retention and treatment provision. This 
chapter addresses the first aspect, and applies a discrete-time survival analysis to 
examine the retention of EEA dentists in the Scottish GDS. 
As EEA nationals make an increasing contribution to the dental workforce in the 
Scottish NHS, a comprehensive understanding of retention patterns for these migrant 
dentists in the NHS is crucial to developing effective workforce planning. Questions of 
importance include: (1) how long and at what time trend do migrant professionals stay 
in the NHS? (2) how do retention patterns vary with personal characteristics? and (3) 
what factors influence the likelihood of an individual professional leaving the service? 
These questions, however, have rarely been addressed due to the limitations of available 
data. To our knowledge, only one work has attempted to examine some of these issues. 
Hann, Sibbald and Young (2008) examine the effect of the country of qualification on 
migrants‟ workforce participation in the NHS England using logistic regression 
modelling and find better long-term retention for migrant doctors from the Middle East, 
non-EEA Europe, Northern Africa and Asia compared with domestically qualified 
doctors. However, constrained by data limitations, their study is far from conclusive 
with only a few controls included, e.g. age, gender and medical specialty. To the extent 
that the decision with regard to labour supply is likely to depend on an aggregation of 
various information and influences, we employ detailed administrative data from the 
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Scottish dental system to gain a comprehensive understanding of the retention decisions 
of migrant dentists working in the Scottish GDS. 
There is an extensive literature examining the retention decisions of teachers. A 
common feature of retention studies is that a proportion of subjects in the sample have 
work episodes still ongoing when data collection ends. These so-called right-censored 
subjects, with undetermined event time, provide important information, particularly 
about the probability that work episodes will last for relatively long periods of time. The 
methodology of survival analysis, which is originally developed for modelling human 
lifetimes in medical studies and later extended by economists and sociologists for 
modelling social transitions and engineers for modelling industrial product reliability 
(Willett and Singer, 1991), takes censoring into account. Willett and Singer (1991) 
introduce survival analysis methods into educational research using an example of 
teacher attrition and student dropout. Following their lead, teacher transfers and 
resignations are more adequately addressed. Factors that have been found to influence 
teacher career decisions include salary (Murnane and Olsen, 1989, 1990; Dolton and 
Van der Klaauw, 1995, 1999), the distance between the teaching school and high school 
or hometown (Boyd et al., 2005), and working conditions such as school attributes, 
student race composition, and student achievement (Scafidi, Stinebrickner and Sjoquist, 
2003; Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin 2003; Boyd et al., 2005). In particular, the work by 
Boyd et al. (2005) comprehensively examines these factors using a discrete-time 
competing-risk model incorporating unobserved heterogeneity (mixed-logistic 
regression) and suggests that interactions between teacher qualifications and student 
achievement, unobserved heterogeneity, and the geography of prior home and job play 
important roles in explaining variations in retention rates among New York City 
elementary schools. 
96 
 
 
Studies related to the health sector, on the other hand, are very limited. The few 
contributions we are aware of focused on doctors working in the USA. Singer et al. 
(1998) apply discrete-time survival analysis to explore effects of physician and centre 
characteristics on the hazard of a primary care physician leaving the Community Health 
centre. Pathman et al. (2004) use the Cox proportional hazard modelling technique to 
compare retention durations for physicians in rural health professional shortage areas 
(HPSAs) and non-HPSAs. After accounting for physician characteristics, community 
characteristics, and practice and job characteristics, no significant difference between 
the two cohorts has been found. Using the same method, Ries et al. (2009) evaluate the 
effects of the Academic Medicine‟s faculty development program on the retention of 
junior faculty at the University of California, San Diego.    
In this paper, we make use of administrative data collected for authorising 
payments for NHS dental treatment in Scotland to gain a better understanding of 
retention decisions of migrant dentists and influences on these. These data are far more 
detailed than what has previously been analysed in health professional retention 
research. They provide information on the attributes of every EEA dentist in contract 
with the Scottish GDS during the period of 12/1996 – 09/2008, the practice where they 
practiced, and the value for the treatment they delivered at various time points during 
their work episodes (dentist overall treatment provision). More importantly, the 
matched patient-practitioner longitudinal structure of the data permits direct observation 
of the patient population being treated. Discrete-time proportional hazards modelling is 
applied to characterize the time trend of retention for migrant dentists in the Scottish 
NHS and identify factors associated with the likelihood of a dentist leaving the service. 
The econometric methodology assesses the importance of four dimensions of variables 
in the underlying utility function that governs each dentist‟s stay-or-leave decision 
while controlling for random unobserved heterogeneity.  
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section 
introduces full details of the two survival analysis methods that are used in our study. 
Section 5.3 lays out the process we used to convert the data set to accommodate 
discrete-time survival analysis techniques from the individual level claim-based 
payment data we have. This section also describes the variables that are likely to affect 
dentists‟ retention decisions. Estimation results are presented in Section 5.4. The last 
section discusses the results and concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2 DISCRETE-TIME SURVIVAL ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
 
This study makes use of survival analysis techniques where dentist departure from the 
GDS is the event of interest. Given the MIDAS data which records payment dates for 
claims at a monthly scale, we can measure dentist retention to the nearest month and 
therefore apply discrete-time survival analysis methods which model discrete hazard of 
dentists leaving the service.  
The standard way of estimating discrete-time hazard models is to construct a 
panel data set with a separate record for each time period the dentist is at risk of event 
occurrence, i.e. eligible to experience the target event; in our case, that is from the 
baseline month when he/she entered the GDS until the month of exit or the closing 
month of the study (censored). Each record consists of an indicator variable for duration 
time, a binary response variable for event occurrence, and a set of covariates that are 
likely to influence dentists‟ retention behaviour. The duration time is converted from 
calendar time by indexing calendar months using t=1,…, T for each of the half-open 
monthly interval [t-1, t), where we set t=0 at the baseline month. The process we use to 
create this panel data set and covariates will be discussed in detail in Section 5.3.  
Risks of the target event occurring are generally described and modelled using 
hazard and survival in survival analysis. The hazard function,    , is defined as the 
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conditional probability that dentist i will depart from the GDS in a time interval (month) 
t given that he/she does not depart in any earlier period:  
        *    |    +,     (5.1) 
where    denotes the number of months elapsed between dentist i entering and 
departing. Survival function     is defined as the probability that dentist i will “survive”, 
i.e. will not depart beyond the time interval t: 
        *    +.      (5.2) 
For this to happen, the dentist must not depart in all previous periods. Thus, the 
hazard function specifies the risk of dentist departure specific to each particular time 
period, while the survival function specifies the cumulative risk of non-departure across 
the current and previous periods. 
Two analytical methods are frequently used for estimating hazard and survival 
functions: the Kaplan-Meier (KM) survival analysis and hazard regression modelling. 
The non-parametric KM (or product-limit) method (Kaplan and Meier, 1958) pools 
together dentists who are not distinguished by observable covariates, and estimates the 
hazard and survival for homogeneous dentists, denoted as  ̂  and  ̂  with the subscript i 
dropped. This method is widely used as a basic but important tool for preliminary 
analyses to provide straightforward illustrations and useful summaries of duration data. 
Advanced regression modelling techniques, on the other hand, allow for individual 
heterogeneity by covariates, time-variation and covariate-dependence in the hazard 
probability. In particular, the discrete-time framework, which essentially estimates a 
pooled binary response model of whether or not the dentist finishes his/her work 
episode within each calendar month after entry, allows us to not only explore the 
relationship between hazard and various predictors, but also to determine whether the 
effects of predictors vary with time.  
 
99 
 
 
5.2.1 Kaplan-Meier survival analysis 
 
Let    be the number of dentists that entered the interval t and who are at risk during 
that time period,    be the number that departed from the GDS during the interval t, and 
   be the number that were censored at the end of the interval. Dentists at risk in the 
time interval t will drop out of the risk pool once the target event or censoring occurs; 
otherwise, they will enter the risk pool in the future interval. Thus, the relationship 
between these three numbers can be expressed as: 
                ∑ (     )   .   (5.3) 
A natural estimator for KM hazard,  ̂ , is the fraction of those dentists entering 
the interval that depart during the interval: 
   ̂      ⁄ .       (5.4) 
The corresponding survival estimate,  ̂ , can be estimated by multiplying the 
survival probability for the pervious time period by one minus the hazard probability for 
that period, or multiplying probabilities of dentist non-departure across the current and 
all previous periods together: 
   ̂   ̂   (   ̂ )  ∏ (   ̂ )   .    (5.5) 
KM estimates are also the maximum likelihood estimates of hazard and survival 
functions for a randomly selected dentist (Singer and Willett, 1993). These estimates 
take censoring into account by setting the conditional probability of dentist departure at 
a particular time period equal to the frequency of observed departures at that period. 
The fundamental assumption for doing this is that the censoring mechanism operates 
independently of the event occurrence and the risk of event occurrence, or is what is 
termed non-informative (Singer and Willett, 2003). Therefore, dentists remaining in the 
study after the censoring time can be assumed to have the same retention perspective as 
those who would have remained in the study had the sample period been long enough to 
allow all people to experience the target event:  
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  ̂  ∏ (   ̂ )  ∏ (     )   ⁄  ∏ (       )   ⁄         . (5.6) 
Were there no censoring occurring, the survival estimate would simply equal the 
number “at risk” by the end of interval divided by the number of total observations in 
the study: 
  ̂  ∏ (      )⁄          ⁄ .     (5.7) 
Note that if the censoring mechanism is informative, i.e. subjects are lost to 
follow up because they have experienced the event or are likely to do so in the near 
future, survival analysis will be biased just as other traditional statistics methods. This is 
because there is no way of knowing whether they drop out from the study at random as 
assumed, or due to reasons that relate to the (unknown) event occurrence. 
By plotting the KM survival estimates against the duration time, we obtain the 
KM survival curve which is a useful graphical method in the survival analysis. We can 
construct a KM survival curve for the whole population of dentists to describe and 
display the trend of dentist retention in the GDS over time. Median survival time, 
another important statistic in survival analysis, can be directly indicated in the KM 
survival curve as the time at which the survival probability is 50%. Mean survival time 
is inappropriate in the presence of censoring dentists with unknown length of stay. 
We can also construct separate KM survival curves for grouped dentists to 
determine univariate effects of categorical variables. The Log-rank test (Mantel, 1966) 
can be used as a robust test for the differences in survival probabilities across 
subgroups. However, this method does not allow us to quantify the effect size. 
Furthermore, variations we observe are likely to confound effects of other factors 
because dentist decisions as to whether to stay or leave the GDS are generally 
influenced by various risk factors. For example, if dentists from different countries have 
different demographic distribution (e.g. age at entry), we might confound country 
effects with those omitted demographic effects. Despite these shortcomings, the KM 
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graphical method is very popular for a preliminary analysis and also a specification 
check for the hazard regression model building. 
 
5.2.2 Regression modelling: proportional hazards specifications 
 
The regression modelling technique for survival analysis allows us to simultaneously 
quantify the effects of multiple risk factors behind dentists‟ departure decisions. The 
most commonly used model is the proportional hazards, or PH specification. In this, 
the hazard function depends on a baseline hazard function    ( ) and a vector of 
covariates     with unknown coefficients  :   
        ( ) (     )       (5.8) 
where  (     ) is often assumed as     (    ) so that              ⁄ . Thus, 
coefficients    can be interpreted as the time-constant proportional effect of 
covariates    , which describes the departure from the baseline hazard   ( ) shared by 
the all study subjects. A covariate with a positive/negative coefficient    and therefore 
a      greater/smaller than 1, is positively/negatively correlated with the conditional 
probability of dentist departure and negatively/positively correlated with the retention 
duration. 
Existing literature suggests it is important to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity in hazard modelling, especially in case that controls for effects of 
covariates are incomplete or unobservable variables are important. Omitted 
heterogeneity typically distorts the duration dependence downward as a result of the 
“weeding out” of individuals with higher hazard (unobserved random effect) (Lancaster, 
1979; Kiefer, 1988; Van den Berg, 2001). The omitted heterogeneity also induces 
attenuation biases of the covariates,    , or the dependence between covariate effects 
and duration,  , which will give misleading inferences regarding the covariate effects of 
the regressors (Lancaster, 1985; Sharma, 1987; Kiefer, 1988). Lancaster (1979) 
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proposes a mixed proportional hazards (MPH) model with a time-constant random 
component to capture the variance of unobserved heterogeneity (frailty):  
       ( )    (    )     ( )    (       )    (5.9) 
where    is a random variable with mean one and finite variance, and      (  ) is the 
i.i.d. error term.  
A variety of specifications have been suggested for estimating the proportional 
hazards model. The Cox semi-parametric specification proposed in 1972 (Cox, 1972) 
estimates coefficients    using the partial-likelihood approach without specifying the 
distribution of the baseline hazard. The baseline hazard rate can be retrieved with the 
typical method used being a noisy step function over-fitted to the observed data 
(Royston and Parmar, 2002; Jones and Branton, 2005).  
In fact, accurate inference and out-of-sample prediction of the duration 
dependency is generally of interest to policy makers. The parametric specification is 
therefore more often used, which integrates a baseline hazard function following a 
specific statistical distribution (e.g. exponential, Weibull, Gompertz, log-normal, log-
logistic, and generalized gamma distribution). However, the estimation of coefficient 
effects will be biased if the shape of duration dependency is mis-specified (Light and 
Omori, 2004). 
Royston and Parmar (2002) propose a flexible parametric alternative of the Cox 
specification. This new approach provides a middle ground: it uses spline functions (i.e. 
piecewise polynomial functions) to flexibly model the duration dependency, and allows 
for explicit, although not very easy-to-interpret, characterization of the duration 
dependency. Yet, further extensions are required, including frailty, competing risks, etc 
(Lambert and Royston, 2009).    
A far more commonly used approach is the discrete-time specification, which is 
fully developed and better understood by economists and social scientists. Given the 
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equivalence between the standard maximum likelihood estimator for the discrete 
duration data, proportional hazard model, and traditional binary response models 
(Kiefer, 1988; Doskum and Gasko, 1990; Sueyoshi, 1995), the discrete hazard function 
can be modelled using sequential binary linked models such as the complementary log-
log (cloglog) and logit model:  
       (   )     (    (     ))       ( )          
            ,    (     ( )        )-            
  (5.10) 
     (   )     ,   (     ⁄ )-     ,  (    ⁄ )-          
       ,     (⁄     ,  (    ⁄ )-         )-    
  (5.11) 
where      ( ) and    ,  (    ⁄ )- are log of the baseline hazard and odds functions 
requiring estimation, and    is a dentist-specific random effects following a particular 
distribution. 
The former corresponds to the proportional hazards model, while the latter 
corresponds to the proportional odds model. The proportional hazards (odds) model is 
now essentially a multiple linear regression of the transformed discrete hazards on the 
baseline hazard (odds) function, which is absorbed into an intercept term that varies 
with time, and covariates that are likely to affect the hazard (odds) rate. The 
proportionality assumption can be relaxed simply by including interaction terms 
between covariates and (log) time. 
The distribution of the baseline hazard function can be modelled in many ways: 
piecewise functions, standard transformations (e.g. logs, polynomials, etc), and 
smoothing functions (e.g. splines, kernel, local polynomial regression, etc) (Jones and 
Branton, 2005). The piecewise function that includes a dummy variable for each 
interval allows for a fully flexible estimation of the duration dependency, and is 
therefore far more widely used in the literature. One problem with this method is the 
potential computational problems imposed when data have either small sample size or a 
large number of discrete time periods, as in our case, or when too few events or subjects 
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can be observed at some time periods (Singer and Willett, 2003). In these cases, the 
other two methods may have some advantages in arriving at accurate estimates. Among 
smoothing methods, the local polynomial regression is particularly recommended for 
hazard modelling on discrete duration data (Wang, 2005), and a common option is the 
local linear regression, which is also called the locally weighted scatterplot smoothing 
(LOWESS). This method flexibly models the duration dependency using the smoothed 
values obtained by fitting weighted least square polynomial regressions locally to each 
bandwidth specified. By doing this, the model captures the most influential part of the 
variation in the data. The only problem is that it does not give a distribution function of 
the hazard, making it difficult in our case to interpret and forecast the time trend of 
dentist retention. 
The distribution of     is typically assumed as following either a Normal 
(Gaussian) distribution or a Gamma distribution in the discrete-time framework. 
Although Heckman and Singer (1984) find the misspecification of heterogeneity 
distribution can seriously bias regression parameter estimates and duration dependence 
in the case of Weibull models, most work in the literature suggests that estimates in 
general are not very sensitive to the specification of the mixing distribution as long as 
the specification of the baseline hazard is sufficiently flexible (Kiefer, 1988; Addison 
and Portugal, 1998; Nicoletti and Rondinelli, 2009). 
 
5.3 DATA DESCRIPTION  
 
The data used in this analysis come from the MIDAS, a large-scale individual-level 
claim-based database that covers all NHS treatment delivered and paid in the Scottish 
GDS over the last ten years. Dentists in practice are required to submit a claim for each 
single course of treatment delivered to a patient, detailing the dentist, patient, practice 
and treatments. Our information on the spell of work episodes is therefore precise and 
rich compared with existing literature in two aspects. First, we have the exact number of 
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months of participation rather than approximate years, since payments are transacted 
monthly. Second, the matched (dentist-patient) longitudinal data not only provide 
information on the standard controls such as dentist personal characteristics, overall 
treatment provision and practice characteristics, but also direct observations of patient 
composition. The latter two types of variables, in particular, comprehensively capture 
dentists‟ working conditions.  
For the purpose of our analyses we obtained a full sample from the MIDAS 
database covering all claims submitted by the 269 migrant dentists in contract to the 
GDS during the period of 12/1996 – 09/2008.  
 
5.3.1 Construction of the panel data for survival analysis 
 
As discussed in the previous section, this individual level claim-based payment data 
need to be converted into a monthly panel so as to accommodate discrete-time survival 
analysis techniques. The panel data approach not only leads to easy fitting of flexible 
hazard functions but also facilitates introduction of time-varying covariates that are 
likely to influence dentists‟ decisions to leave (Wooldridge, 2006).  
As dentists may provide services in multiple practices within the same month, 
and each practice‟s resident dentists have a unique list number to process NHS 
transactions, we configure the following two versions of the panel data set:  
Version 1: List number–month panel 
The first version was generated by aggregating claims within dentists‟ list 
number and calendar month, so that we have a single observation for each list number-
month match. Within each match, we not only retained variables provided in MIDAS 
such as calendar time, dentist ID, dentist demographic characteristics (e.g. gender, age 
at first treatment, country from which the VT number was applied, etc.), list number, 
and practice characteristics (e.g. postcode, practice deprivation, health board ID, etc.), 
but also generated a new variable for the monthly overall treatment fees. Of the migrant 
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practitioners in the sample, 77 out of 269 (29%) have undertaken NHS work in multiple 
practices, with 55 of them having worked in different practices in the same month while 
24 took short or long breaks before joining the new practice.  
Version 2: Dentist–month panel 
The second version of the panel data set is where we only keep one observation 
for each single calendar month the dentist has received payments for NHS treatment. 
List numbers overlapping on the same dentist and same month are pooled together, and 
we retain only either the value of a variable for the dominate list number on which the 
dentist claimed the highest fees during the month (e.g. remuneration structure, practice 
characteristics), or the aggregated value. 
The two versions of data set define work episodes in different ways and capture 
different dentist retention duration: version one of the data set defines work episodes by 
list number and captures elapsed retention in each practice, while version two pools 
separate list numbers at intervals shorter than 12 months
12
 together into one work 
episode and captures completed retention in the GDS. Although the first version 
contains more work episodes for regression analysis, we prefer the second version 
because the variable of interest is the completed retention duration. 
A central issue is how to define a dentist‟s entry and exit properly using the 
claim data in which no accurate dates are provided – while the MIDAS records the 
resignation date of dentists‟ list number, we find that dentists in the sample usually do 
not immediately stop receiving payments after resigning their list numbers. Instead, it is 
possible to determine whether a practitioner is active or not in the GDS using the new 
generated monthly payment panel. We assume that a dentist enters the service since 
his/her first monthly payment comes under observation. Once entered, the dentist can be 
observed in each single calendar month unless he/she takes a break and receives no 
                                                 
12
 In the definition of exit laid out in the following paragraph, we view payment gaps less that 12 months 
as intermediate breaks rather than completion of work episodes. 
107 
 
 
payments, or exits from the service. We generated a variable to measure the number of 
months elapsed until the next monthly payment is observed for the dentist and find that 
117 out of 269 (43%) dentists were missing in one or more intermediate months and 
subsequently returned later. The majority (269/274) of these payment gaps were less 
than 12 months, with only 5 exceptions ranging between 13 and 42 months. To allow 
for intermediate breaks within work episodes, we assume a dentist departs if he/she has 
no subsequent payment recorded over the next 12 months. By this definition, payment 
gaps shorter than 12 months are considered as temporary interruptions, not resulting in 
the exit from the analysis risk pool.  
The panel data set for discrete-time survival analysis requires a separate record 
for each time period when the dentist is “at risk” rather than when the dentist has 
payment observed. The process by which we converted the payment panel into the 
survival-time panel involves the following three steps. First, we compress the monthly 
payment panel into a dentist-level data set which include data on dentist ID, the first 
month and final month the dentist receive payment in the sample period, dummy 
variable for event occurrence and a set of time-constant covariates for the dentist. 
Second, the dentist-level data set is converted into a survival-time dataset and expanded 
into a monthly panel using the STATA command “stset” and “stsplit” (STATA9, 2005). 
Finally, we include time-varying covariates by merging the new generated dataset with 
the payment panel dataset we first generated. 
The “exit” defined here is a dentist‟s first episode of departure from the GDS, 
which is the event of interest to our analysis. Re-entry records that follow a gap longer 
than 12 months are defined as the dentist‟s subsequent episode and excluded from our 
analysis. An alternative method is to treat the period after re-entry as a separate episode, 
which is unlikely to change our estimation results given the small number of records 
(26, 0.5% of the initial sample) observed for dentists‟ subsequent work episodes. Total 
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duration of dentists‟ participation in the NHS workforce cannot be estimated since there 
is no way of knowing whether a dentist that is observed to terminate the final work 
episode exits from the GDS permanently or is just on a break, waiting for new work 
episode.  
To illustrate another important implication of this definition, we plot the 
observed retention time for each dentist against the time they enter the GDS in Figure 
5.1. The dots represent those dentists who had an event, i.e. departed from the GDS, and 
the triangles represent dentists who were censored. As we can see, dentists who were 
observed within the last year of the sample period (09/2007-09/2008) are considered to 
have ongoing episodes and censored event time.   
 
 
Figure 5.1: Plots of the observed tenure by month of entry for the migrant  dentists 
active in the Scottish GDS between 1996 and 2008 (n=269). 
 
Figure 5.1 also indicates that the migrant dentists working in the Scottish GDS 
are predominantly recent entrants who arrived after 2006 (199, 74%), for whom the 
study period (12/1996 – 09/2008) is insufficient to observe a complete work episode. It 
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is important to note that although censored work episodes can be included in the 
survival analysis, the length of study period is still very important. The design of the 
study must allow for enough complete work episodes to be observed, a condition 
necessary to perform robust empirical analysis (Clark et al., 2003). Thus, we restrict our 
attention to the dentists who started practising in the GDS during the period of 1996-
2005.  
The refined sample includes 70 dentists who had experienced 49 complete work 
episodes and accumulated 2415 monthly observations by the end of data collection. The 
comparison between the original sample (arrival cohorts 1996-2008) and refined sample 
(arrival cohorts 1996-2005) in terms of the number of events and the length of study 
period can be found in Table 5.1. We report three indicators for the length of study 
period: the median of observation time (i.e. the median tenure of all dentists), the 
median of censoring time (i.e. the median tenure among those dentists who have not yet 
left the service), and the reverse Kaplan-Meier estimator calculated using the KM 
estimate of the survival function with the event indicator reversed such that the outcome 
of interest becomes censored (i.e. the tenure that potentially would have been obtained 
had that dentist not left the service) (Schemper and Smith, 1996). While the former two 
may underestimate the length of the study period, the third one offers a more robust 
measure (Clark et al., 2003). Although the refined sample contains only 70 dentists 
relative to 269 in the original sample, these dentists had 49 complete work episodes 
observed in the study period, only 10 less than the original sample. Furthermore, the 
sample refinement doubles the reverse KM estimators from 23 months to 49 months. 
We tried different cut-off years such as 2005 and 2007, but based on these statistics they 
either lose too much information or are overly influenced by the censoring.  
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         Table 5.1: Overview of the original and refined sample. 
 Original sample Refined sample 
Arrival cohorts 1996-2008 1996-2005 
Sample size    
   N(dentist) 269 70 
   N(dentist-month) 5572 2415 
Number of complete episodes 59 49 
Entry period 12/1996 – 09/2008 12/1996 – 12/2005 
Closing date 09/2008 
Length of study period, months 
   Median of observation time [range] 19 [1,131] 26 [7, 131] 
   Median of censoring time [range] 18 [1,131] 45 [33,131] 
   Reverse KM estimator 23 49 
 
5.3.2 Factors behind dentists’ retention decisions 
 
The NHS payment data provides information on a rich set of factors that are likely to 
affect dentists‟ decision whether or not to continue practising in the GDS. We 
summarise these as follows (see Table 5.2 for descriptive statistics). 
 Dentist personal characteristics  
Dentist demographic attributes available in the data include gender, age-at-
entry
13
 and the country from which the dentist applied. Dentist gender and age-at-entry 
both control for the likely presence of individual heterogeneity in preferences and 
moving costs among dentists. Country indicator variables capture variations in dentists‟ 
length of stay across donor countries; health professionals from different countries are 
expected to have different likelihoods of leaving arising from either different alternative 
wages if returning home, or different labour market ability as the level of international 
recognition for the health service delivery and training system differs across countries. 
To ensure enough subjects exist within each country group, we pooled dentists from the 
smaller donor countries outside of the top four donor countries (e.g. Spain, Ireland, 
Greece and Sweden) into a large group denoted as “Other”. Variables indicating the 
year when the dentist provided the first treatment in the GDS are also included to 
                                                 
13
 We include the age-at-entry identified as the age at first treatment rather than age at treatment due to 
the high correlation between experience and age at treatment. 
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examine whether there is any trend by arrival cohort in the retention behaviour. 
Similarly, the year 1996-2002 were grouped together given only a handful of dentists 
joined each year before 2003.  
 Practice characteristics  
Practices are characterized in terms of the deprivation category scale from 1 
(most affluent) to 7 (least affluent) based on practice postcode and the health board in 
which the practice resides. Practice deprivation indicators help to capture spatial 
variations in living costs and amenities, and also the different patient types by proxy for 
patients‟ socioeconomic characteristics. The scales lower than 4 and higher than 5 were 
merged into two new categories respectively as most migrant dentists concentrated in 
practices with deprivation categories 4 and 5. Similarly, the 13 health boards were 
merged into 3 by pooling those contracting less than 8 sample dentists into a single 
artificial “health board”.    
 Patient composition  
The matched (patient and dentist) MIDAS data permit accurate descriptions of 
patient composition. Although it does not capture all potential patient attributes, we 
include three elements of the patient population: percent exempt patients, percent male 
and average patient age at treatment. Patients with different demographic characteristics 
are expected to have different dental conditions and treatment requirement. Our work on 
treatment intensity in Chapter 6 finds middle aged and male patients receive more 
intensive treatment. The exempt status of patients could also give rise to different 
economic incentives for dentists. Given that the effect of time-varying variables cannot 
be separated accurately from the possible duration dependence unless the time paths of 
variables vary considerably across individuals (Kiefer, 1988), we calculated these 
variables over all patients being treated over the whole course of the work episode.  
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Exploring how practice characteristics and patient composition influence 
dentists‟ hazard of leaving, we are able to identify the practices that experience 
difficulties in retaining international recruits. However, practice characteristics and 
patient composition are likely to be associated with the total value of the treatment 
provided by dentists, which provides dentists with another important incentive to stay or 
leave. In this case, the failure to account for variations in overall treatment provision 
will confound the effects of interest with those of overall treatment provision. Thus, our 
final controls concern dentists‟ overall treatment provision. 
 Dentist overall treatment provision  
Under the NHS dentistry payment system where GDPs are recompensed for 
time, the overall treatment fees received by dentists within each month (in constant 
SDR107 prices) provide a direct indicator of dentists‟ overall treatment provision. We 
assume that dentists‟ overall treatment provision is exogenous and captures the demand 
side shift. Dentists whose patients require lower value of treatment are more likely to 
leave the service. The identification of overall treatment provision is of importance. In 
practice, time-varying variables are usually simplified into a summation, so we first 
calculate the average of monthly treatment fees received by each dentist over the whole 
course of the work episode as a summation measure of overall treatment provision. 
However, allowing for variables to vary over time in estimation has turned out to be 
very important in empirical work (Lancaster, 1979; Atkinson and Micklewright, 1985). 
We thus make use of the rich information available in the monthly payment data and 
account for the time paths of individual circumstances. However, the inference can be 
difficult as a result of state dependence or rate dependence, i.e. predictors are reversely 
affected by an individual‟s event status or his hazard (Singer and Willett, 2003). In our 
context, dentists may reduce labour supply in the month they leave or are going to 
leave. To solve this problem, we calculate the average of monthly fees for the treatment 
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that dentists have provided during the past six practice months
14
 as dentists‟ departure 
decision is less likely to affect their labour supply several months earlier. This method 
links prior predictor status with current outcome status by assuming dentists adjust their 
risk of leaving according to the amount of treatment fees they received in previous 
months, which seems fairly plausible. Considering the time trend of overall treatment 
provision, treatment fees are normalised by the average of all the dentists who have 
practiced in the GDS for the same number of months to capture dentists‟ relative overall 
treatment provision compared to the dentists with same experience.  
   Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Obs N/Mean %/SD min max 
A. Dentist characteristics     
Age-at-entry 70 30.46 7.63 22 58 
Gender (male=1) 70 32 46% 0 1 
Country      
 Greece 70 9 13% 0 1 
 Ireland 70 11 16% 0 1 
 Spain 70 16 23% 0 1 
 Sweden 70 9 13% 0 1 
 Other 70 25 36% 0 1 
Year of entry      
 1996-2002 70 26 37% 0 1 
 2003 70 10 14% 0 1 
 2004 70 18 26% 0 1 
 2005 70 16 23% 0 1 
B. Practice characteristics     
Practice deprivation category (1: affluent  7: deprived) 
 depcat_1-3 70 16 23% 0 1 
 depcat _4 70 27 39% 0 1 
 depcat _5 70 18 26% 0 1 
 depcat _6,7 70 9 13% 0 1 
Anonymous Health board ID 
 caid _8 70 26 37% 0 1 
 caid _10 70 13 19% 0 1 
 others 70 31 44% 0 1 
 C. Patient composition      
%Male patients 70 0.44 0.05 0.24 0.56 
Average patient age (Page) 70 40.43 5.93 18.98 53.51 
                                                 
14
 Monthly treatment fees were averaged over the period of past six practice months rather than calendar 
months to avoid a loss of information, because there are ten dentists in the sample leaving the service 
right after a six-month break or even longer with no treatment provided.   
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%Exempt patients 70 0.32 0.13 0.02 0.72 
D. Dentist overall treatment provision    
Average monthly treatment fees over the whole career  
 meanfeesperm 2415 42.35 25.31 0.45 107.32 
Normalised average monthly treatment fees in past 6 months  
 nfeesperm6 1972 0.00 33.31 -54.31 166.25 
 
5.4 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
5.4.1 Overview 
 
We present our statistical results in two parts. The well-known non-parametric KM 
method was first applied as a preliminary analysis. KM hazard and survival functions 
were estimated for the total sample of dentists to provide a straightforward illustration 
of the time trend of retention for migrant dentists contracted with the Scottish GDS. 
Univariate effects of categorical variables (e.g. country, year of entry, deprivation 
category of practice and health board) were also evaluated using the KM method. By 
doing this, we can assess the equality of KM survival estimates across categories and, if 
appropriate, combine similar categories together for a simpler categorical variable to be 
included in the subsequent regression models. 
In the second part, we characterize the duration dependency of the hazard of 
dentists leaving the service and identify factors affecting the hazard rate using a 
proportional hazard modelling approach. Since dentist participation is defined by 
monthly treatment fees, we adopt the discrete-time specification estimating a 
complementary log-log linked binary model of whether or not the dentist finishes the 
work episode at each month after entry. Duration dependency is modelled using both 
the flexible LOWESS function and a quadratic function of logarithmic time. We report 
estimation results of the quadratic specification in the final model to explicitly 
characterize the duration dependency. A proportional odds model and the flexible 
parameter specification were also estimated as robustness checks. Finally, unobserved 
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heterogeneity is taken into account by incorporating an individual-specific random error 
component following different distributions (e.g. Gaussian and Gamma distributions).  
 
5.4.2 Kaplan-Meier estimation 
 
Description of retention data 
 
To illustrate the calculation process for the KM estimates, we present the distribution of 
the retention duration for the 70 migrant dentists who joined the Scottish GDS between 
1996 and 2005 by each year of the career in Table 5.3. The table summarizes the 
number of practitioners that are at risk at the beginning of the year (column 2), the 
number that departed from the GDS during the year (column 3), the number that were 
censored by the end of the year (column 4), and the KM estimates of survival and 
hazard functions (column 5 and 6). 
       Table 5.3: Kaplan-Meier survival analysis of retention for migrant dentists in the   
       Scottish GDS between 1996 and 2008. 
 Number who…   
Year 
since 
entry 
t 
Were at risk 
(active) at the 
beginning of 
the year 
   
Depart 
during the 
year 
 
   
Were 
censored at 
the end of 
the year 
   
Survival 
function 
 ̂   
Hazard 
function  
 ̂  
1 70 4 0 
0.94 
[0.03] 
0.06 
[0.03] 
2 66 27 0 
0.56 
[0.06] 
0.41 
[0.08] 
3 39 8 3 
0.44 
[0.06] 
0.21 
[0.07] 
4 28 3 10 
0.40 
[0.06] 
0.11 
[0.06] 
5 15 5 4 
0.26 
[0.06] 
0.33 
[0.15] 
6+ 6 2 4 
0.18 
[0.07] 
0.33 
[0.24] 
          Standard errors are in square brackets. 
 
As shown in Table 5.3, dentist departure peaked in the 2
nd
 year following entry: 
almost two fifths of dentists (27) left the service during this interval. Censoring starts to 
influence the outcome from the 3
rd
 year. Of the 39 dentists who worked in the service 
for 3 continuous years, 8 finished their work episodes and 3 were censored by the end of 
the year. This left 28 entering their 4
th
 year, and for these dentists censoring occurs more 
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commonly, with 18 censored and only 10 leaving the service by the end of sample 
period. Thus, we can estimate the hazard rate in year 3 and 4 as 8/39 = 0.21 and 3/28 = 
0.11 and the corresponding survival rate as 0.56× (1-0.21) = 0.44 and 0.44× (1-0.11) = 
0.40 regardless of censoring. The survival rate for the 2
nd
 year can be estimated as 39/70 
= 0.56 directly since no censoring has occurred then. However, these figures are not 
precise as the standard errors for the hazard estimates and survival estimates are large. 
Standard errors for years 5 and 6+, in particular, are not reliable because the number of 
dentists at risk in year 5 drops below 20 (Singer and Willett, 2003). In what follows, we 
restrict the discussion of KM estimates to the initial 48 months after entry. 
Actuarial KM survival and hazard curves for the pooled dentists were 
constructed at monthly intervals in order to examine the pattern of non-UK qualified 
dentists‟ retention in the GDS in greater detail. Figure 5.2 displays the estimated 
proportion of dentists who departed from the service and dentists who were practising in 
the GDS by each month, starting from the month of entry until the month of departure 
or the end of the sample period (September 2008). As shown in the figure, the small 
sample size brings about large fluctuations in the hazard estimates. Overall, we see an 
inverse U-shaped time trend pertaining to the hazard of leaving: it increases up to the 
end of the second year, peaking in months 19 through 22, and then declining, followed 
by an upward tail in later periods. Correspondingly, the survival estimates drop sharply 
nearing the end of the second year. The median tenure (where the survival estimate is 
0.5) for the non-UK qualified dentists is indicated as 26 months, suggesting that half of 
the non-UK qualified dentists under study have already departed from the GDS by the 
26th month following entry. All these suggest there is a high turnover of migrant 
dentists in the GDS, which is likely to be a concern for policy makers in the context of 
poor access of NHS dental services. 
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Figure 5.2: Kaplan-Meier survival analysis of retention of retention for migrant dentists 
in the Scottish GDS between 1996 and 2008. 
 
 
Univariate analysis 
 
Figures 5.3-5.6 present the results of the univariate analysis of categorical variables (e.g. 
country, year of entry, deprivation category of the practice and health board) using the 
non-parametric KM method. A separate KM survival curve was constructed for each 
subgroup and log-rank tests were employed to examine the equality of the survival 
functions. The median tenure for each subgroup is indicated in the figures as the time 
when the survival estimate equals 0.5. Overall, we find significant effects for all the 
categorical variables on dentists‟ retention behaviour when controlling no other effects: 
log-rank tests rejected the hypothesis that the survival functions are the same across 
subgroups. Furthermore, effects of these variables seem to be duration-dependent: the 
differences of survival estimates, even the rank, among subgroups change over dentists‟ 
career. Therefore our data may not meet the proportionality assumption.   
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Figure 5.3: Kaplan-Meier survival analysis of retention for migrant dentists by 
country. * P = 0.0000 by log-rank test. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Kaplan-Meier survival analysis of retention for migrant dentists by 
year of entry. * P = 0.0961 by log-rank test. 
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Figure 5.5: Kaplan-Meier survival analysis of retention for migrant dentists by 
deprivation category of the practice (1-affluent, 7-deprived). * P = 0.0005 by log-
rank test. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Kaplan-Meier survival analysis of retention for migrant dentists by 
health board (caid=1-8,10-12,14,30). * P = 0.0226 by log-rank test. 
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In order to generate simpler combined categorical variables to be included in the 
subsequent regression models, we examine the effect of dentist‟s country, year of entry 
and practice deprivation in more detail. Figure 5.3 shows the variations in the migrant 
dentists‟ retention among countries. As indicated, dentists from different country groups 
have very similar patterns of retention in the GDS in the early periods of the career: all 
of them left quite fast during the first 2 years after entry. The survival estimates 
bifurcate in the beginning of the second year: dentists from Spain, Ireland and Greece 
continued the high rate of leaving, while dentists from Sweden and other countries 
slowed down their pace. The group consisting of dentists from other countries leaving 
sped up again from the 45
th
 month, and the Swedish group maintained a slow rate over 
the whole career. Given the similarity of survival estimates among dentists from Greece, 
Ireland, and Spain (P=0.6414 by the log-rank test), we merge these three groups into a 
new country group for subsequent regression modelling. 
Figure 5.4 compares the retention of dentists according to the year when they 
provided the first treatment in the GDS. Dentists who joined the service before 2003 
have the longest retention (median tenure = 25 months) while those in 2003 have the 
shortest (median tenure = 18 months). The arrival cohorts of 2004 and 2005 follow a 
very similar pattern of cohort 2003 (P=0.5516 by log-rank test), so we use the year of 
2003 as a threshold to define the arrival cohort of entrants.     
Figure 5.5 indicates the effect of the deprivation category of the practice on 
dentists‟ retention behaviour. Log-rank tests suggest significantly different retention 
among the overall four groups (P=0.0005), but with no significant differences between 
the groups 1-3 and 4 (P=0.1613) or between the groups 5 and 6, 7 (P=0.2795). 
Therefore, we generate a new dummy variable for deprived practice which equals one 
when the deprecation category is larger than 4, and zero otherwise. Overall, dentists 
who practised in affluent areas stayed longer in the Scottish GDS than those in deprived 
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areas. The difference does not emerge until the beginning of the 2nd year, when dentists 
in deprived practices (depcat≥5) leave the service at a continually high rate, while the 
dentists in affluent practices (depcat≤4) have a reduction in their risk of leaving.  
 
5.4.3 Hazard regression modelling  
 
To identify factors that are associated with a non-UK dentist‟s likelihood of leaving the 
Scottish GDS, we apply a discrete-time proportional hazard (complementary log-log) 
modelling technique in a multivariate setting. Influences considered include dentist 
personal characteristics, practice characteristics, patient composition, and dentist overall 
treatment provision (two measures) (see Table 5.2 for descriptive statistics). To preserve 
degrees of freedom, categorical variables are examined with the simpler combined 
categories. 
The duration dependency of the hazard function is also of particular interest to 
this study. In selecting the proper specification for the baseline hazard, we were 
constrained by the small sample size in that only 70 migrant dentists joined the Scottish 
GDS before 2006 and experienced only 49 events by the end of data collection. The 
traditional flexible stepwise baseline hazard function is considered inappropriate as it 
includes too many interval dummy variables. Instead, we consider a series of baseline 
hazard specifications: polynomial function of time and logarithmic time (e.g. linear, 
quadratic and cubic), a wide stepwise function which include a dummy variable for each 
half-year interval within the first four years after entry and a dummy for the months 
thereafter, a LOWESS function with a 30% bandwidth (selected from 25% to 80% at 
5% intervals), and a cubic spline function with 2 interior knots (selected from 1 to 4). 
Complementary log-log regressions were estimated only controlling for effects of the 
baseline hazard. Table 5.4 compares goodness-of-fitting of these models using 
likelihood ratio tests (for nested models), and minimizing the Akaike Information 
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Criterion (AIC)
15
 (for non-nested models). Likelihood ratio tests suggest quadratic 
functions, both of time and logarithmic time, fit the data better than linear and cubic 
functions. Moreover, the LOWESS specification, which models the duration 
dependency completely flexibly, has the lowest AIC (449.10) as expected. This is 
followed by the stepwise specification (AIC = 460.08) and the quadratic function of 
logarithmic time (AIC = 460.35). Since the stepwise specification includes too many 
variables, we employed both the LOWESS specification and the quadratic function of 
logarithmic time in subsequent multivariate modelling, and in particular, the latter one 
which allows for explicit characterization of the duration dependency. To illustrate the 
distribution of the hazard function, predictions for these entire baseline hazard models 
are plotted in Figure 5.7, which indicate an inverse U-shaped distribution throughout. 
 
Table 5.4: Goodness-of-fitting statistics for variorums baseline hazard functions. 
 
Specification 
 
Function 
LR test 
p-value 
 
Log 
likelihood 
 
AIC 
Linear            -239.4 482.89 
Quadratic             
  0.000  -233.4 472.74 
Cubic             
     
  0.250  -232.3 472.63 
Linear log              -236.9 477.74 
Quadratic log                 
  0.005  -227.2 460.35 
Cubic log                 
       
  0.146  -226.5 461.03 
Stepwise      ∑ 
                -221.0 460.08 
LOWESS             ( )   -222.6 449.10 
Spline                   ( )           ( )   -226.3 460.57 
                                                 
15
 The AIC is defined as -2 times the log likelihood plus 2 times the sum of number of covariates and 
number of structure parameters to penalize each covariate included in the model.  
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Figure 5.7: Within-sample predictions of hazard distribution for various 
baseline hazard functions. 
 
The proportionality assumption was examined for each variable by including a 
relevant interaction term with     ( ) . A forward stepwise modelling procedure was 
employed with time-interactive variables entered in order, using the significance level 
of 5% and likelihood ratio tests as the criteria for retaining. Across the specifications 
analysed, the proportional assumption holds for all variables except the arrival cohort 
dummy and percentage male patients. The findings are consistent when we re-examine 
the proportional hazard assumption by testing the Schoenfeld residuals from Cox 
models at the significance level of 5%.  
Estimation results of multivariate proportional hazard models are presented in 
Tables 5.5 and 5.6. Tables 5.5 compares different specifications in terms of different 
measures of variables, baseline functions and link functions with no unobserved 
heterogeneity controlled for, while Tables 5.6 only includes variables that are estimated 
with significance effects in the preferred Specification C and take unobserved 
heterogeneity into account. For each of the specifications reported, the null hypothesis 
that all the explanatory variables are jointly equal to zero is rejected by likelihood ratio 
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tests (P=0.000 for all specifications). Standard errors were corrected for both 
heteroskedasticity across dentists and within-dentist correlation using robust cluster 
variance estimation except Specifications Gi and Gii, where dentist-specific effects are 
accounted for. 
 
Table 5.5: Regression results of multivariate proportional hazard models. 
Specification A B C D E F 
    
Logit 
  
Baseline hazard 
     LOWESS t 57.6190* 55.6844* 
   
43.7416* 
 
[11.8819] [12.1801] 
   
[10.1804] 
     
  
27.7087* 27.8453* 
  
   
[6.7135] [6.6295] 
        
  
-2.5788* -2.6028* 
  
   
[0.6634] [0.6681] 
  
Splines 
      s0_constant 
   
9.2474* 
 
     
[3.4378] 
 s1_constant 
   
0.0124 
 
     
[1.5897] 
 
Dentist overall treatment provision 
   Summation of monthly treatment fees over the whole career (£100) 
meanfeesperm -0.0087 
     
 
[0.0088] 
     Normalised prior monthly treatment fees (£100) 
  nfeesperm6 -0.0177* -0.0198* -0.0198* -0.0180* -0.0114* 
  
[0.0083] [0.0078] [0.0078] [0.0067] [0.0058] 
Dentist personal characteristics 
   Age-at-entry -0.6494* -0.7207* -0.6877* -0.6924* -0.6659* -0.3757* 
 
[0.2037] [0.2179] [0.1868] [0.2052] [0.1881] [0.1293] 
Age^2/100 0.9665* 1.0611* 1.0212* 1.0280* 1.0034* 0.4724* 
 
[0.2899] [0.3097] [0.2542] [0.2848] [0.2651] [0.1706] 
Male 0.1149 0.1398 0.0177 0.0157 0.1477 0.1896 
 
[0.3580] [0.3588] [0.3958] [0.4074] [0.3735] [0.2948] 
Country (ref. Greece, Ireland & Spain) 
   Sweden -2.2223* -1.8187+ -1.5526 -1.5864+ -1.9886* -1.1013 
 
[1.0017] [1.0104] [0.9456] [0.9605] [0.8285] [0.7358] 
Other -0.6111 -0.4538 -0.3024 -0.3324 -0.2824 -0.3891 
 
[0.4628] [0.4480] [0.4810] [0.5020] [0.4463] [0.3079] 
Year of entry (ref. 1996-02) 
    2003-05 4.6961+ 6.2375* 10.1630* 10.1734* 7.5155* 1.0937 
 
[2.3997] [2.6911] [3.3332] [3.3139] [3.2046] [1.4711] 
2003-05*ln(t) -1.6195* -2.0807* -3.3225* -3.3389* 
 
-0.5663 
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[0.7097] [0.8106] [0.9915] [0.9884] 
 
[0.4751] 
s0_2003-05 
   
-2.1370* 
 
     
[0.8598] 
 s1_2003-05 
   
-0.1478 
 
     
[0.3569] 
 
Practice characteristics 
    Deprivation category (ref. Affluent: depcat≤4) 
  Deprived: depcat≥5 0.4617 0.3333 0.3639 0.3676 0.4296 0.3824 
 
[0.4797] [0.4947] [0.5595] [0.5584] [0.4452] [0.2937] 
Health board (ref. Caid=8) 
    Caid=10 0.5088 0.4479 0.4347 0.4223 0.5814 0.2564 
 
[0.5389] [0.5186] [0.4973] [0.5098] [0.4991] [0.4398] 
Caid=1-7,11,12,14,30 0.2476 0.1381 -0.0971 -0.0771 0.0301 -0.3568 
 
[0.6921] [0.6969] [0.5174] [0.5231] [0.4674] [0.3246] 
Patient composition 
    %Male patients -8.0318 -6.0761 70.7736* 70.7071* 47.5931+ 
 
 
[8.5327] [8.9289] [25.3807] [24.6934] [26.5743] 
 %Male*ln(t) 4.0967* 3.7632* -20.4028* -20.3512* 
  
 
[1.3422] [1.3497] [7.2771] [7.1205] 
  s0_%Male 
   
-11.7963 
 
     
[7.2001] 
 s1_%Male 
   
1.9339 
 
     
[3.3988] 
 Average patient age 
      Page 1.6197* 1.7071* 2.0440* 2.0664* 1.8217* 
 
 
[0.7374] [0.7270] [0.6411] [0.7055] [0.6339] 
  Page^2/100 -2.2192* -2.2970* -2.6571* -2.6906* -2.3975* 
 
 
[1.0193] [0.9948] [0.8717] [0.9493] [0.8442] 
 % Exempt patients -1.7905 -0.8243 -1.7465 -1.6696 -1.6004 
 
 
[2.2633] [2.2533] [3.2568] [3.2171] [2.2987] 
 Constant -24.8236* -26.9807* -94.8036* -95.2729* -59.0920* 2.3169 
 
[10.0861] [9.8808] [17.3373] [17.9429] [15.2652] [2.2014] 
Log likelihood -198.62 -192.70 -192.72 -193.09 -40.23 -207.62 
AIC 433.23 421.40 423.43 424.19 122.47 441.24 
Ho: All covariates except constant=0 
   Likelihood ratio statistics 81.74 73.53 73.50 72.74 64.82 43.69 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
EPV
16 
2.9 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.5 4.1 
N 2415 1973 1973 1973 1973 1973 
Standard errors are in square brackets. 
* significant at the 5% level. 
+ significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
The first two specifications of Tables 5.5 present tests for choosing the proper 
measure of dentist overall treatment provision. Since duration dependency is not of 
interest for this stage, we include a LOWESS function of time as the baseline hazard. 
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All variables were fitted into a discrete-time proportional hazard model (cloglog) with 
no unobserved heterogeneity. Specification A includes a static summation measure 
(meanfeesperm), whereas Specification B uses normalised monthly treatment fees of the 
past six practice months (in constant SDR107 prices) (nfeesperm6) to capture dentists‟ 
prior relative productivity. Comparing across the two specifications, it can be seen that 
both measures allow for capturing the negative effect of dentists‟ overall treatment 
provision on their stay-or-leave decision, although the effect of the average monthly 
treatment fees over the whole career (meanfeesperm) is not statistically significant 
(P=0.328). The direction and significance of other coefficient estimates are much the 
same across the two specifications. In particular, Specification B has a log-likelihood 
that that is 5.91 log-points higher, indicating a better goodness-of-fit when allowing for 
the dynamic of individual circumstances. The dynamic measure is thus a better choice 
for modelling the effect of dentist overall treatment provision. 
Specification C estimates the same model of Specification B with the preferred 
quadratic baseline hazard function to provide explicit inferences of the duration 
dependency. Although the quadratic function of logarithmic time cannot flexibly model 
the duration dependency as the local linear regression function (LOWESS) does, the 
overall fitting of the two models are very similar (Log-likelihood = -192.70 for 
Specification B, and -192.72 for Specification C). 
The next two specifications provide robustness checks. Specification D reports 
the results of estimating a proportional odds specification (logit), which fits the data less 
well than the proportional hazard specification (Log-likelihood = -193.093, 0.38 log-
points lower than Specification C). Specification E reports the results of estimating a 
flexible parametric specification at the hazard scale using the Stata module “stpm” 
written by Royston (2001; revised 2007). The baseline hazard function is smoothed 
using a natural cubic spline function with one interior knot at the 50
th
 percentile of the 
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diction of the uncensored log times. The number of interior knots was selected from 0 to 
5 using minimising AIC. Despite the different coefficient magnitude, which is not 
directly comparable between the two specifications given the different baseline hazard 
rates, the covariate effects seem to be robustly estimated with identical signs and 
significances. 
Across the specifications analysed, we obtained the same set of factors that are 
closely associated with the hazard of dentists leaving the service, including age-at-entry, 
year of entry, percentage male patients, average age of patients and relative prior overall 
treatment provision (nfeesperm6). After adjusting for these variables, no statistically 
significant difference in the hazard rate was found by gender (P=0.964 in Specification 
C for example), combined country groups (P=0.2595), deprivation categories of the 
practice (P=0.515), or combined health boards (P=0.4034). The percentage of exempt 
patients has a negative coefficient parameter across specifications, but none of these 
effects is significant. In particular, the finding that migrant dentists are indifferent to the 
location of practice is very interesting and contravenes intuition. One suspicion is that 
the effect might be captured by patient composition due to the correlation between 
them. Thus, we estimated Specification F excluding variables for patient characteristics 
on the basis of Specification B, but still did not find any significant effect of practice 
deprivation (P=0.193).  
Taken together, Specification C is our preferred specification. In Table 5.6, 
Specification G estimates a better fitted model on its basis only retaining factors with 
significance. Given that omitted unobserved heterogeneity leads to biased estimation of 
coefficient parameters, particularly when the baseline hazard function is not completely 
flexible, we incorporate a random error component to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity in dentists. Two specifications of the unobserved heterogeneity 
distributions have been considered: the Gaussian and Gamma distributions. 
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Specification Gi estimates a random-effects complementary log-log model using the 
Stata10 command “xtcloglog” with 24 quadrature points. The accuracy of the 
quadrature approximation was assessed using a sensitivity check by command 
“quadchk” (STATA9, 2005). Specification Gii estimates the Gamma mixed hazard 
model proposed by Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) and Meyer (1990) using the Stata 
module “pgmhaz8” written by Jenkins (2004). The likelihood ratio tests reject the null 
hypothesis that dentist-specific effects are zero in both specifications (chibar2(01) = 
7.37 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.003; chibar2(01) = 4.88 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.014). Comparing 
across the three specifications, it can be seen that omitted unobserved heterogeneity has 
the expected impact upon parameter estimates. When heterogeneity correction is not 
implemented, coefficient estimates are smaller in size, and duration dependence is 
biased downward as can be observed from hazard predictions of time-dependent effects 
for these three specifications in Figure 5.8. In choosing the best specification of 
unobserved heterogeneity distribution, frailty variance is significant at the level of 5% 
in the Gaussian mixing specification, which has a log-likelihood that is 1.24 log-points 
higher compared with the Gamma mixing. In what follows, we restrict the discussion of 
the individual coefficients to the estimates reported in the random effects 
complementary log-log model (Specification Gi). 
Among the controls on dentists‟ personal characteristics, only the age-at-entry 
and year of entry have significant effects on the probability of non-UK qualified dentists 
leaving the GDS. Age-at-entry has a significant U-shaped effect on the hazard rate with 
a trough at 35.8 years of age (P=0.0809). A dentist who was 36 at the time of jointing 
has the lowest risk of leaving, which is estimated as, for example, 19.3% lower than a 
dentist who was 3 years younger or older at the time of joining. The high hazard rate for 
young dentists is not surprising, as it has been well documented in the labour literature 
that the average rates of job changes decrease with age (Topel and Ward, 1992). On the 
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other hand, for dentists who are older at entry, reasonable interpretations could either be 
the personal preference such as life style and habits that are hard to change because of 
age, or the lower costs of returning benefit from the established social networks in the 
original country.  
 
Table 5.6: Regression results of mixed proportional hazard models controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity. 
Specification C G Gi Gii 
   
Gaussian Gamma 
Baseline hazard 
        27.7087* 26.6737* 53.6684* 35.2503* 
 
[6.7135] [5.2695] [20.0208] [10.8393] 
      -2.5788* -2.6557* -4.8901* -3.1757* 
 
[0.6634] [0.5978] [1.6944] [1.0137] 
Dentist personal characteristics 
 Age-at-entry -0.6877* -0.7092* -1.7134* -1.2998* 
 
[0.1868] [0.1588] [0.7687] [0.5714] 
Age^2/100 1.0212* 0.9947* 2.3928* 1.7929* 
 
[0.2542] [0.2167] [1.0670] [0.7654] 
Male 0.0177 
   
 
[0.3958] 
   Country (ref. Greece, Ireland & Spain) 
 Sweden -1.5526 
   
 
[0.9456] 
   Other -0.3024 
   
 
[0.4810] 
   Year of entry (ref. 1996-02) 
  2003-05 10.1630* 9.0399* 17.1997* 13.5246* 
 
[3.3332] [2.6788] [6.8631] [5.8322] 
2003-05*ln(t) -3.3225* -2.9446* -5.4110* -4.3926* 
 
[0.9915] [0.8197] [2.0937] [1.8759] 
Practice characteristics 
  Deprivation category (ref. Affluent: depcat≤4) 
Deprived: depcat≥5 0.3639 
   
 
[0.5595] 
   Health board (ref. Caid=8) 
  Caid=10 0.4347 
   
 
[0.4973] 
   Caid=1-7,11,12,14,30 -0.0971 
   
 
[0.5174] 
   Patient composition 
  %Male patients 70.7736* 63.2468* 130.2842* 81.9615* 
 
[25.3807] [18.2578] [63.6145] [34.8600] 
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%Male*ln(t) -20.4028* -18.0662* -34.4566+ -20.9818* 
 
[7.2771] [5.2858] [18.0034] [10.6804] 
Average patient age 
    Page 2.0440* 2.0122* 4.8933* 4.0160* 
 
[0.6411] [0.5211] [2.1800] [1.5993] 
 Page^2/100 -2.6571* -2.6342* -6.3867* -5.1664* 
 
[0.8717] [0.6918] [2.8226] [2.0218] 
% Exempt patients -1.7465 
   
 
[3.2568] 
   Dentist overall treatment provision 
 Normalised prior monthly treatment fees (£100) 
nfeesperm6 -0.0198* -0.0223* -0.0456* -0.0395* 
 
[0.0078] [0.0066] [0.0140] [0.0119] 
Constant -94.8036* -89.5353* -196.9346* -142.7543* 
 
[17.3373] [14.7712] [75.7374] [45.1543] 
ln(frailty variance) 
 
2.2168* 1.1498+ 
   
[0.8573] [0.6899] 
Log likelihood -192.72 -196.29 -192.60 -193.85 
AIC 423.43 416.57 411.20 413.69 
Ho: All covariates except constant=0 
 Likelihood ratio statistics 73.50 66.36 72.82 70.11 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ho: Frailty=0 
   Likelihood ratio statistics 7.37 4.88 
p-value 
  
0.003 0.014 
EPV
16
 2.7 4.5 4.5 4.5 
N 1973 1973 1973 1973 
N_g 
  
70 70 
Standard errors are in square brackets. 
     * significant at the 5% level. 
     + significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
                                                 
16
 It is necessary to acknowledge the importance of EPV, i.e. the ratio of events per independent variable, 
in proportional hazards analysis (Concato et al., 1995; Peduzzi et al., 1995; Bradburn et al., 2003). The 
simulation work by Peduzzi et al. (1995) shows that the accuracy, precision, and significance of the 
regression coefficients estimated by the proportional hazard model will become increasingly unreliable as 
the EPV decreases. The reliability of our coefficient estimates may be constrained by the small EPV, but 
our estimates seem to be robust across a variety of specifications. In addition, a sample updating in 
January 2011 has  been proposed to allow for more reliable estimations with larger EPVs. 
131 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Out-of-sample prediction of hazard for the discrete-time proportional 
hazard model with no unobserved heterogeneity (Specification G), Gaussian-
distributed unobserved heterogeneity (Specification Gi), Gamma-distributed 
unobserved heterogeneity (Specification Gii) for an “average” migrant dentist by (1) 
year of entry and (2) percentage male patients. 
*age-at-entry=30; female; Greece, Ireland or Spain; year of entry=2003-2005 if applicable; 
deprived=0; caid=8; percentage male patients=44% if applicable; average patient age=40; 
percentage exempt patients=32%; normalised prior monthly treatment fees=0. 
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The data also reveals a significant time-varying variation in the trend of 
retention between cohorts (P=0.0342). The coefficient on variable 2003-05 assesses the 
initial difference in the hazard between dentists who joined the service during the period 
of 1996-2002 and 2003-2005, while coefficients on the interaction term describes how 
the difference changes over time. Estimates suggest a positive risk difference between 
the two cohort groups upon arrival, which reduces to zero at approximately the 24
th
 
month
17
 after entry, and turns negative thereafter. For better illustration of the duration-
dependent effect, we plot the predicted hazard and survival probability against the 
number of months following entry for a fictitious “average” dentist at different arrival 
cohorts in Figure 5.9. Hazard predictions are derived by setting all covariates equal to 
the mean value (age-at-entry=30; female; Greece, Ireland or Spain; Deprived=0; caid=8; 
normalised prior monthly treatment fees=0; percentage male patients=44%; average 
patient age=40; percentage exempt patients=32%), and corresponding survival 
probability is calculated as    *   ,  (     )-+. As can be seen, recent entrants are 
only a little more likely to leave than early entrants during the initial 24 months 
following entry, but far less likely to leave thereafter. This could be a result of a policy 
shift; the Dental Action Plan (Scottish Executive 2005) began in April 2005, and gave 
rise to many more allowances to encourage dentists to work in Scotland. Alternatively, 
the big difference in later periods could be a simple result of the limited length of the 
study period. The hazard of dentists finishing work episodes at a given interval is 
calculated using the frequency of observed episode terminations; there are 88% of 
dentists of the cohort 1996-02 processing complete work episodes, while only 59% of 
dentists of the cohort 2003-05 by September 2008. 
 
 
                                                 
17
 The result is calculated as (exp(17.1997/5.4110)). 
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Figure 5.9: Out-of-sample prediction of hazard and survival for the   multivariate    
discrete-time proportional hazard model with Gaussian-distributed unobserved 
heterogeneity (Specification Gi) for an “average” migrant dentist by (1) year of 
entry and (2) percentage male patients. 
*age-at-entry=30; female; Greece, Ireland or Spain; year of entry=2003-2005 if applicable; 
deprived=0; caid=8; percentage male patients=44% if applicable; average patient age=40; percentage 
exempt patients=32%; normalised prior monthly treatment fees=0. 
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The next two dimensions of risk factors – practice characteristics and patient 
composition – together capture variations in dentists‟ working conditions. Estimates 
suggest that dentists‟ retention behaviour is closely associated with demographic 
characteristics of the patients they treated, but not characteristics of their practices. The 
percentage of male patients being treated is estimated to have a significant positive 
effect on the hazard rate initially, which reduces to zero at the 44
th
 month
18
 after entry. 
Out-of-sample predictions of the hazard and survival rate for an average dentist are also 
plotted in Figure 5.9 by 10%, 50% and 90% percentiles of percentage male patients (i.e. 
40%, 45% and 50%). Although we only find a significant correlation between the 
percentage male patients and the hazard rate during the initial 44 months following 
entry, the predicted survival rates suggest that dentists treating more male patients have 
shorter retention in the service. In addition, the quadratic in average age of patients has 
a significant effect on the hazard rate which reaches the peak at 38 (P=0.0750). Overall, 
the more middle aged and male patients a dentist treats, the higher the risk of leaving. 
This is likely a result of work burden: our work on treatment intensity in Chapter 6 finds 
treatment delivered on middle aged and male patients are generally more intensive than 
treatment otherwise. 
Finally, dentists facing lower demand for treatment service are more likely to 
leave the service: other things equal, a dentist who receives £100 less in monthly 
treatment fees during past six months when compared with the average fees received by 
dentists working in the service for the same length of periods, is estimated to be 4.46% 
(exp(0.0456)-1) more likely to leave in a given month.  
 
5.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of migrant dentist retention in the Scottish 
NHS, using a sample derived from administrative data of the Scottish dental system for 
                                                 
18
 The result is calculated as  (exp(130.2842/34.4566)). 
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entrants of 1996-2005. The data shows low retention rates of migrant healthcare 
professionals: half of the migrants left the service by the 26th month following entry. It 
is estimated that almost 60% have gone within four years, although this may not be very 
precise given the small number of dentists remaining in later periods. For ease of 
comparison, we calculated the average participation rate 5 years after entry is 28.3% 
between 1996 and 2004, while figures on Scottish DVTs
19
 suggest that the average 
participation rate in NHS Scotland 5 years after VT is 66% between 1991 and 2004, and 
among whom, those graduated from Scotland have participation rates that are 16%, 
29% and 32% higher than graduates from in England, Ireland and Northern Ireland. We 
acknowledge that the retention examined here only refers to the major Scottish NHS 
sector, GDS. Dentistry in the UK is quite unique in that GDPs work mainly as 
independent contractors, and tend to put more focus on their private work, or even 
completely switch to the private sector after a period of practice in the NHS. It is also 
possible that these dentists left for other NHS sectors (e.g. Scottish CDS and HDS, or 
NHS sectors in other UK countries), a new country, or returning to their original 
countries after obtaining some working/training experience abroad. Collecting detailed 
information on overseas qualified healthcare professionals‟ career paths, especially their 
destination, will enhance effectiveness of workforce planning. 
Nevertheless, the high turnover of migrant dentists in the major NHS sector is 
still likely to be a concern to policy makers in the context of poor access of NHS dental 
services. The MIDAS data allow us to investigate a full range of potential determinants 
of retention duration that are rarely available in other datasets. Multivariate analysis in a 
mixed discrete-time proportional hazards framework provides important insights into 
retention decisions of migrant dentists, which constitutes this study a potentially 
important application to workforce planning. First, our results indicate an inverse U-
                                                 
19
 Data requested from Dr. Colin Tilley from NHS Education for Scotland, 2007. 
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shaped distribution of the predicted baseline hazard functions peaking through the third 
practice year (see Figure 5.9) for dentists joining during 2003-05 throughout. Second, 
retention patterns are found to vary with some personal characteristics: migrants joining 
the service at around 36 and after 2003 have longer retention duration in the service. 
Surprisingly, we found no significant variation in retention between men and women or 
among country groups. These results may help to set evidence-based targets for 
international recruitment programmes and recruitment initiatives for a more effective 
improvement on NHS dental access. Third, the insignificant effect of practice 
deprivation that has been found suggests migrant dentists could be effectively recruited 
for posts in understaffed socially and economically deprived areas. Finally, we find 
dentists‟ retention decisions are closely associated with patient composition: dentists 
facing more middle aged and male patients, who require more intensive treatment, are 
more likely to leave.  
These findings should be interpreted in the context of the overall limitations 
present in the data we have used. The reliability of the coefficients may be constrained 
by the small number of migrant dentists practising in Scotland, but our estimates seem 
to be robust across a variety of specifications. To preserve degrees of freedom, we 
combined categorical variables, and modelled the duration dependency using a 
quadratic function of time instead of the generally favoured flexible stepwise baseline 
hazard function. Although the quadratic function makes strong assumptions about the 
hazard distribution, the flexible LOWESS baseline function and the flexible parameter 
specification which models duration dependency using a natural cubic spine function 
identified a common set of risk factors.  
The lower hazard that has been found for recent entrants (2003-05) suggests the 
censoring mechanism in our sample does hold some informative value: dentists 
processing censored work episodes concentrated in the recent arrival cohort, thereby 
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likely to bear lower risk of leaving. This suggests we might have underestimated the 
retention duration, but it should not affect the observed variations by other risk factors. 
Nevertheless, this finding raises concern as to what extent the entrants of 1996-2005 in 
our sample are representative of all migrant dentists in Scotland. The Scottish Executive 
has introduced a series of NHS access schemes since 2006, such as providing incentives 
to encourage dentists working in Scotland, developing salaried dental services and 
directly recruiting dentists from Poland in 2006. The financial support, newly 
established networks and enhanced employment perspectives are likely to change the 
composition of new migrant inflows. Therefore, collecting a new sample including the 
latest entrants with a long sample period for further investigation is necessary to make 
robust policy recommendations. In addition, the potential endogeneity of dentist overall 
treatment provision is another issue which warrants further investigation using a large 
sample. 
Whilst this study focuses on migrant dentists working in the Scottish GDS and 
the data limit the policy implications of the work, our methodology can be applied to 
other suitable data in order to address various retention issues for healthcare 
professionals. Investigating how the retention decision making processes differ between 
native and overseas qualified health professionals and evaluating the effectiveness of 
recruitment initiatives, for example, are of particular policy interest. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 COMPARING TREATMENT OF MIGRANT AND NON-MIGRANT 
DENTISTS IN THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Another concern with respect to the migration of health professionals is how migrant 
professionals provide treatment compared with domestically trained professionals. Also, 
given the high turnover of migrant dentists in the Scottish GDS highlighted in the 
previous chapter, to what extent do migrants assimilate into the new health care system. 
This chapter addresses these issues while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
among dentists using fixed effects method. 
International recruitment has become an important tool to address workforce 
shortages in healthcare in many industrialized countries. There are obvious questions 
regarding the extent to which migrants are suitable substitutes for domestically trained 
professionals, especially in the realm of health care, where in the presence of 
asymmetric information health care professionals have considerable discretion over the 
type of care they deliver, this raises concerns regarding both the quality and safety of 
healthcare (OECD, 2008; Simoens and Hurst, 2006). Assessing the extent to which 
there are differences between internationally recruited and domestically trained health 
professionals is, therefore, clearly a concern for public policy. Until now, however, 
there has been little empirical work comparing the services delivered by migrant and 
indigenously trained health care professionals. 
The labour economics literature has long focused on examining the economic 
assimilation of migrant workers (see the survey in Borjas, 1994). Upon arrival in a host 
country experiencing a shortage of country exclusive human capital, migrants tend to 
have a big earning gap as compared to native workers of similar ability (Chiswick, 
1980). However, the size of this earnings gap usually diminishes as migrants learn the 
local language and institutions, accumulate local experience, and adjust their skills to 
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suit local conditions (Eckstein and Yoram, 2003). In general, these studies use earnings 
as a proxy for skills, with more rapid assimilation rates being found among higher 
skilled migrants (Friedberg, 2000). More recently, researchers have investigated not 
only earnings, but also employment in terms of labour force participation and self-
employment (see the survey in Dustamn and Fabbri, 2005). It has been argued that 
labour market participation is more important than wages in migration assimilation in 
northern and western European countries which have less flexible labour markets 
coupled with generous welfare systems (Zorlu and Hartog, 2008). In contrast to general 
migrant workers, a question relevant to migrant health professionals is whether the 
difference in treatment provided by migrant and non-migrant professionals disappears 
with time and, if so, how long this process takes. The previous chapter has highlighted a 
high turnover of migrant dentists in the Scottish GDS. While we may expect that the 
high degree of transferability of medical education within Europe could reduce 
assimilation time of health professionals, it is not clear as to what extent the country-
specific skills and practice styles developed in original countries could be adjusted to fit 
with the new health care system within the short stay of migrant dentists in the Scottish 
GDS. 
In light of these issues, this chapter examines whether there are differences 
between the treatment provided by migrant and non-migrant dentists and whether these 
differences disappear over time. We again use administrative data from the NHS 
General Dental Service in Scotland, and target a particular group of migrant health 
professionals – dentists migrating from EC/EEA countries and contracted under the 
Scottish National Health Service.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section describes 
our data, sets out our empirical methodology and presents the empirical results. A 
difference-in-differences model is estimated to examine how migrant dentists‟ 
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responses to different case mix and individual circumstances compare with non-migrant 
dentists‟ responses, and whether the treatment difference disappears with time as 
migrants assimilate into the host country. Given the longitudinal nature of the data, we 
control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity in dentists using fixed effects 
method. However, the dentist fixed effects method cannot identify the initial treatment 
difference and assumes homogeneous patients such that unobserved dentist-specific 
characteristics affect treatment delivery in the same way for all patients. Thus, in the 
penultimate discussion section, we estimate an auxiliary OLS regression of dentist 
effects estimated to isolate the fixed effect of migrant status, and, at the first attempt, 
make full use of the matched patient and practitioner data to simultaneously control for 
patient- and dentist-specific effects using a three-way error-component model. The last 
section concludes the paper. 
 
6.2 EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
  
6.2.1 Data 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the anonymised treatment data reported in this paper comes 
from the MIDAS, which is a large-scale administrative database of linked patient-
practitioner information that stores all GDS treatment in Scotland. Within each CoT, the 
patient usually receives a range of items of service, each with an associated fee 
regularly informed by Doctors‟ and Dentists‟ Review Body. The NHS payment system 
allocates a unique identifier for each patient, GDP, and CoT, making it possible to 
follow patients, GDPs and types of treatment over time.  
The sample of data on migrant and non-migrant dentists was acquired by using 
the GDC number of dentists issued with a VT number to identify their GDS treatment. 
For migrant dentists, the sample was restricted to include only dentists who began 
providing GDS treatment after January 2006. For non-migrant dentists, the sample was 
restricted to dentists who completed VT in July 2006 and who subsequently provided 
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treatment in the GDS. We can therefore, investigate how a migrant GDP adjusts 
practice style over time since entry compared with a comparable non-migrant GDP with 
the same practice experience in the GDS. By doing so, we implicitly assume the 
influence of previous experience in the source country on practice style is insignificant 
and remains constant for each GDP throughout the practice. Friedberg (2000) evaluates 
the importance of domestic- and foreign-source human capital in determining 
immigrant-native differences in the human-capital corrected earnings, and finds that the 
return to foreign experience is generally insignificant. 
The treatment data for both migrant and non-migrant dentists were restricted to 
information on adults because there is much more detailed information on the treatment 
of adults compared to children. The initial sample consisted of 199 migrant GDPs with 
264,843 claims and 83 non-migrant GDPs with 217,755 claims paid before September 
2008. In order to account for the impact of visit duration on treatment, each patient‟s 
first observation was dropped, which reduced the sample to 116,211 claims made by 
192 migrant GDPs and 112,394 claims made by 83 non-migrant GDPs. Finally, we 
focus on treatment provided during the same experience period – the first 24 months 
after entry. This further reduces the sample size to 107,378 claims made by 192 migrant 
GDPs and 108,528 claims made by 83 non-migrant GDPs. 
Table 6.1 reports descriptive statistics for migrant and non-migrant GDPs. 
Patients treated by the two groups of GDPs are very similar in terms of their age, 
gender, exemption status and duration since last visit.  
The type of treatment these patients required is also very similar but there are 
some small differences in the proportion of CoTs in which patients required diagnostic 
(examinations and x-rays), periodontal (scaling and polishing), and conservative 
(fillings) treatment.   
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Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics. 
  
Non-migrant Migrant 
Variable Description N Mean SD N Mean SD 
feesdr107 Total value of the claim (constant SDR107 prices) 108528 36.52 57.54 107378 38.35 56.53 
page The age of the patient 108528 45.25 14.51 107378 45.44 14.43 
psex The sex of the patient (male=1) 108528 0.44 0.50 107378 0.45 0.50 
exempt Exemption status (exempt=1) 108528 0.27 0.44 107378 0.29 0.46 
visitdur Duration since last visit (months) 108528 5.53 3.56 107378 5.76 4.04 
diag Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was a diagnosis item 108528 0.72 0.45 107378 0.70 0.46 
prev Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was a preventive item 108528 0.0006 0.0243 107378 0.0004 0.0193 
perio Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was a periodontal item 108528 0.49 0.50 107378 0.44 0.50 
cons Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was a conservative item 108528 0.36 0.48 107378 0.40 0.49 
surg Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was a surgical item 108528 0.07 0.25 107378 0.08 0.28 
prosth Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was a prosthetic item 108528 0.06 0.23 107378 0.07 0.25 
ortho Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was an orthodontic item 108528 0.0000 0.0053 107378 0.0001 0.0114 
other Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was an „other‟ item 108528 0.06 0.24 107378 0.07 0.26 
occasional Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was an occasional item 108528 0.01 0.07 107378 0.01 0.11 
incomplete Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was an „incomplete‟ item 108528 0.005 0.068 107378 0.010 0.101 
misc Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was a „miscellaneous‟ item 108528 0.20 0.40 107378 0.22 0.42 
trauma Equals 1 if at the claim was characterized by trauma 108528 0.0012 0.0345 107378 0.0010 0.0314 
enterage The age of the dentist at the first treatment in the GDS 83 25.29 2.26 192 34.36 8.83 
dsex The sex of the dentist (male=1) 83 0.49 0.50 192 0.48 0.50 
sal Remuneration structure (salaried=1) 83 0.02 0.15 192 0.19 0.40 
se Remuneration structure (self-employed=1) 83 0.98 0.15 192 0.83 0.38 
Exp_0-6 Equals 1 if less than 6 months elapsed since the first treatment 108528 0.09 0.29 107378 0.21 0.40 
Exp_7-12 Equals 1 if 7-12 months elapsed since the first treatment 108528 0.28 0.45 107378 0.31 0.46 
Exp_13-18 Equals 1 if 13-18 months elapsed since the first treatment 108528 0.32 0.47 107378 0.27 0.44 
Exp_19-24 Equals 1 if 19-24 months elapsed since the first treatment 108528 0.31 0.46 107378 0.21 0.41 
depcat The deprivation category of the dentist‟s practice (1/7=least/most deprived) 
caid Health board ID (anonymous)  
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Dentist characteristics differ between the two groups, though. The average age-at-
entry of the migrant GDPs was 34, 9 years older than the non-migrants. Non-migrant 
dentists were more likely to be non-salaried than migrant dentists, perhaps as a result of the 
Scottish Executive‟s recruitment initiative introduced in Chapter 4. The distribution of 
CoTs by deprivation category of the practice (1/7 = least/most deprived) presented in 
Figure 6.1 also shows that migrant dentists work in practices more deprived than non-
migrants. 
 
Figure 6.1: Distribution of GDPs by deprivation category of the practice. 
 
Within the sample period migrant dentists provide more treatment (by value) per 
CoT as compared to non-migrants (£38.22 vs. £36.55). However, following Friedberg 
(2000), Figure 6.2 shows how the mean value of treatment per CoT changes during the 
sample period. It suggests that while there is some difference between migrant and non-
migrant dentists initially, there is convergence in the mean value per CoT from the fifth 
quarter after entry onwards. 
Figure 6.2 also indicates that both groups of GDPs demonstrate that there is an 
initial period during which the mean value per CoT increases probably as a result of the 
claims process: during the first few months only short and therefore relatively low value 
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CoTs will be processed. Thus, we focus on the treatment provided after the second month 
after entry. This reduces the sample size to 103,412 claims made by 179 migrant GDPs and 
107,668 claims made by 82 non-migrant GDPs. 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Treatment value for migrant and non-migrant GDPs over time. 
 
 
6.2.2 Regression methods 
 
The traditional Labour Economics literature has highlighted a speedy assimilation process 
by general migrant workers as they learn the local language and institutions, accumulate 
local experience, and adjust skills to suit local labour markets (Eckstein and Yoram, 2003). 
In the present study, while it is likely that healthcare professionals have developed country-
specific skills and practice styles from the previous training and working experience in their 
country of origin, the descriptive statistics do suggest some degree of convergence by 
migrant GDPs to their non-migrant counterparts (see Figure 6.2). We attempt to capture 
these individual specific effects and potential convergence in treatment by estimating the 
following difference-in-differences (DiD) model: 
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  (    )                     ∑          
  ∑                         
  (6.1) 
where      is the value of the kth CoT provided by dentist j for patient i‟s kth CoT;   is a 
dummy variable indicating a migrant GDP;      denotes a set of controls such as patient 
characteristics and the broad treatment categories reported in Table 6.1 that vary across 
patients, dentists and CoTs;       is a vector of binary variables indicating dentist 
experience by every six months elapsed since the first treatment (g {3-6, 6-12, 13-18, 19-
24}; the reference category is the 2
nd
 month after entry);    and    are patient- and dentist-
specific effects capturing unobserved heterogeneity between patients and dentists, 
respectively; and     is a pure random error orthogonal to all explanatory variables.  
The administrative data we use here are not standard as in the more common types 
of panel data in the sense that dental treatments are not delivered at the same time points or 
even intervals, so the k subscript in model (1) is an ordinal number indicating the order of 
treatments within each unique patient-dentist combination (or “spell”), rather than the time-
series dimension. We assume that there is no correlation between the residuals of different 
patient-dentist match across each k-th CoTs, and therefore, do not include the unobservable 
order-specific effect. Our specification does not consider time-specific effects given the 
short sample period we have and also the high correlation between dentist experience and 
year dummies. However, a variable reflecting the time duration elapsed since the patient‟s 
last visit is included to control for the potential dependence in observations over time. 
The DiD model allows us to test whether migrant and non-migrant dentists behave 
differently from each other in practice
20
. The coefficients on the interactions between the 
                                                 
20
 We can also estimate models separately for migrant and non-migrant GDPs, but, by doing so, we lose 
information on patients who are treated by both types of dentists, which contributes to the identification of the 
three-way error-component model in section 6.3.2 which accounts for both patient- and dentist-specific 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
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migrant dummy and treatment category indicators, prev*m, perio*m, ..., misc*m, capture 
differences in the practise styles of migrant and non-migrant GDPs. The coefficient on the 
interactions between the migrant dummy and experience category variable, Exp_g*m, 
captures the rate that migrant GDPs adjust treatment intensity over time, relative to the non-
migrant GDPs, while allowing for their initial difference at the reference experience 
category,    We can calculate the assimilation rate (i.e. the rate of reduction in treatment 
difference between migrant and non-migrant GDPs) during the period from    to    as 
 (  |  )   (  |  ), where month 3-6         month 19-24. A quicker assimilation 
rate implies that treatments between migrant and non-migrants converge faster, and vice 
versa.  
The fixed effects estimation method, which treats unobservable effects as a 
parameter to be estimated rather than part of the residuals, is preferred in our analysis to 
allow for arbitrary correlation between unobservable effects and observed explanatory 
variables. The data allow us to control precisely for dentist effects by recording all 
treatments that have been provided by each dentist (mean N=831.3) over the sample period. 
Therefore, we estimate the dentist fixed effects version of Equation (6.1), which assumes 
heterogeneous dentists by including a different intercept for each dentist, but homogeneous 
patients by setting patient effects jointly to zero: 
 
  (    )                     ∑          
 ∑                           
   (6.2) 
It is assumed that treatments on the same patient are independent and that 
unobserved dentist-specific characteristics affect treatment delivery in the same way for all 
patients.  
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6.2.3 Regression results 
 
Table 6.2 presents the results of estimating the treatment intensity function in a dentist 
fixed effects specification. An F-test that all regressors are jointly equal to zero is rejected 
(F(74,210745)=4461.27, Prob>F=0.0000). Standard errors are corrected for both 
heteroskedasticity across dentists and within-dentist correlation using robust cluster 
variance estimation.  
    
    Table 6.2: Estimation results of the dentist fixed effects model. 
Assimilation estimates (ref. group: Exp_2) 
Exp_3-6 -0.0092 Exp_3-6*m 0.0389 
 
[0.0307] 
 
[0.0350] 
Exp_7-12 0.003 Exp_7-12*m 0.0484 
 
[0.0297] 
 
[0.0339] 
Exp_13-18 0.0115 Exp_13-18*m 0.0318 
 
[0.0298] 
 
[0.0349] 
Exp_19-24 0.0186 Exp_19-24*m 0.0052 
 
[0.0303] 
 
[0.0360] 
Case mix 
   prev 0.7394* prev*m 0.0319 
 
[0.1318] 
 
[0.2011] 
perio 0.6885* perio*m -0.0061 
 
[0.0130] 
 
[0.0177] 
cons 1.1777* cons *m -0.0104 
 
[0.0191] 
 
[0.0262] 
surg 0.6270* surg*m 0.0344 
 
[0.0157] 
 
[0.0215] 
prosth 1.4709* prosth*m 0.1122* 
 
[0.0262] 
 
[0.0372] 
ortho 1.1839 ortho*m 0.8166 
 
[0.8176] 
 
[0.9958] 
other 0.0557+ other*m -0.0261 
 
[0.0283] 
 
[0.0373] 
occasional 0.6180* occasional*m -0.0792 
 
[0.0494] 
 
[0.0643] 
incomplete 0.6061* incomplete *m -0.1448 
 
[0.0854] 
 
[0.0970] 
misc -0.0225 misc*m 0.0034 
 
[0.0196] 
 
[0.0254] 
trauma 0.1122 trauma*m 0.0639 
 
[0.0680] 
 
[0.0944] 
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Remuneration 
   sal Yes sal*m Yes 
exempt 0.0896* exempt*m 0.0206 
 
[0.0163] 
 
[0.0211] 
Patient characteristics 
  page 0.0031* page*m -0.0016 
 
[0.0011] 
 
[0.0016] 
page^2/100 -0.0048* page^2/100*m 0.0021 
 
[0.0010] 
 
[0.0016] 
psex 0.0137* psex*m 0.0111* 
 
[0.0041] 
 
[0.0055] 
visitdur 0.0395* visitdur*m -0.0015 
 
[0.0033] 
 
[0.0039] 
visitdur^2/100 -0.1459* visitdur^2/100*m 0.0066 
 
[0.0171] 
 
[0.0202] 
Practice deprivation (ref. group: depcat4) 
depcat Yes depcat*m Yes 
Health board (ref. group: caid5) 
 caid Yes caid*m Yes 
_cons 1.5410* 
  
 
[0.1143] 
  F 4461.27 N 211080 
r2 0.61 N_g 261 
r2_a 0.61 g_avg 808.74 
r2_o 0.32 sigma_u 0.67 
r2_w 0.61 sigma_e 0.56 
r2_b 0.08 rho 0.58 
For confidentiality reasons, we do not report coefficients on binary variables and  
responding interaction variables that are identified with small number of dentists, such as 
dentist contract (sal, sal*m), practice deprivation (depcat, depcat*m) and NHS Health 
Board (caid, caid*m). 
Standard errors are in square brackets.  
 * significant at the 5% level. 
 + significant at the 10% level. 
 
The random effects estimation method which produces efficient estimates exploring 
both within- and between-variance of the data is also employed on the data. The Hausman 
test (Hausman and Taylor, 1981) rejected the random effects model (  (57)=386.35, 
Prob>   =0.0000) and dentist effects estimated in the fixed effects model are significantly 
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different from zero (F(260, 210745) = 11.93, Prob > F = 0.0000) and account for as much 
as 58% of the variation in treatment value ( =0.58). 
In what follows, we focus on the difference-in-differences variables to examine how 
a migrant GDP responds to the various case mix and personal circumstances relative to a 
comparable non-migrant GDP, and, after adjusting for observed variables and dentist fixed 
effects, how their treatment differences vary with time.  
Variations in patient dental conditions are captured by indicator variables for the 
broad treatment categories defined in the SDR and a dummy variable for treatment required 
arose as a result of trauma. An F-test that interaction variables between the migrant dummy 
and treatment category indicators are jointly equal to zero is not rejected at the 5% of 
significant level (P=0.0575), which suggests migrant and non-migrant GDPs deliver similar 
treatment for various treatment categories. The only exception is for the prosthetic 
treatment: migrant GDPs provide significantly more treatment for patients who require for 
prosthetic treatment (11.22%, P=0.003) compared with non-migrant GDPs. 
Dummy variables for a dentist‟s contract (salaried or not) and each patient‟s 
exemption status captures how dentists respond to remuneration structure and demand-side 
cost-sharing, respectively. The coefficients on dentist contract and its interaction are based 
upon the 2 (or 0.8% of the sample) GDPs who switched contracts during the sample period 
and therefore, are not reported for confidentiality reasons. Non-migrant GDPs provide 
exempt patients with 8.96% more treatment than non-exempt patients (P=0.000) and the 
interaction term shows that there is no significant difference between migrant and non-
migrant dentists in the way they treat exempt and non-exempt patients. 
As to the standard patient controls, only the interaction term on the patient gender is 
significantly different from zero. This suggests that, relative to female patients, male 
patients receive significantly more treatment from migrant dentists than from non-migrant 
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dentists (1.11%, P=0.044). It can be found that, ceteris paribus, male patients at 33 years
21
 
old receive the highest value of treatment.  
The indicator variables for the deprivation category of the practice and NHS Board 
where the patient receives treatment and their migrant-interactive variables capture the 
variations in treatment intensity by patients‟ socioeconomic characteristics and Health 
Boards. While the individual coefficients are not reported in Table 6.2, F-tests suggest that 
migrant GDPs provide significantly different treatment relative to non-migrants according 
to the deprivation category and (separately) NHS Board in which they practise (P= 0.000 
for both groups of interaction variables). 
Migrant and non-migrant GDPs follow significantly different time patterns of 
treatment value. An F-test that the interaction terms, Exp_g*m, are jointly equal to zero is 
rejected (P=0.0006). Using coefficients on the experience variables, generates the treatment 
experience profiles plotted in Figure 6.3. This shows the treatment difference between 
migrant and comparable non-migrant GDPs diminishes over time within two years of 
practice in the GDS. The first two six months see increases of treatment value by both 
groups, which is likely to be a result of the claim process. Since the second six months, 
migrant GDPs provide 4.84% more treatment than their non-migrant counterparts relative 
to the second month after entry; this gap reduces to 3.18% the following six months, and 
then approaches to zero by the fourth six months post-entry. These insignificant 
coefficients do not necessarily suggest an insignificant assimilation process as they are 
being estimated relative to the 2
nd
 month post-entry; whether there is significant 
convergence or divergence during the sample period depends upon how  (  ) changes 
with time. Table 6.3 presents predicted assimilation rates over time. It suggests that, after 
adjusting for observed heterogeneity across CoTs and dentist fixed effects, there is 
                                                 
21
 The result is calculated as -0.0031/[2×(-0.0048/100)]. 
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significant convergence of migrant GDPs to comparable non-migrants from the 7
th
 to the 
24
th
 month since entry: the difference of treatment value reduces significantly by 4.32% 
(P=0.002, 95% confident interval is [-6.97%, -1.67%]). 
 
Figure 6.3: Predicted treatment experience profiles for migrant and non-migrant GDPs. 
 
Table 6.3: Predicted assimilation rates. 
  Coef. Std. Err. P>t   [95% Conf. Interval] 
Exp_7-12 - Exp_3-6 0.0095 0.0154 0.540 [-0.0209, 0.0398] 
Exp_13-18 - Exp_7-12 -0.0166 0.0114 0.145 [-0.0390, 0.0058] 
Exp_19-24 - Exp_13-18 -0.0266 0.0082 0.001 [-0.0428, -0.0104] 
Exp_19-24 - Exp_7-12 -0.0432 0.0135 0.002 [-0.0697, -0.0167] 
 
As a robustness check, we estimate the assimilation rate during the period from the 
7
th
 to the 24
th
 month in 2 more dentist fixed effects specifications (see Table 6.4 for results). 
Standard errors are again corrected for both heteroskedasticity across dentists and within-
dentist correlation using robust cluster variance estimation. Specification A re-estimates our 
baseline model reported in Table 6.2, where we set the 2
nd
 half year (i.e. Exp_7-12) as the 
reference group. The assimilation rate can therefore, be directly captured by       . 
Specification B replicates specification A but only focuses on the active treatments which 
contain other items of service rather than only an exam, or only a scale & polish, or both 
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(Chalkley and Tilley, 2006). These treatments constitute 65% of the sample. Specification 
C is the same as Specification A, but excludes the variable, visitdur, in order to use 
information on all treatments rather than only on patients‟ subsequent treatments which 
allow us to calculate the time duration since the last visit. Comparing the main coefficients 
of interest – the interactions between migrant dummy and experience category variables 
Exp_19-24*m – across specifications suggests a robust assimilation process for migrant 
GDPs. During the period from the 7
th
 to the 24
th
 month after entry, the treatment difference 
between migrant and non-migrant GDPs reduces by an even larger magnitude for all 
treatments (5.56%) and subsequent active treatments (5.38%) as compared with subsequent 
treatments (4.33%). All these estimates are found to be statistically significant. 
 
6.3 DISCUSSION 
 
The treatment provided by all migrant dentists who started providing dental services in the 
GDS after 2006 are compared with the treatment provided by a comparison group 
consisting of the 2005/06 cohort of Scottish DVTs. We choose a particular cohort of DVTs 
for comparison rather than a representative sample of the overall DVTs as it carries more 
policy relevance to compare the outputs of the government recruited migrant GDPs with 
the outputs of local graduates who entered the service at the same time. By controlling for 
dentist fixed effects, the treatment difference between these two groups of GDPs at the 
reference experience category as captured by the time invariant dummy variable,   , is 
eliminated, together with dentist-specific fixed effects,   , by within transformation and 
therefore, cannot be identified directly. We allow for this initial difference, and restrict our 
focus on whether the difference disappears over time as migrant GDPs assimilate into the 
local system.    
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       Table 6.4: Estimation results across dentist fixed effects specifications. 
  
A. 
Incl. visitdur 
 
B. 
Incl. visitdur 
active 
C. 
Excl. visitdur 
 
Assimilation estimates (ref. group: Exp_7-12) 
Exp_2-6 -0.0113 -0.013 0.0148* 
 
[0.0093] [0.0129] [0.0073] 
Exp_13-18 0.0086 0.0104 -0.0028 
 
[0.0071] [0.0098] [0.0064] 
Exp_19-24 0.0156* 0.0179 0.0005 
 
[0.0077] [0.0114] [0.0071] 
Exp_2-6*m -0.0136 -0.0189 -0.0174+ 
 
[0.0148] [0.0184] [0.0102] 
Exp_13-18*m -0.0168 -0.0198 -0.0272* 
 
[0.0114] [0.0160] [0.0113] 
Exp_19-24*m -0.0433* -0.0538* -0.0556* 
 
[0.0135] [0.0195] [0.0152] 
Case mix 
 
  
prev 0.7393* 0.7069* 0.8022* 
 
[0.1319] [0.1255] [0.1353] 
prev*m 0.0315 0.0066 -0.1707 
 
[0.2011] [0.2029] [0.1622] 
perio 0.6884* 0.6067* 0.7249* 
 
[0.0130] [0.0157] [0.0133] 
perio*m -0.0061 -0.0107 -0.0412* 
 
[0.0177] [0.0252] [0.0183] 
cons 1.1777* 1.1171* 1.1296* 
 
[0.0191] [0.0237] [0.0153] 
cons *m -0.0104 0.0093 -0.006 
 
[0.0262] [0.0307] [0.0221] 
surg 0.6270* 0.5853* 0.5860* 
 
[0.0157] [0.0184] [0.0133] 
surg*m 0.0345 0.0420+ 0.0054 
 
[0.0215] [0.0253] [0.0179] 
prosth 1.4709* 1.4328* 1.5015* 
 
[0.0262] [0.0265] [0.0259] 
prosth*m 0.1124* 0.1154* 0.0814* 
 
[0.0372] [0.0374] [0.0323] 
ortho 1.1838 1.084 0.9027 
 
[0.8175] [0.8124] [0.8024] 
ortho*m 0.8166 0.8483 1.2759 
 
[0.9958] [0.9856] [0.8106] 
other 0.0557+ 0.0019 0.0492* 
 
[0.0283] [0.0273] [0.0245] 
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other*m -0.026 -0.0141 -0.0276 
 
[0.0373] [0.0362] [0.0338] 
occasional 0.6180* 0.5185* 0.5662* 
 
[0.0494] [0.0526] [0.0398] 
occasional*m -0.0795 -0.0561 -0.1252* 
 
[0.0643] [0.0679] [0.0564] 
incomplete 0.6061* 0.5454* 0.5379* 
 
[0.0854] [0.0870] [0.0820] 
incomplete *m -0.1447 -0.1214 -0.0805 
 
[0.0970] [0.0980] [0.0891] 
misc -0.0225 -0.1043* -0.0316* 
 
[0.0196] [0.0258] [0.0158] 
misc*m 0.0034 0.0342 0.0308 
 
[0.0254] [0.0332] [0.0204] 
trauma 0.1125+ 0.1593 0.1333* 
 
[0.0681] [0.0969] [0.0558] 
trauma*m 0.0633 0.0402 -0.0327 
 
[0.0945] [0.1224] [0.0680] 
captreat (dropped) (dropped) -0.1690* 
   
[0.0160] 
captreat*m (dropped) (dropped) 1.8337* 
   
[0.0221] 
Remuneration 
 
  
sal Yes Yes Yes 
sa1*m Yes Yes Yes 
exempt 0.0896* 0.1288* 0.0985* 
 
[0.0163] [0.0209] [0.0126] 
exempt*m 0.0206 0.0188 -0.0042 
 
[0.0211] [0.0279] [0.0155] 
Patient characteristics   
page 0.0031* 0.0034+ -0.0036* 
 
[0.0011] [0.0017] [0.0010] 
page^2/100 -0.0048* -0.0061* 0.0013 
 
[0.0010] [0.0017] [0.0010] 
page*m -0.0016 -0.002 0.0004 
 
[0.0016] [0.0024] [0.0014] 
page^2/100*m 0.0021 0.0028 0.0008 
 
[0.0016] [0.0024] [0.0014] 
psex 0.0137* 0.0202* 0.0310* 
 
[0.0041] [0.0066] [0.0036] 
psex*m 0.0111* 0.0149+ 0.0054 
 
[0.0055] [0.0084] [0.0046] 
visitdur 0.0395* 0.0474*   
 
[0.0033] [0.0040]   
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visitdur^2/100 -0.1457* -0.1700* 
 
 
[0.0172] [0.0206]   
visitdur*m -0.0014 0.0003   
 
[0.0039] [0.0047]   
visitdur^2/100*m 0.0061 -0.0032   
 
[0.0203] [0.0249]   
Practice deprivation (ref. group: depcat4) 
depcat Yes Yes Yes 
depcat*m Yes Yes Yes 
Health board (ref. group: caid10) 
caid Yes Yes Yes 
caid*m Yes Yes Yes 
_cons 1.6412* 1.6841* 2.3256* 
 
[0.1077] [0.1192] [0.0957] 
F 4585.01 1928.44 4621.09 
r2 0.61 0.50 0.63 
r2_a 0.61 0.50 0.63 
r2_o 0.31 0.22 0.57 
r2_w 0.61 0.50 0.63 
r2_b 0.08 0.06 0.38 
N 211080 137191 425142 
N_g 261 261 264 
g_avg 808.74 525.64 1610.39 
F_fe 11.92 10.46 11.57 
sigma_u 0.68 0.77 0.30 
sigma_e 0.56 0.68 0.58 
rho 0.59 0.56 0.21 
For confidentiality reasons, we do not report coefficients on binary variables  and 
responding interaction variables that are identified with small number of dentists, such 
as dentist contract (sal, sal*m), practice deprivation (depcat, depcat*m) and NHS 
Health Board (caid, caid*m). 
       Standard errors are in square brackets.  
       * significant at the 5% level. 
       + significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
6.3.1 Absolute difference: auxiliary OLS regression 
 
So far, we implicitly assume that the treatments provided by migrant and non-migrant 
GDPs are identical after adjusting for observed heterogeneity across CoTs and dentist fixed 
effects. This is a standard assumption in the labour literature on internal migration, but it 
may not be suitable for our study where we compare migrant and non-migrant GDPs who 
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were trained in different dental education system; assessing the absolute differences 
between treatments provided by migrant and non-migrant GDPs over time is also an 
interesting question to explore. In this section, we recover the coefficient of the migrant 
dummy,  , by estimating an auxiliary regression of the estimated dentist fixed effects,   .  
The distributions of dentist fixed effects for migrant and non-migrant GDPs that are 
estimated from Specification A are plotted in Figure 6.4. It shows that migrant GDPs on 
average have higher fixed effects than non-migrants GDPs (t-statistics=-6.2326, 
Pr(|T|>|t|)=0.0000). It should also be noted that there is more variation, as measured by the 
coefficient of variation, in the distribution of non-migrant fixed effects compared with the 
distribution of migrant fixed effects, despite the fact that migrant GDPs came from different 
training and experience backgrounds.  
 
Figure 6.4: Distributions of dentist effects for migrant and non-migrant  
GDPs estimated from the dentist fixed effects specification. 
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Following Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999), henceforth AKM, we recover the 
persistent effect of migrant status,  , by decomposing the estimated dentist fixed effects 
into two components:   
                  (6.3) 
giving a simplified version of Equation (6.2) 
    (    )                    (6.4) 
where      is a set of all observable characteristics that vary across dentists and CoTs;    
measures persistent variation in treatment supply among dentists;    is the unobservable 
component of dentist fixed effects; and    is a vector of observable characteristics that is 
invariant or rarely changing for dentists over different CoTs. We can now capture the 
treatment difference between migrant and non-migrant GDPs using  (    ) for each six 
months following entry.  
The estimates of   can be recovered using an auxiliary OLS regression by making 
an additional random effects assumption that    and   are orthogonal (AKM, 1999).  This 
is generally a strong assumption in a sense that migrant GDPs may be motivated in a 
different way as compared with their native counterparts. However, since this study aims to 
measure the differences in treatments  provided by migrant and non-migrant GDPs, 
regardless of whether this is due to   or   , and the extent to which such a differential 
arises from each component is beyond the scope of this chapter. The migrant coefficient 
could also be biased if the auxiliary regression omits variables that are simultaneously 
correlated with    and   (Plümper and Troeger, 2004). In this case, the estimated migrant 
effect can be composed of a number of components; the pure migrant effect, the part of the 
effect of    correlated with migrant status, and the part of the effect of    correlated with 
the omitted variable which happens to be correlated with  . We make the identification 
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assumption that none of the observed variable excluded from the auxiliary regression is 
simultaneously correlated with    and   . This is reasonable given the rich set of 
explanatory variables we control for in the auxiliary regression. 
As fixed effects methods only use time variations within each cross-sectional 
observation, between-variations for certain variables could also be taken up by the fixed 
effects (Cornelißen and Hübler, 2007). Thus the auxiliary regression includes time-
invariant variables (e.g. the dentist‟s migrant status, age-at-entry and gender)22, and also a 
set of variables that are rarely changing within each dentist (e.g. the dentist‟s contract 
(salaried or not), the deprivation category of the practice location, and the health board that 
the dentist worked in at the first treatment)
23
. Given the small number of dentists in the 
sample, we combine both the deprivation and health board categories that contain few 
dentists together to avoid collinearity. These variables are jointly significantly different 
from zero (F(33,227)=247.89, Prob>F=0.0000), and explain 74% of the variance of dentist 
effects obtained from the dentist fixed effects model (R-squared=0.74).  
Table 6.5 presents coefficient estimates and robust standard errors of the auxiliary 
OLS regression. The coefficient on the migrant dummy suggests that, after controlling for 
observed variables that are invariant or rarely changing, a foreign GDP provides 11.47% 
more treatment than a comparable local trainee during the 2
nd
 six months after entry, but 
this estimate is not statistically significant (P= 0.667). We find no significant variations by 
dentists‟ age-at-entry and gender. Again, dentist contract, practice deprivation and Health 
Board on entry have significant effects on dentist fixed effects, but cannot be reported due 
to confidentiality reasons.  
                                                 
22
 Time-invariant variables explain only 12% of the variance of dentist effects estimated. 
23
 This assumes that characteristics of the dentist contract and their practice on entry have a persistent impact 
on their fixed effect.  
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Table 6.5: Estimation results of the auxiliary OLS regression. 
Initial difference  
  
m 0.1147  
  
 
[0.2662]  
  
Dentist characteristics  
  
enterage -0.0003  enterage*m -0.0028 
 
[0.0074]  
 
[0.0083] 
dsex -0.0044  dsex*m -0.0125 
 
[0.0392]  
 
[0.0773] 
Remuneration 
 
 
  
sal Yes  sal*m Yes 
Grouped practice deprivation (ref. group: depcat4) 
depcat Yes  depcat*m Yes 
Grouped health board (ref. group: caid5) 
 
caid Yes  caid*m Yes 
_cons 0.3525+  
  
 
[0.2117]  
  
F 247.89  r2 0.74 
N 261  r2_a 0.70 
For confidentiality reasons, we do not report coefficients on binary variables and 
responding interaction variables that are identified with small number of dentists, such as 
dentist contract (sal, sal*m), practice deprivation (depcat, depcat*m) and NHS Health 
Board (caid, caid*m). 
Standard errors are in square brackets.  
* significant at the 5% level. 
+ significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
6.3.2 Patient effects: two dimensional fixed effects specification 
 
Another fundamental assumption of the dentist fixed effects specification is homogeneous 
patients. However, AKM (1999) emphasise the importance of personal and firm 
heterogeneities, in their case, in the compensation determination using French linked 
employer-employee data and assert that omitting either of these effects can give rise to 
aggregation biases and omitted-variable biases. When patient effects,   , are omitted, the 
estimated coefficients on the time-varying characteristics,   , equal the true coefficients,  , 
plus an omitted variable bias that depends upon the conditional covariance between      
and   , given   . The bias is generally nonzero as patients with certain characteristics (e.g., 
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exempted from payment) may have different level of demand for treatment than others. 
And the estimated dentist fixed effect,   
 , equals the pure dentist effect,   , plus an 
aggregation bias which is made up of a weighted average of    for all patients who have 
ever been treated by dentist j, conditional on     . Thus, the migrant dentist effect 
recovered from the auxiliary regression of  
 , can not only be related to the variations in 
treatment provision between the two types of dentists per se (the average of dentist effects), 
but also to the variations in treatment demand by the patients treated by them respectively 
(weighted average of patient effects). Given the different dentist contracts and distributions 
of practice deprivation, the patients treated by migrant and non-migrant dentists are likely 
to have different dental health and treatment demand, and thereby bias the estimates of 
migrant dentist effects. 
Thus, we exploit the matched (patient and dentist) structure of the data, and 
consider a two dimensional fixed effects specification controlling for dentist effects and 
patient effects together. Consider a simplified version of Equation (6.1): 
    (    )                          (6.5) 
   {
          
          
 
where       is a set of observable explanatory variables that vary across patient, dentist and 
different CoTs;       measures persistent variation in treatment demand/supply among 
patients/dentists, which is arising from not only unobserved patient-/dentist-specific effects, 
     , but also observed variables that are invariant or rarely changing for patients/dentists 
over different CoTs,      . The random error,      , is orthogonal to all explanatory 
variables, including    and    . This assumption is standard in the applied econometric 
literature (AKM, 1999; Andrews, Schank, and Upward, 2006; Cornelißen, 2006) and 
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implies strict exogenous mobility by patients. This model produces consistent and unbiased 
estimates by explicitly allowing for observable and unobservable heterogeneity in both 
dimensions and unrestricted correlation among the effects. 
The fixed effects method of estimating three-way error-component models was first 
introduced by AKM (1999), and developed in a more practical context by Andrews, Schank 
and Upward (2006). For researchers who are interested in consistent estimates of 
coefficients on observed time-varying variables (    ), the practical and easy solution is the 
spell fixed effects method, which is essentially to time-demean within each patient-dentist 
combination. However, this method only allows the recovery of the sum (     ), rather 
than each separately. On the other hand, for researchers who are also interested in obtaining 
consistent estimates of    and   , the suitable solution would be to include dummy 
variables for the j-level heterogeneity and sweep out the i-level heterogeneity by the fixed 
effects transformation, called “FEiLSDVj” (Andrews, Schank and Upward, 2006). Since a 
particular concern of this paper is on the estimation of the dentist effects   from which the 
migrant effect can be isolated, we implement the latter method using a memory saving 
Stata module “felsdvreg” written by Cornelißen (2006).  
The FEiLSDVj model places too great demand on our data to be well identified. 
Patient effects are identified by repeated observations on the patient, while dentist effects 
are identified by patients who change dentists during the sample period, called “movers”. 
The two levels of effects can only be individually identified if patients move between 
dentists. In our case, treatment histories must be sufficiently connected: no dentist effects 
can be identified for dentists without movers. However, the nature of our analysis is such 
that acquiring such a sample might be difficult. The three-way error-component model 
needs representative information on dentists and patients. If we took a random sample of 
162 
 
 
patients we would have fewer observations on the dentists we are interested in. To ensure 
there is no bias in terms of switching patients, we would have to identify all dentists who 
saw the patients treated by migrant and DVT GDPs during the sample period, whether or 
not they were migrants or DVT GDPs. We did this for a 5% random sample of all patients. 
The number of observations on migrant and DVT GDPs decreases to 13,922 and 5,344, 
respectively; but with 72,618 claims made on behalf of the same patients by other GDPs. 
These all suggest that while the three-way error-component model may be an option in 
principle, it may not be all that appropriate for the migrant analysis.  
Our sample is generated by extracting all information on the two groups of GDPs 
we are interested in. On the patient dimension, we only take into account the treatments 
which are provided by each matching-dentist under observation, as any services provided 
by other dentists are not recorded. Table 6.6 gives an overview of the estimation sample. 
Patients in the sample have only 1.89 observations on average, with 55,947 out of 111,580 
(50.1%) receiving treatment just the once and 103,779 (93.0%) staying with only one 
dentist. Andrews, Gill and Upward (2006) discuss the bias in the estimation of the 
correlation between firm effects and worker effects. They find in their study, a negative 
relationship between the bias and the number of movers, i.e. the higher worker mobility 
that each firm experiences, the less biased is the estimate. Based on this conclusion, 
Cornelißen and Hübler (2007) restrict their analysis to firms with at least 5 movers and 
workers with at least 2 observations. Following the same methodology, we generate a 
refined sample which includes 118,108 CoTs provided by 122 migrant and 50 non-migrant 
GDPs and to 42,854 patients in total. However, even though the refined sample excludes 
those dentists and patients for whom fixed effects are poorly estimated, estimates may still 
not be very precise, given the relatively small number of CoTs received by each patient 
(2.76) and of patients who changed dentists (7,689, or 17.94%) over the sample period. 
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Table 6.6: Identification of the two dimensional fixed effects models. 
 Full Sample Refined sample 
 CoTs Patients Dentists CoTs Patients Dentists 
 211080 111580 261 118108 42854 172 
Identification of patient effects           
  Obs. per patient:           
1 55947 (26.5%) 55947 (50.1%)   NA NA   
2 59382 (28.1%) 29691 (26.6%)   46884 (39.7%) 23442 (54.7%)   
3 46356 (22.0%) 15452 (13.9%)   35037 (29.7%) 11679 (27.3%)   
4 25092 (11.9%) 6273 (5.6%)   18888 (16.0%) 4722 (11.0%)   
5+ 24303 (11.5%) 4217 (3.8%)   17299 (14.6%) 3011 (7.0%)   
Identification of dentist effects           
  Dentists per patient           
1 187106 (88.6%) 103779 (93.0%)   94441( 80.0%) 35165 (82.1%)   
2 22272 (10.6%) 7409 (6.6%)   21985 (18.6%) 7303 (17.0%)   
3+ 1702 (0.8%) 392 (0.4%)   1682 (1.4%) 386 (0.9%)   
  Movers 23974 (11.4%) 7801 (7.0%)   23667 (20.0%) 7689 (17.9%)   
  Movers per dentist           
0 10708 (5.1%)   33 (12.6%) NA   NA 
1-5 35870 (17.0%)   58 (22.2%) 3543 (3.0%)   8 (4.7%) 
6-10 20968 (9.9%)   26 (10.0%) 14335 (12.1%)   25 (14.5%) 
11-20 32299 (15.3%)   40 (15.3%) 19746 (16.7%)   38 (22.1%) 
21-30 10849 (5.1%)   13 (5.0%) 7128 (6.0%)   11 (6.4%) 
31-50 14834 (7.0%)   17 (6.5%) 9275 (7.9%)   16 (9.3%) 
51-100 20278 (9.6%)   16 (6.1%) 16223 (13.7%)   16 (9.3%) 
100+ 65274 (30.9%)   58(22.2%) 47858 (40.5%)   58 (33.7%) 
  Groups           
1 199859 105734 224 117629 42650  168 
2 436 350 2 323 134  2 
3 77 66 2 156 70  2 
 
For both samples, dentists with movers are divided into 3 “groups”, where each 
group is defined by patient mobility such that patients only receive treatment from dentists 
within the same group. Within each group, one dentist is arbitrarily selected as the 
reference with no dentist effect identified, and the other dentist effects represent the 
deviation from the reference. Therefore, dentist effects are not comparable across groups 
because dentists in different groups are characterised on different references. We base the 
corresponding auxiliary analysis of dentist effects on the largest group which contains 224 
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and 168 dentists in the two samples respectively, contributing 94.7% and 99.6% of total 
observations.  
Table 6.7 presents results of fitting the two dimensional fixed effects specification 
on the full sample (Specification 2), and the refined sample (Specification 3) which yields 
relatively better identified coefficient estimates. Standard errors are corrected for both 
heteroskedasticity across patients and within-patient correlation using robust cluster 
variance estimation. For comparison, estimation results of the dentist fixed effects 
specification are also reported as Specification 1. 
Table 6.7: Estimation results across specifications controlling for dentist effects, or 
both dentist effects and patient effects. 
 
FEj FEiLSDVj 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
  
full sample refined sample 
I. Fixed effects regression 
  
Assimilation estimates (ref.: Exp_7-12) 
  
Exp_2-6 -0.0113 -0.0244+ -0.0230 
 
[0.0093] [0.0138] [0.0151] 
Exp_13-18 0.0086 0.0156* 0.0154+ 
 
[0.0071] [0.0076] [0.0086] 
Exp_19-24 0.0156* 0.0225* 0.0281* 
 
[0.0077] [0.0083] [0.0093] 
Exp_2-6*m -0.0136 0.0028 0.0038 
 
[0.0148] [0.0201] [0.0201] 
Exp_13-18*m -0.0168 -0.0238+ -0.0280* 
 
[0.0114] [0.0121] [0.0121] 
Exp_19-24*m -0.0433* -0.0413* -0.0509* 
 
[0.0135] [0.0136] [0.0135] 
Case mix 
   
prev 0.7393* 0.7688* 1.1192* 
 
[0.1319] [0.1471] [0.1890] 
prev*m 0.0315 -0.1103 -0.4114 
 
[0.2011] [0.2935] [0.2908] 
perio 0.6884* 0.6841* 0.6942* 
 
[0.0130] [0.0086] [0.0099] 
perio*m -0.0061 0.0345* 0.0226+ 
 
[0.0177] [0.0133] [0.0134] 
cons 1.1777* 1.1436* 1.1417* 
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[0.0191] [0.0092] [0.0099] 
cons *m -0.0104 -0.0028 0.0017 
 
[0.0262] [0.0135] [0.0134] 
surg 0.6270* 0.6051* 0.6032* 
 
[0.0157] [0.0162] [0.0169] 
surg*m 0.0345 0.0496* 0.0607* 
 
[0.0215] [0.0232] [0.0225] 
prosth 1.4709* 1.4619* 1.4493* 
 
[0.0262] [0.0228] [0.0236] 
prosth*m 0.1124* 0.0787* 0.0995* 
 
[0.0372] [0.0327] [0.0315] 
ortho 1.1838 1.8598+ 2.2181+ 
 
[0.8175] [1.0029] [1.1735] 
ortho*m 0.8166 (dropped) (dropped) 
 
[0.9958] 
  
other 0.0557+ 0.0041 -0.0452* 
 
[0.0283] [0.0167] [0.0182] 
other*m -0.026 -0.0203 0.0234 
 
[0.0373] [0.0239] [0.0240] 
occasional 0.6180* 0.3656* 0.3388* 
 
[0.0494] [0.1068] [0.1164] 
occasional*m -0.0795 0.0387 0.0328 
 
[0.0643] [0.1315] [0.1315] 
incomplete 0.6061* 0.4934* 0.4904* 
 
[0.0854] [0.0853] [0.0806] 
incomplete *m -0.1447 -0.1274 -0.1405 
 
[0.0970] [0.0985] [0.0914] 
misc -0.0225 -0.0702+ -0.1082* 
 
[0.0196] [0.0374] [0.0510] 
misc*m 0.0034 -0.0245 0.0163 
 
[0.0254] [0.0552] [0.0626] 
trauma 0.1125+ -0.0090 0.0474 
 
[0.0681] [0.1227] [0.1266] 
trauma*m 0.0633 0.1571 0.1449 
 
[0.0945] [0.1907] [0.2109] 
Remuneration 
   
sal Yes Yes Yes 
sa1*m Yes Yes Yes 
exempt 0.0896* 0.1413* 0.1710* 
 
[0.0163] [0.0354] [0.046] 
exempt*m 0.0206 0.0036 -0.0246 
 
[0.0211] [0.0517] [0.0576] 
Patient characteristics 
   
page 0.0031* -0.0213+ -0.0236+ 
 
[0.0011] [0.0123] [0.0130] 
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page^2/100 -0.0048* 0.0104 0.0129 
 
[0.0010] [0.0130] [0.0138] 
page*m -0.0016 -0.0057 -0.0058 
 
[0.0016] [0.0127] [0.0118] 
page^2/100*m 0.0021 0.0083 0.0077 
 
[0.0016] [0.0135] [0.0125] 
psex 0.0137* 
  
 
[0.0041] 
  
psex*m 0.0111* 
  
 
[0.0055] 
  
visitdur 0.0395* 0.0473* 0.0407* 
 
[0.0033] [0.0035] [0.0039] 
visitdur^2/100 -0.1457* -0.1950* -0.1688* 
 
[0.0172] [0.0266] [0.0288] 
visitdur*m -0.0014 -0.0001 0.0066 
 
[0.0039] [0.0050] [0.0050] 
visitdur^2/100*m 0.0061 -0.0102 -0.0352 
 
[0.0203] [0.0367] [0.0365] 
Practice deprivation (ref.: depcat4) 
  
Depcat Yes Yes Yes 
depcat*m Yes Yes Yes 
Health board (ref.: caid10) 
  
caid Yes Yes Yes 
caid*m Yes Yes Yes 
_cons 1.6412* 
  
 
[0.1077] 
  
F 4585.01 
  
r2 0.61 
  
r2_a 0.61 
  
r2_o 0.31 
  
r2_w 0.61 0.57 0.57 
r2_b 0.08 
  
N 211080 211080 118108 
N_g 261 111580 42854 
g_avg 808.74 1.89 2.76 
F_f 12.15 1.10 1.13 
F_fp 
 
1.07 1.10 
F_ff 
 
2.54 2.71 
sigma_u 0.68 0.55 0.56 
sigma_e 0.56 
  
rho 0.59 
  
Cov(lf107,xb) / Var(lf107) 
 
0.46 0.57 
Cov(lf107,pfe) / Var(lf107) 
 
0.24 0.14 
Cov(lf107,dfe / Var(lf107) 
 
0.14 0.06 
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Cov(lf107,res) / Var(lf107) 
 
0.17 0.24 
II. Auxiliary OLS regression 
  
Initial difference 
   
m 0.1147 1.7406+ 1.6776 
 
[0.2662] [1.0270] [1.2356] 
Dentist characteristics       
enterage -0.0003 0.0456 0.0369 
 
[0.0074] [0.0335] [0.0433] 
enterage*m -0.0028 -0.047 -0.0384 
 
[0.0083] [0.0352] [0.0444] 
dsex -0.0044 0.1181 0.2037 
 
[0.0392] [0.1813] [0.2227] 
dsex*m -0.0125 -0.2728 -0.292 
 
[0.0773] [0.2459] [0.2717] 
Remuneration 
   
sal Yes Yes Yes 
sal*m Yes Yes Yes 
Grouped practice deprivation (ref.: depcat4) 
  
depcat Yes Yes Yes 
depcat*m Yes Yes Yes 
Grouped health board (ref.: caid10) 
  
caid Yes Yes Yes 
caid*m Yes Yes Yes 
_cons 0.3525+ -1.1600 -0.9793 
 
[0.2117] [0.9301] [1.1756] 
F 247.89 150.43 105.46 
r2 0.74 0.86 0.83 
r2_a 0.70 0.84 0.79 
N 261 224 168 
For confidentiality reasons, we do not report coefficients on binary variables and 
responding interaction variables that are identified with small number of dentists, such 
as dentist contract(sal, sal*m), practice deprivation (depcat, depcat*m) and NHS 
Health Board (caid, caid*m). 
 Standard errors are in square brackets.  
* significant at the 5% level. 
+ significant at the 10% level. 
 
Both types of unobserved heterogeneity are important in determining the treatment 
delivery. F-tests that patient effects and dentist effects are individually and jointly equal to 
zero are rejected on both samples – F(111579,99212)=1.07 & Prob>F=0, 
F(225,99212)=2.54 & Prob>F=0 and F(111804,99212)=1.1 & Prob>F=0 for Specification 
2; F(43022,75026)=1.1 &Prob>F=0, F(169, 75026)=2.71 & Prob>F=0,  and F(43022, 
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75026)=1.13 & Prob>F=0 for Specification 3). In particular, the patient-specific 
heterogeneity appears to play a relatively more important role than the dentist-specific. 
Dentist and patient effects estimated on the full sample account for 14% and 24% of the 
variation in treatment value, respectively (    (       )    (    ) ⁄ = 0.14, 
   (       )    (    )⁄  = 0.24). After excluding those dentists and patients for whom 
fixed effects are poorly estimated, the variations explained by fixed effects reduce to 6% 
for dentists and 14% by patients (    (       )    (    ) ⁄ = 0.06, 
   (       )    (    )⁄  = 0.14). 
Following each specification of fixed effects estimates, coefficient estimates and 
robust standard errors of the auxiliary OLS regression are reported in Panel II of Table 6.7. 
Having accounted for patient effects, the explanatory ability of the auxiliary regression, as 
measured by the R-squared value, increases from 74% to 86% in the full sample, and 83% 
in the refined sample. Consistent with the dentist fixed effects specification, only the 
unreported dentist contract, practice deprivation and Health Board on entry have significant 
effects on dentist fixed effects. 
The two dimensional fixed effects specification is required to estimate a patient 
fixed effects model including dentist dummies. Dentist-specific fixed effects therefore, may 
not be well identified given the small number of patients switching dentists over the short 
sample period of two years. The coefficient estimate of the migrant dummy in the auxiliary 
regression increases from 0.1147 (Specification 1) to 1.7406 (Specification 2). Given that 
the dentist effects specification attributes variation arisen from patient types to dentist 
effects, this could be indicative of lower fixed effects of patients registered with migrant 
GDPs compared with those with non-migrant dentists. However, the coefficient is apparent 
implausibly large, and it is likely due to the inaccurate identification of the two dimensional 
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fixed effects model. Fitting on the refined sample makes no substantial difference, and the 
coefficient magnitude reduces very small (1.6776). Figure 6.5 illustrates the range of 
dentist effects estimated from the two dimensional fixed effects specification on both 
samples.  
 
Figure 6.5: Distributions of dentist effects for migrant and non-migrant GDPs estimated 
from the two dimensional fixed effects specification on two samples. 
 
Effects of variables with insufficient within-patient variations over the short sample 
period may also not be precisely determined. For example, patient age, exempt status, the 
practice deprivation and Health Board the patient resides in, and some particular treatment 
categories that that are either never or always, required by each particular patient (e.g. 
preventive, orthodontic, occasional, „incomplete‟, „miscellaneous‟ treatment, and treatment 
arose from trauma). Nevertheless, this is not the case for the main variables of interest.  
Common treatment categories are generally estimated with very similar coefficients 
and significance when compared with the dentist fixed effects specifications, except „other‟ 
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treatment. Including patient effects induces a smaller effect of „other‟ treatment, for which 
a possible explanation is that patients who receive „other‟ treatment have higher patient 
effects than those do not. Furthermore, we find migrant and non-migrant GDPs deliver 
different treatment for various treatment categories after controlling patient effects: an F-
test that interaction variables between migrant dummy and treatment category indicators 
are jointly equal to zero is rejected at the 5% of significant level on both samples 
(P=0.0210 and 0.0038). Besides prosthetic treatment indicated in the dentist fixed effects 
specification, migrant GDPs also provide significantly more treatment for periodontal and 
surgical treatment than a comparable non-migrant GDPs.  
Finally, and most importantly, estimates of the interaction terms            
demonstrate a consistent assimilation process of migrant GDPs across specifications. Table 
6.7 suggests the treatment difference reduces by similar amount during the period between 
the 7
th
 and the 24
th
 month (4.33%, 4.13% and 5.09%, respectively) and all at the 5% level 
of significance.   
 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
 
As a flexible and low-cost adjustment to temporary or regional imbalance, overseas 
qualified health professionals have made a significant and escalating contribution to health 
workforce in industrialized countries. This work, for the first time to our knowledge, 
evaluates the impact of international recruitment on the healthcare provision in the host 
country by comparing the treatment provided by migrant and non-migrant health 
professionals.   
The treatments provided by all migrant dentists who started providing dental 
services in the service after 2006 are compared with the treatment provided by a 
comparison group consisting of the recently domestically trained dentists who subsequently 
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worked in the GDS. A difference-in-differences model is estimated to examine whether 
migrant GDPs respond differently to case mix and individual circumstances (treatment 
category, patient type, remuneration, etc.), and after adjusting for observed variables and 
dentist fixed effects, how their treatment differences vary with time. Given the longitudinal 
nature of the data, we control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity in dentists using 
fixed effects method. Our results provide evidence that migrant GDPs have marginally 
different practice styles as compared to non-migrants. Compared with non-migrant GDPs 
with comparable characteristics, migrant dentists provide significantly different values of 
treatments only for patients who require prosthetic treatments and for male patients. In the 
dentist fixed effects model, the treatment difference at the reference experience category is 
eliminated together with dentist fixed effects and cannot be directly identified. Holding 
dentist fixed effects constant, there is evidence that their treatment difference diminishes 
with time spent in the GDS. Using the 2
nd
 six months of practice as the reference group, we 
find a consistent assimilation process across different specifications: the treatment 
differences reduces significantly by around 5% during the period from the 7
th
 to 24
th
 month.     
The treatment difference at the reference experience category is also recovered by 
estimating an auxiliary OLS regression of estimated dentist effects against a set of variables 
that are time-invariant or rarely changing. We find migrant GDPs provide 11.47% more 
treatment than non-migrant GDPs during the 2
nd
 six months after entry, but this is not 
statistically significant.  
The matched (patient and practitioner) longitudinal nature of the data also allows us 
to control more extensively for potential aggregation and omitted-variable biases by 
omitting persistent unobservable variations among patients, or patient effects than existing 
studies. This was done by estimating a three-way error-component model capturing 
unobserved heterogeneity in both patients and dentists. Our results suggest both types of 
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unobserved heterogeneity play important roles in determining the intensity of individual 
treatment and should therefore, be controlled for together in the intensity function. 
However, dentist effects, as well as effects of certain variables, may not be very well 
determined given the small proportion of patients switching between dentists/variables 
during the two-year sample period. Fitting on a refined sample which excludes dentists and 
patients with poorly estimated fixed effects makes no obvious improvement. Nevertheless, 
the main variables of interest, such as assimilation estimates and treatment categories that 
are commonly delivered, are generally precisely estimated, and suggest a consistent 
assimilation process except that migrant GDPs provide significant different treatment on 
various treatment categories than non-migrant GDPs when controlling for patients‟ 
underlying dental conditions. Updating the sample with a longer sample period to allow for 
sufficient patient mobility is essential for better estimates in future research. 
Treatment delivered by the two groups of GDPs is compared in terms of the total 
value of the CoT. In the realm of dental service, where in the presence of asymmetric 
information dentists have considerable discretion over the type of service they deliver, it is 
hard to decide whether the high value of treatment is of benefit to patients or simply 
financially motivated. It is not necessary that non-migrant GDPs provide the “standard” 
value of treatment, or better quality of service. However, as international recruitment 
becomes increasingly popular in OECD countries as a flexible and low-cost adjustment to 
temporary or regional workforce imbalance, it is clearly an important public concern to 
study if patients treated by migrant GDPs receive treatment at levels that are consistent with 
that provided by non-migrant GDPs or not is also an important public concern. Our 
findings do not show any evidence of this concern and suggest that migrant GDPs have 
marginally different practice styles as compared to non-migrants and exhibit significant 
convergence to their non-migrant counterparts during the first two years following entry.   
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
The migration issue has achieved prominence in health labour markets in recent years, 
especially within the European Union area since the May 2004 and December 2007 EU 
enlargements. In some developed countries, such as the United Kingdom for example, 
international recruitment has become an effective solution to short-term health workforce 
shortages. In this context, there has been growing interest in explaining and assessing the 
impact of health professional migration (Bach, 2003; WHO, 2006). This, however, has 
been rarely addressed in the health policy literature due to the general lack of data related to 
migrant health professionals. The research in this thesis begins to fill the gap by (1) 
examining the migration and permanent residence decisions of health professionals and the 
influcneses behind those decisions in a theoretical model framework; and (2) assessing the 
impact of health professional migration on the host country by investigating EEA dentist 
performance in the Scottish NHS using administrative data derived from the Scottish dental 
system. 
To provide a systematic explantion for health professional migration, individual 
motivation needs to be recast to recognize the important role of institutions in generating 
and sustaining the movement (Bach, 2003; Commander, Kangasniemi and Winters, 2002; 
Manning and Sidorenko, 2007). The self-selection model by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) 
provides an appropriate basis for our analytical framework, and it was therefore, extended 
in Chapter 3 to explicitly account for the strong sector-specific properties migrant health 
professionals have exhibited. Some of these include the investment motivation of 
professional development and training, and stringent regulatory regimes in the health 
sector. The extended model suggests that countries with higher international recognition for 
the health service delivery and training systems are in general more popular in the 
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international health labour markets, while professionals‟ intention to remain permanently 
reduces when the duration of contracts and visas extends. We also exploited the effects of 
institution variables by assuming migration costs vary among professionals with different 
skill levels. Take the UK for example. The country-to-country campaigns may foster a 
further inflow of health professionals from targeted donor countries, while government 
intervention on permanent residence may be recommended to avoid a brain drain. In 
addition, the restrictive relicensing regime and the change of the immigration rules for non-
EEA health professionals that are targeted to maintain practice standards and secure 
employment opportunities for native graduates, could actually limit the migration only from 
countries with higher returns to skills. However, this effect is ambiguous for most donor 
countries, which in general provide lower returns to skills. 
The general policy suggestion is to adopt performance-based payment mechanisms 
and increase remuneration differences between grades in order to restrict the outflow of 
high-skilled native health professionals and the inflow of low-skilled foreign professionals. 
Alternatively, governments could achieve positive selection by reducing migration costs for 
high-skilled professionals by, for example, higher relicensing requirements and increasing 
competition in the labour market. Unfortunately, with the data available it is impossible to 
provide a more accurate and comprehensive assessment of influences on the size and skill 
composition of the migration flow. Collecting individual data of health professionals in 
donor countries is essential to develop empirical evidence and appropriate strategies for 
regulating and monitoring the migration of health professionals in future. 
Having access to the administrative data derived from the Scottish dental system, 
we also examined the impact of health professional migration within EU on the host 
country by investigating the performance of dentists migrating from EC/EEA countries 
contracted under the Scottish NHS in terms of retention and treatment provision. In the 
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retention chapter, we characterized the time trend of retention for EEA dentists in the 
Scottish GDS and identified factors associated with the likelihood of a dentist leaving the 
service using discrete-time proportional hazards modelling. Taking the sample of EEA 
nationals who entered the Scottish GDS during 1996-2005, we find half the EEA dentists 
had left the service by the 26th month following entry. Furthermore, the detailed data allow 
us to gain a better understanding of retention decisions by investigating a full range of 
potential determinants of retention duration that are rarely available in other datasets. The 
results indicate an inverse U-shaped relation between the hazard of leaving and time since 
entry, which peaks through the third practice year. We also find hazards of leaving the 
service are lower for migrants who join the service at around age 36, who arrive after 2003, 
and who treat less middle aged (around age 38) and male patients requiring more intensive 
treatment. The hazards are not associated with dentists‟ gender and original country, and 
practice deprivation.  
These findings potentially help to set evidence-based targets for international 
recruitment programmes and identify those practices with difficulties in the dentist labour 
market. However, keep in mind of the limitations present in the data we have used, policy 
suggestions should be made with caution. Constrained by the small number of migrant 
dentists practising in Scotland, the reliability of the coefficients may not be high. We 
combined categorical variables and modelled the duration dependency using a quadratic 
function of time to preserve degrees of freedom, and estimated a series of specifications 
including various flexible baseline functions and unobserved heterogeneity distribution for 
robustness checks, which generally identified a common set of risk factors. A further 
concern is to what extent the entrants of 1996-2005 in our sample are representative of all 
EEA dentists in Scotland many of whom entered after a series of NHS access schemes 
launched since 2006. The endogeneity of dentist overall treatment provision in the retention 
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decision is another issue which warrants further investigation using a large sample. 
Collecting a new sample including the latest entrants with a longer sample period is 
necessary for further investigation. On the whole, whilst this study focuses on EEA dentists 
working in the Scottish GDS and the data limit the policy implication of the work, our 
methodology can be applied on suitable data to address many retention issues for healthcare 
professionals. 
In Chapter 6, we compared the output of migrant and non-migrant health 
professionals to evaluate the impact of international recruitment on the healthcare provision 
in the host country. This has never yet been attempted before to the best of our knowledge. 
We compared the treatment provided by all migrant dentists who started providing dental 
services in the GDS after 2006 with the treatment provided by a comparison group 
consisting of the 2005/06 cohort of Scottish DVTs. Given the longitudinal nature of the 
data, we estimated a difference-in-differences model controlling for time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity in dentists to examine whether migrant GDPs respond differently 
to case mix and individual circumstances (treatment category, patient type, remuneration, 
etc.), and how they assimilate into the host country. Our results suggest that, compared with 
non-migrant GDPs with comparable characteristics, migrant GDPs have marginally 
different practice styles, providing significantly different value of treatment only for 
patients who require prosthetic treatment and for male patients. The initial treatment 
difference at the reference (2nd) practice month cannot be identified in the dentist fixed 
effects model. Holding dentist fixed effects fixed, there is evidence that their treatment 
difference diminishes with time spent in the GDS.  
As international recruitment becomes commonly used within OECD countries as a 
flexible and low-cost adjustment to temporary or regional imbalance, whether patients 
registered with migrant and non-migrant healthcare professionals receive consistent 
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services is clearly an important concern. Our findings provide evidence that there is 
significant convergence in practice style of migrant and non-migrant dentists over time 
during the first two years following entry.  
The treatment difference at the reference practice month is also recovered by 
estimating an auxiliary OLS regression of dentist effects estimated against a set of variables 
that are time-invariant or rarely changing. We find migrant GDPs provide 11.47% more 
treatment than non-migrant GDPs during the 2
nd
 six months after entry, but this is not 
statistically significant. Another concern is the potential aggregation and omitted-variable 
biases by omitting persistent unobservable variations among patients, or patient effects. The 
matched (patient and practitioner) longitudinal nature of the data allows us to control more 
extensively than existing studies. We estimated a three-way error-component model 
capturing unobserved heterogeneity in both patients and dentists. Our results suggest both 
types of unobserved heterogeneity play important roles in determining the intensity of 
individual treatment. However, we acknowledge that the two dimensional fixed effects 
model may not be very well determined given the relative small proportion of sample 
patients switching between dentists.  Although the estimation sample is refined by 
excluding dentists and patients with poorly estimated fixed effects to improves estimation, 
updating the sample with a longer sample period to allow for sufficient patient mobility is 
essential for better estimates in future research. 
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